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Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shiftsfromfresh airto
poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians,
even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise
andfall of our democraticfaith.,
I. INTRODUCTION
As a cure for what ails democracy in a pluralistic modem society, such as
ours, Michael Sandel recommends "dispersing" sovereignty to a "multiplicity
of [civic republican] communities-some more, some less extensive than
nations.",2 He intimates that doing this "may entail according greater cultural
and political autonomy to subnational communities," which, in turn might
"ease the strife that arises when state sovereignty is an all-or-nothing affair,
absolute and indivisible, the only meaningful form of self determination., 3 He
sees in federalism not just a "theory of intergovernmental relations," but a
"political vision" that "self-government works best when sovereignty is
4
dispersed and citizenship formed across multiple sites of civic engagement."
Although Sandel appears not to have had American Indian tribes in mind when
he made these comments, his thoughts have interesting implications for tribes,
whose members have retained separate cultural and political identities despite
concerted efforts to assimilate them into American society.
From first contact, Indian tribes have been in danger of being assimilated
into American society, thereby losing their separate political and cultural6
identity. The only thing preventing this has been the tribes' unextinguished
claim to sovereignty-"the right [to be both] self-governing, [and] to exercise

'Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,
62

YALE
L.J. 348,390 (1953).
2
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 345 (1996).

3

1d. at 345-46.

4

5

d. at 347.

Sandel's list includes Catalans, Kurds, Scots, and Quebecois. Id. at 345.
6By way of comparison, "Canadian law [has] traditionally viewed settlement and the
assertion of British sovereignty as extinguishing [Indian tribal] sovereignty." Patrick Macklem,
DistributingSovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45

STAN.

L. REV. 1311, 1320

(1993). "[W]hile British policy towards the native population was based on respect for their right
to occupy their traditional lands ... there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty
and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown." R. v.
Sparrow, [1990] S.C.R. 1075, 1103.
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dominion over land.",7 The federal government's failure to protect tribes'
unique status and communal identities has seriously eroded the tribes' land
base, and with it, their ability to self-govern. This has left tribes, which have
resisted assimilation, outside our society-without the power to resist its
intrusions, share in its benefits, or contribute to its evolution.
Federal Indian policy-beset from its beginning by recurring paradoxes,
inconsistencies, and conflicting national and tribal objectives-reflects our
ambivalence toward the concept of tribal sovereignty. At various times,
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the field of Indian law provided some measure
of protection for tribal sovereignty against the changing whims of
Congressional policy. Yet, in recent years, the Court has seriously eroded even
these modest protections.8
As a nation, we have never done the hard work of trying to incorporate
the concept of tribes as distinct sovereigns into our federal structure of
government. 9 Tribal cultures remain strong in the face of powerfully negative
political and jurisprudential forces, and tribes continue to gain influence in
political spheres. Yet the current diminished status of tribal sovereignty is
taking its toll on the ability of tribes to survive as unique cultural and political
communities and is diminishing their contribution to the vitality of our country
as a whole. While many Indian law scholars (and Indian activists) advocate
reinvigorating tribal sovereignty as a panacea to tribal ailments, 10 a coherent
theoretical basis upon which to rebuild the jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty
has yet to emerge."
7

L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm:TribalSovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM.
L. REV.
8 809, 897 (1996).
See generally David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnqrist Court's Pursuit of
States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001)
[hereinafter Getches, Beyond Indian Law] (arguing that Court is "remaking Indian law and
revising a political relationship between the nation and Indian tribes that was forged by the
Framers of the Constitution and perpetuated by every Supreme Court until now"); David H.
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivisim of the Supreme Court in
Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996) [hereinafter Getches, New Subjectivism] (observing
that Court recently has considered and weighed cases to reach results aligned with Justices'
individual ideas of Indian jurisdictional situation).
9
See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5, 85 (1999)
(describing challenge of fitting tribes in our federal system of government as "complex" and
"anomalous" federalism problem, which if solved could solve federalism as well); see also Nell
Jessup Newton, FederalPower over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195, 240 (1984) (admitting that although task of constructing constitutional framework that
will protect tribal rights is difficult because of continuing persistence of nineteenth-century
doctrines and attitudes, it is "essential").
'0 See, e.g., C.E. Willoughby, Comment, Native American Sovereignty Takes a Back Seat
to the "Pig in the Parlor:" The Redefining of Tribal Sovereignty in TraditionalProperty Law
Terms, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 593, 596 (1995) ("[T]he sovereign power of Native American tribes can
and must be reidentified.").
"lA parallel effort is underway in Canada as both scholars and the Canadian government
examine ways in which enhanced sovereignty can be accorded to aboriginal peoples. See Ralph
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This Article uses Michael J. Sandel's twin concepts of a civic republican
polity and dispersed sovereignty as a starting point for developing a theoretical2
justification for returning greater political and cultural autonomy to tribes.'
Republican thinking contains some very useful principles for the cause of
enhanced tribal sovereignty. These principles should be persuasive because of
the important role they played in the founding of this nation and their
continuing relevance to theoreticians struggling to find a harmonic place for
difference in our democratic society. 13 However, there is a need to find a way
to do this without destabilizing the country's capacity to govern or creating
separate racial homelands for tribes. The Article suggests that granting tribes a
constrained power to nullify laws and policies that diminish their sovereignty
W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward
Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643, 675, 680-83 (1991) (describing Canadian process); Macklem,
supra note 6, at 1320-22 (same); Mary Ellen Turpel, Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian
Charter:InterpretiveMonopolies, CulturalDifferences, 6 CAN. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 1989-1990, at 3
(same); see also Matthew D. Wells, Note, Sparrow and Lone Wolf." Honoring Tribal Rights in
Canada and the United States, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1132-36 (1991) (proposing legislation
modeled after Canadian law to protect core tribal rights in United States). Indeed, a special
committee of Canada's Parliament has gone so far as to recommend that "Canadian law ...
move beyond its American counterpart and explicitly recognize [aboriginal] governments as a
third order of government, on par with their federal and provincial counterparts." See Macklem,
supra note 6, at 1324 (citing INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE (PENNER REPORT), H.C. Issue No. 40, 32d Parl., 1st Sess. 41-48 (1983)
(recommending that "First Nations be recognized as a distinct order of government")). Russel
Barsh makes the point that there is a qualitative difference between Canadian aboriginal peoples'
and American Indians' struggle for power. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indian Policy at the
Beginning of the 1990s: The Trivialization of Struggle, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY: SELFGOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 55 (Lyman H. Legters & Fremont J. Lyden eds.,
1994). The "American Indian struggle" has been "trivializ[ed] ... into an elite game of fiscal
redistribution," making U.S. tribes "far more vulnerable to neocolonialism", while Canadian
natives "live in a country that is already formally divided on linguistic grounds and [thus] cannot
conceive of why they should not have at least as powerful a constitutional status as Quebec." Id.
at 64-65.
21n joining Sandel's civic republican vision to the plight of Indian tribes, the author is
attempting, however imperfectly, to respond to Frank Pommersheim's suggestion that Indian
law scholarship needs to broaden its "ken of concern to include matters of political theory and
local civic action, to search across other disciplines and fields of study for sparks of insight and
to help fan a native prairie fire of political renovation and renewal throughout Indian Country."
Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the Edge of the
Prairie,31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 439,445 (1999).
13By using the term republicanism, I realize that I am perpetuating what Daniel Rodgers
termed a "historiographic irony," joining other players in the game of republicanism even though
"the ball ha[s] all but disappeared." Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a
Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 37 (1992).
Republicanism, it seems clear in retrospect, was neither an ideological map to more
than a small piece of experience, nor a paradigmatic language .... Neither was it a
tradition-theterm toward which many of its appropriators were tending by 1990..
• . Its key terms-virtue, the republic, the common weath-were slippery and
contested.
Id. at 37-38.
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may offer a structural solution that assures the continuation not only of Indian
tribes as vibrant, unique cultures, but also of the United States as a nation and
as a robust, pluralistic, tolerant democratic society.1 4 "[T]he moral
independence of local nomic communities is not a burden to be tolerated or
overcome, but is, instead, an essential part of how we build personal integrity
and moral freedom as rooted, situated, and well-constituted selves. 15 Inorder
to reach the Article's goal of proposing a new theoretical foundation upon
which to build solutions to the problem1 6 of tribal sovereignty, much ground
must be covered.17 Part II starts this journey by looking briefly at modem
140f necessity, this solution is limited to tribes which have a land base on which their

members live and over which the tribes can exercise some measure of sovereignty.
' 5Richard W. Gamett, Once More into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal SelfDetermination, and Federal ConspiracyJurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D. L. REV. 433,
441 (1996) (citing AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995)). Garnett refers to
tribes as6 "independent cultural, political, and nomic communities." Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
1 By applying the terms problem and solution to the concept of tribal sovereignty, I realize
that I run the risk of creating the perception that I agree with governmental policies that have
approached Indians as though they were a problem to be solved by subjecting them to one failed
solution after another. That is not my intent. To the extent that I think tribal sovereignty is a
problem, it is a problem of our own making-a result of centuries of misguided federal policies
and federal Indian law jurisprudence-not one which tribes created in their desire to exist.
Rather, I use the term problem in the sense that the concept of tribal sovereignty has perplexed
many who have tried to propose instrumentalist solutions that would neither fracture the union
nor create such disharmony that conflicts between tribes and their neighbors would abound.
Unless a successful solution is found, history has shown that tribes' attempt to reassert their
sovereignty in opposition to the interests of the federal government and the states will continue
to fail. The history of (and the various reasons for) this failure has been well documented. See
generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE

STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002) (discussing plenary power doctrine and status of
tribal sovereignty); FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1941) (discussing
Indian law and its role in establishing tribal sovereignty); DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 395-458 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing status of tribal
sovereignty); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1995) (discussing Indian legal system and its role in establishing
tribal sovereignty). Moreover, without a practical means for the implementation of a solution,
the painful history of Indian tribes in this country may still end with their disappearance. See
Joseph William Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between
Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1838 (1990). "In adopting
strategies for change, one must remember that no abstract theory of the relation between law and
society can provide a blueprint for reform. Rather, we must attend to the actual working of
structures of power in society."). Singer goes on to note that "[w]hat has worked to improve
conditions for American Indian[s) ...[has been] a complex set of strategies for community
empowerment and self-determination." Id.
17Unlike Rebecca Tsosie, I do not seek to burden this proposed solution with the additional
task of achieving group reconciliation for Indians, which-as she notes-is a complex but
necessary step in the process of renegotiating a more principled and just relationship between
Indians and non-Indians. See Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: InterculturalJustice and the
Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1658-70 (2000) (exploring process by
which "notions of group reconciliation might be adjudicated within the discourse of treaty
rights"). My goal is substantially more modest-namely, to explore theoretical and institutional
ways to enhance tribal sovereignty within the federal structure of government.
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conceptions of sovereignty to see whether granting tribes enhanced sovereignty
within the United States would offend archetypical notions of sovereignty.
Finding it would not, Part II concludes that there is much to be gained by
tribes, if they were to succeed in their quest. Part III discusses the basic
elements of tribal sovereignty, identifies its principal theoretical sources, and
then briefly describes its status at the start of the fifth century of contact with
non-Indians. Part III concludes that, despite centuries of ill-conceived federal
policies and destructive Supreme Court decisions that have weakened the
theoretical sources of tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes have retained sufficient
core elements of what it means to be sovereign, as described in Part II, to
qualify objectively as sovereign entities. Part IV acquaints the reader with
classical and contemporary republican principles and discusses three such
principles that provide particular support for a more robust tribal sovereignty
than exists today, as well as one that might undermine it. Part IV of the Article
shows that Indian tribes not only deserve and need enhanced self-governing
authority to protect what is unique about their communities, it also
demonstrates that, despite everything that has happened to them, the tribes
have retained sufficient cultural, political, and even territorial separation to
qualify as repositories of Sandel's downward dispersed sovereign authority.' 8
Part V acknowledges the problems that recognizing difference as a basis for
separate sovereignty pose to our national norm of a blended society-as well
as to any notion of territorial integrity. However, it argues that modem
republican thinking, particularly Sandel's multiply-situated citizen and
Michelman's dialogic deliberation, assures the survival of both.
It is not enough to establish a theoretical basis for reinvigorated tribal
sovereignty. A practical means for its exercise must be found. Otherwise, the
painful history of Indian tribes in this country may still end with their
disappearance.' 9 Accordingly, Part VI examines various practical solutions to
the problem of tribal sovereignty and finds each of them wanting in some
aspect. The Article proposes that tribes be allowed to exercise a constrained
power to nullify (or opt out of) laws that diminish their sovereignty. Part VI
ends with a brief discussion of how the application of republican principles
might make this result palatable to both Congress and the Court.
II. SOVEREIGNTY
The traditional notion of sovereignty as a single nation with complete
authority over its territory and peoples, free from interference from other
"8 The author realizes that each tribe is unique, and generalities among tribes are difficult to
draw, and thus suspect when drawn. Common tribal features are used here as an artifact to reach
an abstract theoretical conclusion that might have practical favorable consequences for tribes in
general.
19See Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 52-55
(1991).
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states, is largely incompatible with any notion of tribal sovereignty. However,
this traditional formulation is less true today than it was as short as a half
century ago. 20 The content of the term "sovereignty" has always been
"murky, 21 its contours highly "contested," and "its meaning[, as well as its]
value a function
of interpretative acts by those who possess it and those who
22
seek it."
[T]here exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more
controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that
this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into
political science until the present day, has never had a meaning
which was universally agreed upon.2 3
Countries are eliding economically, politically, and culturally at the
international level. Yet, at the same time, they are fragmenting at the nationstate level in response to internal demands for self-determination 24 by
20

Sovereignty had, and still has, both an internal and external aspect. Ruth Lapidoth,
Redefining Authority: The Past, Present, and Future of Sovereignty, 17 HARv. INT'L REV. 8, 9
(1995). It can mean both undisputed territorial jurisdiction within the borders of a state and
personal jurisdiction over a state's citizens (internal), and the power to have a foreign policy and
diplomatic relations, the right to be a member of international organizations, and the right to use
force within the limits allowed by international law (external). Id.; see also POMMERSHEIM,
supra note 16, at 54 (defining sovereignty, outside context of foreign affairs, to be "ability to
govern all individuals and property found within one's borders"); Hendrik Spruyt, Decline
Reconsidered. The Complex Nature of Modern Sovereignty, 17 HARV. INT'L REV. 36, 36 (1995);
Macklein, supra note 6, at 1346 (noting that "international law definitions [of sovereignty] do
not exhaust [its] meaning" because "sovereignty can refer to political and legal authority within
[a state]").
This Article concerns itself with sovereignty's internal features.
21
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY,

AND SELF-DETERMINATION

14 (1990).

Hannum attributes "[a]t least part of the difficulty in defining sovereignty [to] the fact that [the
term] traces its historical roots to sovereigns, in whose hands 'absolute' spiritual and temporal
power rested," and that this view can no longer be supported in a world in which the equality of
states in an international legal regime implies that the "sovereign rights of each state are limited
by the 22equally sovereign rights of others." Id. at 15.
Macklem, supra note 6, at 1346; see also Michael D. Levin, Ethnicity andAboriginality:
Conclusions, in ETHNICITY AND ABORIGINALITY: CASE STUDIES OF ETHNONATIONALISM

178

(Micheal D. Levin ed., 1993) [hereinafter ETHNICITY AND ABORIGINALITY] ("It is almost selfevident to say today that nations are invented."); Joel P. Trachtman, Reflections on the Nature of
the State: Sovereignty, Power and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 401 (1994) (defining
"sovereignty as a socially contingent phenomenon, as an institution" that evolves over time "to
meet social
needs more accurately").
23
HANNUM, supranote 21, at 14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
24
This is one of the more intriguing side effects of a uniting Europe: as national
boundaries fade within the 15-member European Union, more political power flows
to Brussels and more countries beg to join the group, local cultures and languages
are reasserting their strength.
And while a blanket of sameness has settled over consumer trends and styles
in Europe, historians say that more people are interested in protecting minority
languages and asserting local differences than at any other time in this century.
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repressed minorities and ethnic groups. Scholars like Sandel believe that
sovereignty can, and must, be shared, with power and responsibility
"disperse[d] . . . both upward[s] and downward[s]" from the nation-state.26
This Part asks whether the strictures of sovereignty have loosened sufficiently
for Indian tribes to serve, at least conceptually, as repositories of dispersed
sovereignty, and-if they have-what Indians could gain from this status.2 7
The classical notion of sovereignty as an autonomous, exclusive, absolute,
monolithic,28 and hierarchical political authority within fixed territorial borders
is quickly vanishing, 29 and with it the notion of the state as a single repository
of identity for its citizens.30
[T]he old religious mystical concept of sovereignty as being
something, which is 'absolute, sacred and inviolable' already has lost
much of whatever relevance it once may have had .... The fact of

Marlise Simons, In New Europe, a Lingual Hodgepodge: Old Tongues Are Flourishingin a
Revival
ofRegional Cultures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1999, § 1, at 8.
25
See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1996)
(commenting that "values and related processes of decision [underlying or inextricably bound up
in the concept of self-determination] can be seen as a stabilizing force in the international
system"). Vine DeLoria and Clifford Lytle distinguish between "self-determination" and "selfgovernment" even though the two terms "can describe the same social reality" albeit "in
different contexts." VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST
AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 244-45 (1984). "Self-government is basically a
political idea [that] has been superceded in our generation by the demand for selfdetermination."
Id. at 264.
26
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 345.
27
The author has drawn liberally from an article by Ruth Lapidoth in the Harvard
InternationalReview for help in developing this analysis. See Lapidoth, supra note 20, at 8.
28Sovereignty need not reside any longer within a single authority. Rather, as the American
and Canadian experiences-and now the European Union, among others-show, sovereign
authority can be wielded by a number of different entities. Lapidoth discusses other examples of
the nonmonolithic, indivisible nature of modern sovereignty, including for example,
"condominiums," in which two or more states jointly exercise sovereignty over a territory.
Lapidoth,
29 supra note 20, at 11.
d. at 8; see also Trachtman, supra note 22, at 406 (stating that territory has increasingly
become
inaccurate proxy for community and lacks coherency as concept).
30
Spruyt sees sovereignty, on the one hand, as being redescribed and reinvented in some
parts of the world where states are pursuing integration and thus challenging the "spatial limits"
of sovereignty, and, on the other, as being "challenged by alternative forms of political rule that
base their legitimacy and the extent of their jurisdiction on non-spatial criteria" (such as
tribalism, clan membership, and religious communities). Spruyt, supra note 20, at 38. He finds
loyalty to the nation-state as a single locus of identity "eroding toward a multiplicity of loyalties
to regions, clans and ethnic groups." Id. at 38-39. But see David A. Martin, The Civic
Republican Idealfor Citizenship, andfor Our Common Life, 35 VA. J. INT'L. L. 301, 309-10
(1994) (stating that "[d]espite all the evils perpetrated in its name, the nation-state also provides
the framework for important and benevolent functions that cannot yet be wholly entrusted to
transnational institutions," and, therefore, nation-state "will remain the central forum for political
life" "for the foreseeable future" and beyond).
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the matter is that sovereignty today ... is an extraordinarily flexible,
manipulative concept. 3'
The turmoil around the concept of sovereignty seems to be particularly great at
the present time; the content of the concept particularly fluid. According to
Alan Ehrenhalt, "[s]omething odd is happening to government at the end of the
20th century: It is flying apart and coming together, all at the same time. 32
Statehood is no longer a criterion of sovereignty.33 Big governments are under
pressure to break up in response to ethnic, ideological, and/or economic
pressures, even in this country. 34 At the same time, trans-boundary and
regional governing bodies are forming.35 Changes on the international scene,

31

HANNUM, supra note 21, at 26 (quoting Richard B. Lillich, Sovereignty and Humanity:

Can They Converge, in THE SPIRIT OF UPPSALA 413 (Atle Grahl-Madsen & Jiri Toman eds.,

1984)); see also Trachtman, supra note 22, at 400 (describing sovereignty "as an allocation of
power [that] is never lost, but only reallocated," and calling this phenomenon "a law of
conservation
of sovereignty").
32
Alan Ehrenhalt, Demanding the Right Size Government, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at
A27. James Crawford identifies among other characteristics of "the right to self-determination,"
"aright against the State, which. . . administers and controls [those] people," and a "collective,"
or group right. James Crawford, Some Conclusions, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 164-65 (James
Crawford
ed., 1988) [hereinafter RIGHTS OF PEOPLES].
33
HANNUM, supra note 21, at 14-15 ("[F]or the practical purposes of the international
lawyer sovereignty is not a metaphysical concept, nor is it part of the essence of statehood; it is
merely a term which designates an aggregate of particular and very extensive claims that states
habitually make for themselves in their relations with other states." (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)). But see id. at 15 ("One principle upon which there seems to be universal
agreement is that sovereignty is an attribute of statehood, and that only states can be
sovereign."). Applying the "classic" definition of a state found in the 1933 Montevideo
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, cited by Hannum, tribes meet three out of the four
criteria. Tribes possess: "(a) a permanent population[,] (b) a defined territory[, and] (c)
government." Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1993, art. 1,165
L.N.T.S. 19. They lack only the fourth, the "capacity to enter into relations with other States," if
that is 34defined to be foreign nation-states. Id.
Isaias Afwerki attributes the intensity of these centrifugal trends to the history of empire
or nation-formation, the nature of the assimilation process, the quality of governance, and the
acuteness of underdevelopment and regional balance within the state. Isaias Afwerki, Challenge
From Within: The Theory and Practice of Self-Determination, 17 HARV. INT'L REV. 18, 20
(1995). He says that these are all determinants that can either lessen internal tensions within a
multiethnic society and eventually promote the evolution of core values, or make these tensions
worse 35and "sow the seeds of permanent conflict." Id.
Ehrenhalt cites as an example of these transboundary or regional governing bodies the
Alpine Diamond, which he calls a "fledgling regional government [cutting] across ...France,
Italy and Switzerland," which he sees as "essentially a re-creation of the medieval Kingdom of
Savoy, without the monarch.... It exists because the two million people who live in [it] decided
that none of their existing governments-national, provincial or local-were capable of
managing the region's economic development." Ehrenhalt, supra note 32. Ehrenhalt cites other
examples of regionalism--"knitting" governments back together-including Georgia's creation
of a "new powerful superagency to take control of transportation and land-use decisions in the
entire Atlanta metropolitan region" encompassing multiple local governments, and the coming
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particularly the appearance of international and regional governing institutions
and international conventions, have meant less autonomy for national
governments.36 Problems drift between different levels of government, from
local to international, in search of the proper level for a solution.37
Sandel sees the forces of globalization eroding national sovereignty from
above, while "the resurgent aspirations of subnational groups for autonomy
and self-rule" are challenging it from below. 38 Like Ehrenhalt, he finds that
"[c]itizens are essentially looking for two forms of public authority: intimate
ones in their community that can deal with their needs in a humane way, and
regional ones big enough to impose some order and stability on economic
life." 39 Sandel concludes that the "most promising alternative to the sovereign
state is not a one-world community," as some seek, "but a multiplicity of
communities and political bodies . . . among which sovereignty is diffused,"

together of "myriad small communities" surrounding the city of Pittsburgh, up until now known
for their
36 "quarrelsome and turf-conscious" behavior. Id.
Lapidoth, supra note 20, at 8; see also HANNUM, supra note 21, at 15 (stating that notion
of "' [s]overeignty' in its original sense of 'supreme power' is not merely an absurdity but an
impossibility in a world of States which pride themselves upon their independence from each
other and concede to each other a status of equality before the law" (quoting ARTHUR LARSON ET
AL., SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 11 (1965))); Spruyt, supra note 20, at 37 ("One common
view of a declining sovereignty is that global economic interactions have increasingly led to less
autonomy
for national governments.").
37
Ehrenhalt finds the most interesting examples of the downward migration of authority
the "rise of micro-governments" in Europe and this country "to deal with practical issues at the
level of the neighborhood, subdivision and even individual block." Ehrenhalt, supra note 32. He
cites as examples of this phenomena municipal governments in the Netherlands, Denmark, and
Germany "that have ... ced[ed] authority to small-scale elected traffic control boards," which
"have expanded their reach into land use and planning issues," and, in France, the revitalization
of 2500 communes, what he calls "tiny vestiges of medieval life," sometimes with "fewer than
1,000 residents,... by new grants of law enforcement authority that include, in some situations,
the power to make arrests." Id. In this country, examples include "business improvement
districts... [that] begin by cleaning [up blocks and planting trees] and grow into crucial players
in local politics[, and] homeowners' associations that govern life in thousands of new
subdivisions."
Id.
38
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 344.
Beset by the integrating tendencies of the global economy and the fragmenting
tendencies of group identities, nation-states are increasingly unable to link identity
and self-rule. Even the most powerful states cannot escape the imperatives of the
global economy; even the smallest are too heterogeneous to give full expression to
the communal identity of any one ethnic or national or religious group without
oppressing others who live in their midst.
Id. at 344-35. But see Spruyt, supra note 20, at 37-38 (positing that "globalization [may]
actually enhance[] [a nation state's] authority" because "[a]ddressing global economic problems,
migration... , and ... environmental [concerns] puts a premium on the ability of [states] to
interact39 with one another through international fora").
Ehrenhalt, supra note 32. Ehrenhalt adds that citizens realize that the "governments they
have are [either] too remote and bureaucratic" to deal with their problems in a humane way, or
"too small and weak" to impose the necessary "order and stability" for economic advancement.
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and within which citizens learn to function as "multiply situated selves. ' 4° Like
Lapidoth, Sandel believes "[t]he nation-state need not fade away, only cede its
claim as sole repository of sovereign power and primary object of political
allegiance.,, 41 The bonds of what it has traditionally meant to be a sovereign,
therefore, appear to have loosened sufficiently in the latter part of the twentieth
century to allow, at least conceptually, for tribes to function as repositories of
dispersed sovereignty, if they are otherwise qualified. This Article posits that
they are, 42 while acknowledging that granting tribes greater sovereignty over
their lands and members challenges the territorial and cultural integrity of the
United States.
One of sovereignty's less contested features is "that it creates a legal
space within which a community can negotiate, construct, and protect a
collective identity; 4 3 a piece of ground where a community can be free from
interference with its chosen way of life and the development of its foundational
character. While basing sovereignty on an expression of "collective
difference, 44 presents problems, Macklein interprets sovereignty to "permit[]
the expression of collective difference,, 45 which "far from being a reason for
refusing to grant or recognize a community's sovereignty, is in fact a
precondition of sovereignty's existence. 4 6 Indian demands for enhanced tribal
sovereignty and for greater control over their individual and shared identities,
are premised on notions of collective difference and the belief that Indians
possess unique historical and cultural identities worth protecting from the
assimilative tendencies of our society.47 In fact, according to Pommersheim,
40

SANDEL, supra note 2, at 345, 350; see also Macklem, supra note 6, at 1352 n.182

(discussing how countries like Belgium, which "grants differential rights to Dutch and French
people in its constitution," are referred to as "'consociational democracies,' which attempt to
preserve linguistic or cultural identities"); Simons, supra note 24 (quoting Breton novelist
Michael Le Bris: "[wie now accept that our identity can have several layers.... We can feel
and French and Breton all at once.").
European
41
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 345; see also Lapidoth, supra note 20, at 8 ("[A]bsolute [state]
sovereignty has had to cede to various forms of relative sovereignty subject to international law
and practically limited by the great interdependence of states and by their internal ethnic
heterogeneity. New notions such as divided sovereignty and functional sovereignty have been
to describe [this] reality.").
developed
42
See infra Part IV.C (discussing possibility of Indian tribes serving as dispersed centers of
governance).
civic republican
43
Macklem, supra note 6, at 1348.
44See infra Part V (discussing problems posed by enhanced tribal sovereignty).
45
Macklem, supra note 6, at 1348.
46Id. at 1349.
47
Patrick Macklem, Ethnonationalism, Aboriginal Identities, and the Law, in ETHNICITY
AND ABORIGINALITY, supra note 22, at 9.
Underlying the use of human rights terminology or the framework of rights claims is
a plea for recognition of a different way of life, a different idea of community, of
politics, of spirituality, differences which have existed, in the view of Aboriginal
peoples, since time immemorial, but which have been cast as differences to be
repressed or transformed since colonalization.

454

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2005:443

"pride of difference," "Indianness," is at the heart of Indian claims of tribal
sovereignty. 48
Indian tribes need a "measured separatism" to survive as distinct societies;
a space within which they can protect their collective identities and be free
from the interference of outside alien cultures. 49 To retain this separation they
need the power to determine their own lives to function more as subnations.
Sovereignty (undiminished authority) over lands and people gives tribes the
space within which to continue to be different, to be Indian-an "arena of
tribal choice in which to articulate legal values and establish normative tribal
frames of reference. 5°
What Indian tribes need-undiminished authority to determine their own
lives-is an essential aspect of sovereignty. For tribes, "[a] fully 'decolonized'
Indian law requires more than limits on federal power. It must secure selfdetermination in the deeper sense of protecting a tribe's authority to structure
its form of government and to choose means to pursue tribally determined
ends. ' ' 5 1 Anaya suggests that "self-determination" has two normative strands,
both of which might serve as a useful metric for judging the completeness of
tribal sovereignty.52 The first of these strands is self-determination's
"constitutive aspect," which "requires that the governing institutional order be
Turpel, supra note 11, at 33. Turpel goes on to note that European-based cultures have always
reacted to difference with plans for civilization, sameness, domination, and control because they
continue to view aboriginal cultures as "primitive, premodern, or inferior in the sense of being at
lesser states of development than the dominant European culture," in other words, as "artifacts."
Id. at 34. Dan Tarlock, who finds "equally problematic" cultural claims by "at risk communities"
based on "cultural heritage or community values," calls such bases "legitimate" when raised by
aboriginal peoples. A. Dan Tarlock, Can Cowboys Become Indians? Protecting Western
Communities as Endangered CulturalRemnants, 31 ARiz. ST. L.J. 539, 553 (1999).
48POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 103. According to Pommersheim, "[n]either
the legal
community nor the dominant community at large fully understands the pride of difference,
which tests the vitality of the 'old promises' in a diverse society that professes a commitment to
both equality
and pluralism." Id.
49
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 14 (1987) (using
this
term to describe reservation system as "islands of tribalism largely free from interference by
non-Indians or future state governments," which was "measured, rather than absolute, because it
contemplates supervision and support by the United States"). Erik Jensen sees present federal
Indian policy as trying "to protect traditional Indian societies as much as possible and... to
maintain their insulation from the majority society," and that while "[t]he separation is not
complete ... [because] the tribes are subject to the ultimate power of the United States, . . . the
separation is substantial and is, if anything, becoming more entrenched." Erik M. Jensen,
American Indian Tribes and Secession, 29 TULSA L.J. 385, 386 (1993). But see Pommersheim,
supra note 12, at 474 (advocating new era of "measured togetherness," under which tribes
determine extent to which non-Indians can "participate in the public civic life of the tribe, to be
of service"
to tribe; "not to be Indian").
50
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 195.
5 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 127; see also Frickey, supra note 9, at 82 ("[E]conomic
development in Indian country works best when tribes are capable of autonomous sovereignty..
A
u
a).
52ANAYA,
supra
note

25, at 8 1.
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substantially the creation of processes guided by the will of the people, or
peoples, [who are] governed" (consent of the governed and access to the
political process).5 3 The second is self-determination's "ongoing aspect,"
which "requires that the governing institutional order, independent[] of the
processes leading to its creation or alteration, be one under which people may
54
live and develop freely on a continuous basis" (liberty and political equality).
Self-determination, in both its constitutive and ongoing sense, is therefore
necessary if indigenous communities, like Indian tribes, are to maintain their
distinctive cultures. 55
However, Indian tribes, unlike indigenous peoples in other countries, may
not have retained sufficient separate identity to warrant their reconstitution as
centers of dispersed sovereignty in which to practice self-determination, in
either its constitutive or ongoing aspect, regardless of how crucial sovereignty
is to their survival as tribes. Centuries of "fickle, 56 destructive federal Indian
policies, and judicial decisions aimed at the destruction of tribes, may have
indeed destroyed their capacity for a measured separatism. The next section of
this Article describes those policies and their effect on tribal sovereignty.

III. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Indian tribes are "strange sovereigns" in a constitutional sense; 57 their
relationship to the United States is "an anomalous one, and of a complex
character., 58 Tribes resemble foreign countries because they have dominion
over their lands and members. 59 But, unlike foreign nations, with which the
federal government deals at arm's length, they are subject to the paramount
sovereignty of the federal government. 60 And while tribes are clearly not states
53

541d. at

81-82.

id.

55

Id.at 110.

56

RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN

TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY, at viii (1980). Other Indian scholars use even stronger
adjectives
to describe these failed federal policies and judicial decisions. See infra Part III.B.3.
57
Newton, supra note 9, at 197.
58
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886). Aleinikoff describes tribes as being
"both in and of the United States." ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 149.
59
Tribes do not own their lands, the federal government does. See United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440 (1926) (holding that Nonintercourse Act imposes restrictions on
all Indian lands and creates guardianship over that land that extends even to Pueblos, who own
their land); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913) (holding that federal
guardianship power permits statute outlawing sale of liquor to Pueblos). In the case of staterecognized tribes, like the Mattaponi and Pamunkey tribes of Virginia, and the Shinnecock and
Poospatuck tribes of New York, tribal land is owned by the state. This raises interesting
questions, which are beyond the scope of this article, as to whether and to what extent state
ownership
changes the jurisdictional prerogatives of the federal government over tribal land.
60
Federal power over Indians "must exist in that government, because it has never existed
anywhere else; because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United
States, because it has never been denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
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that can claim protection against the intrusions of the federal government based
on long-held doctrinal theories supporting states rights,6' they are just as
clearly more than private associations, which can be regulated much more
freely.62 As Chief Justice John Marshall acknowledged over a century and a
half ago in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,63 the relationship between the federal
government and Indian tribes is "perhaps unlike that of any other two people in
existence . . . marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no

where else." 64 His words are still true today.6 5
This Part of the Article tries to parse the confused doctrinal threads of
federal Indian law in an effort to assess the extent to which tribes retain the
power to self-govern after three centuries of interaction with federal and state
sovereigns. The current status of tribal sovereignty is examined in light of
Anaya's constitutive and ongoing aspects of self-determination.6 6 The Part
starts with a discussion of the traditional rationales for tribal sovereigntytreaties and inherent sovereignty-and then examines the effectiveness of each
in preserving sovereignty. Part III concludes that even the minimal protection
these doctrinal shields once had for tribes has substantially eroded over time,
tribes." Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85 (upholding plenary authority of Congress over internal
Indian61affairs).
Newton, supra note 9, at 197.
62
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes within 'Indian
Country' are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations .... .'). But see
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 98 ("Tribes are 'sovereign' over tribal land and tribe members, in
much the same way that a private organization has property rights and can adopt rules governing
its members' conduct and access to its property."); Barsh, supra note 11, at 56 (describing what
remains of Indian sovereignty after various Supreme Court decisions as "'country club' doctrine
of tribal jurisprudence"); Frickey, supra note 9, at 80 (explaining that "new harmonization of
federal Indian" legal principles with mainstream areas of law may "jettison ... well-established
mediating method[s] rooted in congressional responsibility and judicial checks in favor of a onesided imposition of colonial values" and reduce tribal sovereignty to point that "from the
outside, [tribes] might appear to be little more than ethnocentric Elks Clubs"); id. at 82 ("At
bottom, the Court needs a contemporary comfort level with the proposition that tribes are
governments, not voluntary membership associations; it is surely discomfort with this
conclusion that has led the Court to impose a creeping constitutionalism in federal Indian law.");
Singer, supra note 19, at 6 (under Court's view that tribes cannot exercise powers over
nonmembers, "tribes are merely voluntary associations which can act only in ways that affect
their members, rather than sovereigns who can exercise governmental power over any persons
who come within their territorial boundaries, including nonresidents").
6330 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
'Id. at 16.
65

Aleinikoff criticizes the view of tribes as "anomalous" (their "in-betweenness") because
they are neither a foreign or domestic state, and the fruitless search to find a perfect analogy
between a tribe and some other political community, because this view ignores the fact that
"indigenous peoples have a distinct set of rights and a distinct relationship with the states, in
which they are located," that is sui generis to them. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 141-42. He
suggests that "[r]ather than seeking an analogy, we must come to terms with the sovereignty
questions
in their own right." Id.
66
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing Anaya's two aspects of selfdetermination).
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particularly in recent years. As a result, if the concept of tribal sovereignty is to
retain any vitality, a new, more persuasive theoretical rationale is needed. Part
IV suggests that republican theory provides that rationale.67
A. Sources of Tribal Sovereignty
There are two traditional theoretical foundations for tribal sovereignty.
The first of these is premised on the various treaties negotiated between the
tribes and the federal government; the second, on the tribes' inherent authority
to self-govern. 68 This Part of the Article examines both foundations to see
whether either contains sufficient vitality to serve as a basis for a more robust
vision of tribal sovereignty in the twenty-first century.
1. Treaties
"Again, were we to inquire by what law or authority you set up a
claim [to our land], I answer, none! Your laws extend not into our
of nature and the law of
country, nor ever did. You talk of the 6law
9
nations, and they are both against you.,
For nearly three centuries, the British Crown and then the U.S.
government 7° recognized tribal sovereignty by negotiating treaties with the
tribes as though they were separate sovereign nations. 71 These solemn
67

This Article does not argue that tribes fall within the Guarantee Clause of the

Constitution because they are not states. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing to every state
in Union republican form of government). Rather, the Article suggests that republicanism, as the
base upon which the government of the United States was structured, might provide theoretical
support
68 for a more robust tribal sovereignty than we have today.
According to Wilkinson, the well-settled principle that the doctrine of inherent
sovereignty is pre- and extraconstitutional, when coupled with the promise of a viable, evolving
separatism in the treaties and treaty substitutes, "justifqies] race-based tribal governments
without political representation by nonmembers." WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 117. See
generally Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (affirming that tribal sovereign powers preexisted Constitution and were not affected by dominant society's general laws unless expressly
limited69by Congress).
PETER NABOKOV, NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE
RELATIONS FROM PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-1992, at 122-23 (rev. ed. 1999) (quoting

George70Corn Tassels, Cherokee, Address before United States Commissioners (July 1785)).
The Framers of the Constitution placed the "supreme and exclusive treaty power in
Congress." BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 34. The states had ignored the language in
the "Articles of Confederation authoriz[ing] Congress to 'manage [Indian] affairs"' and had tried
to assert power over Indians by entering into various treaties with the tribes within their borders,
which resulted in conflict and bloodshed. Id. at 33. By vesting exclusive authority in Congress to
make treaties and to regulate commerce with Indians tribes, the Framers intended to end this
practice.
71 Id. at 34.
There were approximately 175 treaties negotiated between Indian tribes and Britain and
the British colonies from 1607 to 1775. See David A. Wilkins, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of
Discovery: A Treaty-Based Reappraisal, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 277, 292 (1998) (citing
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bargainedfor exchanges secured for Indians their homelands and the right to
be left alone.72 For Indian tribes, these treaties are foundational documents,
which affirmed tribal sovereignty over their lands and members,73 set the
physical boundaries of their reservations, 74 and established their off-reservation
fishing and hunting rights.75 Based on a "unique relationship of trust and
Dorothy Jones, British Colonial Indian Treaties, in 4

HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS

185-94 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988)). These early treaties responded to the political,
military, and economic needs of the European colonists and the various tribes. Colonial treaties
were ratified by the Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)), which was first enacted in 1790, and given the effect of
federal law.
The Spanish and the French also entered into many treaties with the tribes to secure tribal
cooperation and aid their survival in the New World.
The most practical manner, at least in North America, by which the Spanish
and other European nations proceeded to secure the goodwill and consent of tribes
for the establishment of peace and friendship, trade, military alliance, the delineation
of territorial boundaries, land cessions, and to secure their foothold on the frontier
against other European competitors, was through the negotiation of treaties.
Wilkins, supra, at 286. However, there the similarities between the three nations ended.
"Spanish civilization crushed the Indian; English civilization scorned and neglected him; French
civilization embraced and cherished him." Id. at 288 (citing Mason Wade, French Indian
Policies,
in 4 HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS, supra, at 20).
72
See Duane Champagne, Beyond Assimilation as a Strategy for National Integration: The
Persistence of American Indian PoliticalIdentities, 3 TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109,
112 (1993) (commenting that treaties negotiated with early colonial governments helped to
preserve "remnant of political and cultural autonomy" for tribes, since tribes no longer had
political power to sustain their right to self-government).
73Treaties also frequently created "institutions . . . for resolving disputes" between Indians
and non-Indians. BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 274. In an experiment that eventually
failed, the treaties between the Five Civilized Tribes and the United States included a provision
that the representatives of these tribes meet at an annual general assembly as a precursor to their
land becoming a territory of the United States. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 25, at 24.
"Congress appropriated funds to underwrite" the effort "and the grand council of the Indian
Territory met annually until 1874 in an effort to adopt an organic document," which would both
preserve tribal customs and rights while enabling the territory as a whole to move toward
statehood. Id. The effort foundered over the issue of allotting tribal lands after admission to the
Union. Id. According to Deloria and Lytle, "[p]roperty rights, rather than political rights"
"doomed" the venture, and "statehood was postponed until such time as the [tribes would]
agree"74to a system of individual as opposed to communal property rights. Id. at 24-25.
See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Once
Congress has established a reservation, all tracts included within the boundaries remain a part of
the reservation until separated from it by Congress."). Disestablishment of the reservation only
occurs when Congress explicitly and specifically states its intent to remove from Indian control
certain lands within the reservation boundary, or from surrounding circumstances. Id.; see also
United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382, 1384-85 (D. Minn. 1979) ("The Supreme Court
has ruled that Congressional intent to abrogate Indian property rights must be clear from the face
of the Act or surrounding circumstances and that doubtful expressions in the Act must be
resolved in favor of the Indians."), aff'd sub nom. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Minnesota,
614 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1980).
75
Off-reservation treaty-based fishing and hunting rights, however, may be abrogated if a
congressionally approved cession agreement completely severs and extinguishes Indian title to
the land. But, if a cession agreement expressly reserves these rights in areas ceded by the treaty,
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protection that the European sovereigns assumed toward Indian nations[,]...
Indian treaty rights are sui romas generis, imparting a distinctive legal
relationship [between the federal government and tribes] that is unparalleled in
other areas of [U.S.] law." 76 For some scholars, these treaties between
sovereign nations provide the "primary doctrinal grounding" for the
recognition of tribal sovereignty.77 This Subsection explores whether Indian
treaties also provide a solid footing for the enhancement of tribal sovereignty.
For almost the entire treaty era, which ended in 1871, treaties served as
necessary "political and legal adjustments between an expansionary, westward
marching American society and established, staunchly resistant tribal
societies.''78 The policy of separating Indians from non-Indians, which
culminated in the current reservation system, originated in the colonial period,
when the British Crown viewed separation as the most expedient way to avoid
costly wars, secure English economic interests in the Indian ruled interior, and
protect the Crown's seaboard trade. 79 When Indian presence became too much
for the white settlers, the simplest, most practical solution for the Crownsucceeded by the federal government-was to move the nearest Indian tribe to
"but not retained within the borders of a reservation," the rights to hunt and fish "are reserved
only until the ceded areas are required for settlement, or until Congressional or Presidential Act"
requires the tribe to relinquish the use of the area. Shelley D. Turner, The Native Americans
Right to Hunt and Fish: An Overview of the Aboriginal Spiritual and Mystical Belief System, the
Effect of European Contract and the Continuing Fight to Observe a Way of Life, 19 N.M. L.
REV. 377, 414 (1989); see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 684, 697 (1993)
(holding that tribe could not regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in area within reservation
boundaries
that Congress had appropriated to build dam, reservoir, and public recreation area).
76
See Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1623.
77POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 40; see also McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) (stating that in almost all cases, federal treaties and statutes define
boundaries of federal jurisdiction); BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 270 (stating that
treaties are "a form of political recognition and a measure of the consensual distribution of
powers between tribes and the United States"); COHEN, supra note 16, at 33 ("The chief
foundation [of federal power over Indian affairs] appears to have been the treaty-making power
of the President and Senate with its corollary of Congressional power to implement by
legislation the treaties made."); Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1621 ("Indian nations today employ the
discourse of treaty rights . . .as a recognition of their legal rights and . . . of their status as
distinct groups that possess political and cultural sovereignty and have a unique relationship to
their traditional lands."). But see Richard A. Monette, A New Federalismfor Indian Tribes: The
Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalismand Republican
Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617, 628-29 (1994) (stating that tribal sovereignty as legal
construct all but disappeared except as temporarily useful artifact of treaty era); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Jefferson, the Norman Yoke, and American Indian Lands, 29 ARIz. L. REV. 165,
185-86 (1987) (describing importance of Indians' right to alienate territories during colonial
times but arguing that American legal theory changed after American Revolution such that
vested title to Indian land could be passed "without the positive sanction of a European-derived
sovereign entity" because Indians could simply be removed by military force to make way for
white settlers.).
78
pOMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 16.
79
Champagne, supra note 72, at 116; see also Williams, supra note 77, at 172 (describing
mercantile goals of British government in period before Revolution).
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a more remote location, and to solemnize by treaty the promises made to the
Indians in exchange for the loss of their lands. 80 To some extent, the setti,.o'
goals coincided with the interests of Indians, who wanted protection from
invading white settlers. 81 Notwithstanding the lingering high-toned rhetoric of
Indian treaties, 82 once the country's military needs no longer served as a
primary motivation for treaty making, the principal policy behind treaties
shifted to making Indian lands available to non-Indians.8 3 After 1850, by which
8°See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 18; see also Williams, supra note 77, at 172.
Discussing the extent to which present legal conceptions of Indian status and rights are grounded
in a highly contingent set of historical circumstances and suppressed discourse, Williams notes:
Rarely has the dynamic relationship of American racism and the dominant caste's
economic interest been so clearly revealed within the normative fineries of national
legal discourse as in the Revolutionary era debate on the status and rights of Indians
in their lands. White interests and expediency, not the rule of law, ultimately
informed and determined Revolutionary era legal discourse on the natural law rights
and status of the Indian.
Id.at 184; see also Keith Bradsher, Michigan Pact Resolves Battle over Limits on Indian
Fishing,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2000, at A16 (describing how Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians felt compelled to agree to pact ending fishing dispute with local white
communities, which put Indian fishers far from their traditional and treaty-protected fishing
grounds to avoid conflict with state's main recreational and fishing areas).
81POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 18. For example, the Treaty between the United States
of America and different Tribes of Sioux Indians, 15 Stat. 635 (1868), stated that reservations
were to be "set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians... and
the United States now solemnly agrees that no person except those herein designated and
authorized . .., shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory
described
in the article." Id. art. II.
82See Newton, supra note 9, at 200 (stating that President Washington and Secretary of
War Knox "advocated a policy of respect for treat[ies]" that had been negotiated by British
Crown, and that new series of treaties be entered into to acquire Indian land "by consent in an
orderly fashion," which "would contain promises to protect Indian tribes and tribal land from
white incursions
in exchange for land cessions").
83
The principal goal of this era, which began in 1800 and ended in 1815, was to move
Indians beyond the Mississippi River. Johnson, supra note 11, at 655 (commenting on fact that
many of early treaties with tribes in northeast were designed to gain allies in battles against first
French, and later British); see also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE
FORMATIVE YEARS, 44-49 (1962) (describing how Indian tribes in northeast never agreed to be
treated as conquered nations after Revolutionary War and how continued white encroachment
into lands set aside for tribes threatened to undo existing treaties); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR.,
LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW & PEACE, 1600-1800, at

20-21 (1997) (noting that in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European colonists learned
that their "survival," let alone their ability to "flourish[]" and "expan[d,]" depended upon
"cooperative relationships with surrounding Indian tribes rather than wars and conflict");
Newton, supra note 9, at 200 (noting that early America's precarious perch among sovereign
nations meant it could ill-afford expense and strain of drawn-out Indian war); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson, to Meriwether Lewis (Aug. 21, 1808), in A JEFFERSON PROFILE: AS
REVEALED IN HIS LETTERS 173 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1956) [hereinafter A JEFFERSON PROFILE]
(referring repeatedly to Sacs and Foxes tribe(s) as nation(s), and advocating commerce as "the
great engine" with which to "coerce them" them into more compliant posture). John Locke's
concept of property-something created by the application of labor-and his aversion to land
left in a state of nature also justified taking land away from Indians. See JOHN LOCKE, THE
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time most Indians had been removed from land that white settlers wanted,
federal Indian policy reflected in treaties was to force tribes onto ever-smaller
reservations.84 In 1871, the era of treating with Indian tribes abruptly ended
with the assertion of language in an appropriation bill forbidding the federal
government from entering into any more treaties with Indian tribes.85 By then,
the official Indian policy was assimilation of Indians into the mainstream
culture. Entering into treaties with Indian tribes, as though they were separate
foreign nations, was seen as antithetical to achieving that goal.86
The history of Indian treaties is not a pretty one, and the federal
government's role in their negotiation and enforcement belies de Toqueville's
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 23 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1956) ("I ask whether in the
wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage
or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences
of life 84as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated.").
See generally PATRICIA LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST (1987) (describing process
by which tribal lands were diminished); Johnson, supra note 11, at 649-50 (stating that
"overriding, but rarely articulated policy" towards Indians was to "get them out of the way so
their land could be settled and developed by whites"). Often multiple tribes were "consolidated
on a single confederated reservation, including tribes with diverse cultures," sometimes with
histories of "outright hostility towards each other." Id. at 650 n.23. This eroded "[t]raditional
cultures, religions, and self-governance systems," and left Indians, as they are today, as "the
poorest and smallest minority in both Canada and the United States." Id; see also Newton, supra
note 9, at 224 (noting congressional authorization of consolidation of tribes with no ethnological
ties-even tribes that were ancient enemies-and citing Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299
U.S. 476, 489 (1937), where Congress authorized occupancy of Shoshone land by Arapahos,
who were Shoshone's long-time enemies). See generally COHEN, supra note 16, at 5-7
(discussing
definition and background of term "Indian Country").
85
Congress withdrew the President's authority to treat with Indians in 1871.
[N]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom
the United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully
made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall
be hereby invalidated or impaired.
The Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 71 (2000)). According to Cohen, after 1871, the federal government dealt with Indian tribes
through agreements, statutes, and executive orders, which had the same legal weight as treaties.
COHEN, supra note 16, at 105-07. By 1871, approximately 389 treaties had been negotiated
between the United States and various Indian tribes, covering nearly ninety-five percent of the
United States public domain lands. Johnson, supra note 11, at 648 n. 18. While most tribal lands
today are secured to Indians by treaty or some other form of federal agreement, Wilkinson notes
that of the 52 million acres of trust land now held by tribes and individual Indians, only about 20
million were originally recognized by treaty. WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 8. Twenty-three
million acres were set aside by executive orders between 1855 and 1919, and the remaining
acreage
by congressionally approved agreements or by federal statutes. Id.
86
See Newton, supra note 9, at 206 (noting that when treaty-making era came to end in
1871, "Indian law became more a matter of domestic law, with Indians regarded as subjects to
be governed, rather than foreign nationals"); see also Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1669
(commenting that "treaties between the United States and Indian nations exempliflied] the
commitment to tribalism and group-based separatism" that "conflict[ed] with the drive for [a]
unitary, all-encompassing ideal of citizenship").
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words, "[t]he conduct of the Americans of the United States towards the
[Indian] is characterized.., by a singular attachment to the formalities of law.
. . . It is impossible to destroy men with more respect for the love of
humanity." 87 Despite the view of treaties as bargainedfor exchanges between
the federal government and Indian tribes, treaties and other cessions of tribal
lands were seldom concluded with willing tribes. Tribes knew that "they must
either cede their lands and put their welfare and survival at the mercy of the
federal government, or be pushed aside without even a small reservation to call
home." 88 However, tribes lacked the negotiating strength to protect their
interests vigorously. 89 Further, "[t]he federal government has a long and
appalling history of breaking treaties with Indian nations," "repeatedly
cast[ing] aside its solemn promises to [the tribes,]" curtailing rights granted
under those treaties, or "arrang[ing] for the seizure and dispersal of tribal
property without paying just compensation." 90 "The history of the United
States Government's repeated violations of faith with the Indians convicts us,
as a nation, of having outraged the principles of justice, which are the basis of
international law; and of having laid ourselves open to the accusation of both
cruelty and perfidy ....
87ALEXANDER DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 360-61 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Longmans,
Green & Co. 1889) (1838).
S8Johnson, supra note 11, at 713; see also id. at 649 (pointing out that despite high-toned
rhetoric, rarely did government acquire land under these treaties by fair, arm's-length
transactions. Rather, "[m]ost of the time, the government acquired lands by a combination of
coercion, fraud, threat of force, or actual military force."); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 99-100
(commenting that while treaties solemnized agreements in which tribes ceded land to federal
government in exchange for government's recognition of tribe's right to self-determination on
their remaining lands, treaties could hardly be considered consensual exchanges among willing
political equals); Michael L. Ferch, Indian Land Rights: An InternationalApproach to Just
Compensation, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 317-18 (1992) (noting that Indian

land holdings were often diminished by treaties accepted by indigenous parties because of
ignorance
or fraud).
89See infra note 93 (providing sources regarding Indian canons); see also United States v.
Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 252 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (remarking that most Indian participants in
treaty negotiations "had to rely on interpreters for an explanation of concepts, most of which
were foreign to their culture," that discussions were limited to "general concepts," and that nonIndians drafted treaty provisions "behind closed doors").
90
Singer, supra note 19, at 2; see also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,
294 (1955) (holding that federal government may seize without compensation Indian land that it
has refused to recognize by treaty or statute); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903)
(upholding forced allotment of Indian lands and recognizing that no legal norm restricts "the
legislative power [to] pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians"); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219, 258-65
(explaining that throughout nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress "unilaterally
abrogated" numerous Indian treaties under plenary power doctrine).
91

HELEN HUNT JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR 29 (1881); see also ALEINIKOFF, supra

note 16, at 95-96 (stating that history of federal Indian policy is betrayal of almost every clause
in Article III of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50, in which federal government
promised "[t]he utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and
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Enshrinement in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution has not
protected the promises in Indian treaties, since Congress can unilaterally
abrogate those treaties. 92 Nor have protective prudential judicial canons
prevented federal courts from the wholesale rewriting of Indian treaties.93
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and
liberty they shall never be invaded ...unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress;
[and that, from time to time,] laws founded in justice and humanity [will be enacted for
preventing wrongs to Indians], and for preserving peace and friendship with them," id. art. III,
ch. VII, 1 Stat. at 52.). One of the more outrageous examples of the ease with which the federal
government broke Indian treaties was the massacre of 133 Cheyenne and Arapaho people, most
of whom were women and children, at Sand Creek. SIMON J. ORTIZ, FROM SAND CREEK: RISING
IN THIS HEART WHICH IS OUR AMERICA 8 (1981); see also Patricia N. Limerick, Haunted
America, in SWEET MEDICINE: SITES OF INDIAN MASSACRES, BATTLEFIELDS, AND TREATIES 119,

126-28 (1995) (describing same event). After the massacre, the Cheyenne and Arapaho, who had
believed that they were protected by "a [United States] flag presented by President Lincoln to
Black Kettle" "were removed from [the territory] despite the fact that they had treat[ies with the
federal government] securing their possession of these lands." Tsosie, supra note 17, at 167071. 92
See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 40 ("Despite the historical fact that treaties are
grounded in the federal recognition of tribal nationhood and sovereignty, they have often been
altered, ignored, or displaced."); Singer, supra note 19, at 54 (commenting that United States
Supreme Court, "by often failing to recognize treaties as either creating vested property rights or
as describing reserved powers of sovereignty, . . . has perpetuated a system that grants less
protection to [Indian] property rights .. .than to [those] of non-Indians"). The Supreme Court
has consistently sustained acts of congressional abrogation when the abrogation is in the national
interest. See, e.g., Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 ("The power exists to abrogate ...an Indian
Treaty ...in the interest of the country."); see also infra Part III.B.2.a (discussing plenary power
doctrine). Newton points out that the Court (ironically) frequently uses the trust relationship
between tribes and the federal government to interpret treaties. Newton, supra note 9, at 232
n.200; see, e.g., United States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 229 U.S. 498, 509 (1913)
(holding that breach of agreement was breach of trust wrongfully disposing of tribal property);
Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886) (stating that trust relationship
"recognizes ...such an interpretation of their acts and promises as justice and reason demand in
all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and
protection").
93
For more about the Indian canons of construction, see Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,
472 (1984) (stating that "[w]hen both an act and its legislative history fail to provide substantial
and compelling evidence of congressional intention to diminish Indian lands, we are bound by
our traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment did not take place and
that the old reservation boundaries survived the opening" of those lands for non-Indian
homesteading); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) (advocating liberal construction of
statutes when government deals with Indians); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380
(1905) ("[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians as 'that unlettered people' understood it...
."); Choctaw Nation, 119 U.S. at 28 (discussing that trust relationship with Indian tribes
"recognizes ... such an interpretation of their acts and promises as justice and reason demand in
all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and
protection"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 554 (1832) (adopting canons of
interpretation that require clarity before courts may conclude that tribes have given up valuable
rights); COHEN, supra note 16, at 221-24 (construing congressional power and limitations upon
power of Indians to sell or make contracts respecting lands and timber allotted to them as
Congress's effort to prevent Indian landlessness); Frickey, supra note 9, at 8-9 (arguing that
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Despite these problems, federal Indian treaties should not be dismissed
too quickly as an inadequate theoretical foundation for a more robust form of
tribal sovereignty. Treaties continue to define the contours of the legal
relationship between tribes and the federal government. For many tribes,
treaties are the "cornerstone" of their sovereignty and legal identity vis-A-vis
the non-Indian world,94 the "charters by which Indian[s gained] the right to
rule themselves on their reserved [lands], 95 and to enter into a government-togovernment relationship with the federal government. 96 This treaty relationship
"ambiguities in federal statutes that might be read [to] invad[e] tribal authority are [to be]
construed narrowly to protect tribal interests," and "treaties that might undercut tribal authority
are also [to be] read narrowly" on assumption that "[t]he treaty transaction was a cession of
rights by the tribe rather than a granting of rights by the United States, and [that] these cessions,
along with all other treaty provisions, are to be interpreted as the Indians would have understood
them"); Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth "-HowLong a Time Is
That?", 63 CAL. L. REv. 601, 617 (1975) (likening three primary canons of construction applied
to Indian treaties to those applied in context of "adhesion contracts": "ambiguous expressions
must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned; Indian treaties must be interpreted as
the Indians themselves would have understood them; and Indian treaties must be liberally
construed in favor of the Indians"). As examples of how far courts are sometimes willing to go
to resolve ambiguities in favor of Indians, see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963)
(holding that tribe is entitled to sufficient water to irrigate all irrigable land on reservation);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (creating implied federal reserved water right
in favor of Indian tribe); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1409 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that tribe is entitled to sufficient water to propagate fish, if that was tribe's goal). But see
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 91-95 (2001) (finding Indian interpretative
canon94subordinate to other more compelling interpretations of statute).
pOMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 213 n.18; see also Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1658
("Indian treaties are a powerful symbol of tribal sovereignty and the preconstitutional political
status of Indian nations."). But see Getches, New Subjectivism, supra note 8, at 1583
(commenting that while treaties "remain a primary source of Indian rights[, they] also led to
substantial diminution of tribal autonomy" because they "memorialized the 'discovery' principle
by submitting the tribes' external political affairs to the United States's control" and because
premised on the United States' political domination of the tribes").
they "were
95
Williams, supra note 77, at 194; see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 16 ("The
concept of an Indian reservation is best defined as the concrete manifestation of a guarantee of a
,measured separatism' to [Indians] as the result of negotiated treaties and settlements reached
between Indian tribes and the federal government." (quoting WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 4)).
96POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 40 ("[T]reaties recognize and embody tribal
sovereignty as the basis for a government-to-government relationship ... with other sovereigns,
including states."). According to Monette, one reason for treating tribes like states is that early
treaty relationships contemplated this. Monette, supra note 77, at 633. Thus, treaties, in which
tribes "pledged allegiance to the Union and sought its protection, support the notion that the
resulting relationship was federative in nature," and that tribal and state sovereignty do not
overlap, but exist in the same plane and relate separately to the central government. Id. at 67172. Monette also argues that like states, tribes "pre-existed the Union as international,
independent entities ...[and] relinquished some measure of . . .sovereignty" to the central
government after creation of the Union; retained sovereignty was not relinquished after creation
of the Union. Id. at 654. Thus, the movement of sovereignty was from the states (and tribes) to a
central government. Id.; see also id. at 633 n.97 ("Both state and tribe contemplated giving up
their independence and joining the newly proposed Union, and neither took the idea for
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with the federal government gives Indian tribes an extra-constitutional status
unlike any other ethnic or racial group in this country, and continues to
distinguish Indian tribes from such groups. 97
To the extent that Indian treaties reflect a set of sovereign promises-a
"sacred pledge made by one people to another [that] required no more than the
integrity of each party for enforcement" 98-they create expectations about how
the signatories will behave towards each other. And regardless of the motives
that drove the parties to the table and their incommensurate bargaining
strength, the practical effect of these treaties was that the tribes "ma[de] peace
and cede[d] land ... to the federal government in exchange for a cessation of
hostilities, the provision of some services, and .. . the establishment and
recognition of a homeland free from the incursion of [non-Indians]." 99
Additionally, the record of Indian treaty negotiations, ratifications, and
proclamations-and the language of these treaties-also confirms the separate
political status of Indian tribes in our nation's history. 00 Underlying these
granted."); id. at 644 (commenting further that Treaty with the Cherokees, 7 Stat. 18 (1785), at
issue in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), "provided for the tribe's sending
deputies
97 to Congress for representation").
Wilkins, supra note71, at 299 ("The unique triumvirate of corporate (self-government),
individual (eligibility for allotments, special reservations), and property (hunting, fishing, and
gathering) rights articulated in treaties further distinguish[es] Indians in a fundamental way from
groups and individuals in the United States.").
all other
98
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 25, at 8; see also Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora
Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.dissenting) ("Great nations, like great men,
should keep their word."); POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 16-17 (viewing treaties as
"bargained for exchange[s]," and stating that treaties have "helped create the enduring and
special legal and moral relationship that exists between the federal government and Indian
tribes"); WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 120-22 (stating that treaties represent "[rneal promises,"
which advance "fulfillment of the ultimate promise"-reservation as homeland and "island[] of
Indianness within the larger society"); Newton, supra note 9, at 262 ("Beyond cavil, one value
'basic in our system of jurisprudence' is that a deal is a deal."); Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1617
("The discourse of treaty rights that is being employed by Native Amercian and Mexican
American people speaks of each Treaty as a 'sacred text' that represents the moral obligations of
the United States to racially and culturally distinct groups that have been treated unjustly by the
dominant society."). But see Turpel, supra note 11, at 36 (commenting that treaties in Canada
are "sacrosanct" to Aboriginal peoples, but are not so regarded by federal government, for which
they are neither basis for "recognition of diverse [Indian] cultures" nor "international agreements
between sovereign peoples or nations").
99
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 17; see also Monette, supra note 77, at 632 (arguing
that treaties brought tribes into federal structure by "caus[ing] the sovereign spheres of the tribes
and the Union to overlap, resulting in a relationship of compact federalism resting on good
faith," in which tribes "authorized or at least consented to the federative nature of the
Union/tribe relationship." (emphasis added)).
100
Treaties referred to Indian tribes alternately as tribes and nations. For example, language
in the 1814 Treaty of Ghent, ending hostilities with Great Britain, consistently referred to Indian
tribes as "tribes" or "nations," even though the United States delegation feared that allowing the
affected tribes to sign the treaty-and thus treating them as independent nations as the British
wanted-might lead them to realign with the British. Wilkins, supra note 71, at 307; see also
Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalismto
Empowerment, 27 CONN.L. REv. 1251, 1256-57 (1995) (stating that end of treaty era, in 1871,
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treaties was the working assumption that the tribes were in full possession of
their sovereignty. In the words of Thomas Jefferson:
I consider our right of preemption of the Indian lands, not as
amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship
whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the
extinguishment of a present right, which gave us no present right
whatever, but of preventing other nations from taking possession,
and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had the full,
undivided and independent sovereignty
1 as long as they choose to
keep it, and that this might be forever. 10
10 2
The words "treaty" and "nation," Marshall wrote in Worcester v. Georgia,
"are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative
proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well-understood
meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the
other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense."' 10 3 Just as
launched Congress on path of no longer dealing with tribes as separate sovereign nations, but
instead as unitary people).
10117 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 340-41 (1903-04) (emphasis added); see also
Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 745 (1835) ("[F]riendly Indians were protected in
the possession of the lands they occupied, and were considered as owning them, by a perpetual
right of possession, in the tribe or nation inhabiting them." (emphasis added)).
'031
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
1031d. at 559-60. To some Indian law scholars, treaties indicate that tribes were historically
perceived as nations that functioned on an international plane. See, e.g., POMMERSHEIM, supra
note 16, at 41 (stating that because business of tribes and United States-and before that
colonies and Crown-was conducted through treaties, tribes historically were perceived of as
nations that functioned on international plane); Monette, supra note 77, at 629 n.81 (noting that
"the Continental Congress [had] three Indian departments" to carry on affairs between Indians
and central government, "appointed a standing committee to ensure that the integrity of
territorial boundaries between the colonies and the tribes be maintained," "required visas and
passports out of a state's and into a tribe's territory," and "received tribal delegations as it did
foreign delegations."); id. (noting that "in 1776, when a colonial citizen was murdered in a
tribe's territory, the Congress determined whether the act constituted a 'national act' or an act of
war, according to the prevailing law of nations"); Newton, supra note 9, at 200 ("In formulating
federal policy toward Indian tribes in the early years of the Constitution, President Washington
and Secretary of War Knox followed the policy promulgated by the British Crown... of dealing
with Indian tribes as sovereign nations."). Even before the British,
Francisco de Vitoria, a prominent Spanish Theologian, was asked in the 1530s
by . . the King of Spain [ ] to address what the rights of the Spanish were in the
New World and.., what rights, if any, the indigenous peoples retained in the face of
Spanish colonialism....
[Vitoria's 1532 lecture] entitled On the Indians Lately Discovered, . . .
confirmed not only that the indigenous peoples possessed natural rights, but also that
as free people they were the 'true owners' of the land they inhabited.
Wilkins, supra note 71, at 285-86. Some Indian law scholars argue that tribes are still
independent states on an international plane. See, e.g., S. James Anaya, The Rights ofIndigenous
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states have no jurisdiction in foreign nations, "[t]he treaties and laws of the
the Indian territory as completely separated from
United States contemplate
' 10 4
that of the states."

For all these reasons, Indian treaties offer the promise of something more
with respect to the concept of tribal sovereignty. To Pommersheim, Indian
treaties are "the closest thing to a (federal) constitutional benchmark from
which to engage in a legal discourse about the nature of tribal sovereignty
within a constitutional democracy." 10 5 Barsh and Henderson view Indian
treaties as equal to "political compacts," "irrevocably annexing tribes to the
federal system in a status parallel to, but not identical with, that of the
states."'' 0 6 They argue that because "[t]reaties are a form of political

People and InternationalLaw in Historicaland ContemporaryPerspective, 1989 HARV. INDIAN
L. SYMP. 191, 193 (1990) (supporting proposition).
1°4Worcester, 31 U.S. (6. Pet.) at 557; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 96-98
(contrasting Marshall's goal of establishing viable "separatism" for Indian tribes from white
world with United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), which sought Indian assimilation);
George Washington, Address to the Cherokee Nation (Aug. 29, 1796), in WRITINGS 956-60
(John Rhodehamel ed., 1997) (addressing Cherokees as separate nation and providing advice for
improvement of nation).
05
' POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 40-41 (stating that treaties are "enshrined in the
supremacy Clause" of U.S. Constitution). According to Pommersheim, federal Indian treaties
impose "affirmative obligations on the [federal] government to provide specific servicesusually in the areas of health, education, and social services-to Indians tribes." Id. The
subsuming of these obligations into the trust relationship between the government and tribes has
"erroneously" converted them into a question of "federal largesse," which he believes they are
not. Id.106
BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 270; see also id. at 275 (implying that Marshall
recognized that treaties were form of compact when he used phrase "domestic dependent
nations" in Cherokee Nation to describe Indian tribes: "What made [tribes] domestic was their
permanent inclusion within the national territory of the United States, and what made them
dependent was their recognition by treaty of federal supremacy."); id. at 59 (interpreting
Marshall's opinion as "treaty federalism, as opposed to constitutional federalism"); ALEINIKOFF,
supra note 16, at 140-49 (using treaties as negotiating paradigm for tribes, and suggesting that
tribes should negotiate with federal or state government for greater share of sovereign authority
and then enter into equivalent of interstate compacts); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling
Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-Government
and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1156 (advocating "return[] to a
relationship based on consent" among tribes, states, and federal government, in which parties
"negotiate [their respective] jurisdictional responsibilities"); Gould, supra note 7, at 815, 901
(commenting that "inherent sovereignty and trust responsibility have each failed the tribes," thus
tribes "must search for solutions which offer promise of cultural accommodation and principled
compromise" through "cooperative agreements with their traditional enemies, the states"). See
generally Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded
Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1999) (advocating expanded use of state-tribal compacts).
However, any solution premised on negotiation, like treaties themselves, may be flawed from a
tribal perspective because of the power imbalance between tribal and government negotiators,
the consumption of scarce tribal resources by the negotiation process, the complexity of the
negotiations (which may require separate but overlapping bargains being struck at the federal
and state level), and because bargained-for solutions may be hard (and costly) to enforce.
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recognition and a ...consensual distribution of powers between tribes and the
United States," their existence creates "a presumption" of noninterference in
tribal affairs. 10 7 Tsosie sees treaties08 as embracing and giving legal imprimatur
to the concept of multiculturalism.'
However, treaties offer weak support for a more robust vision of tribal
sovereignty because they have been drained of almost all substantive
significance. Today, the unfortunate reality is that federal Indian treaties are
little more than interesting historical records, ceremonial touchstones, or
starting points for legal argumentation. Primarily a legal convenience to enable
white settlers to take Indian land with minimal bloodshed, treaties lacked true
legal or moral significance. This enabled the federal government to breach its
nominal binding authority on the nontribal signatories easily-breaches that
the Court would later justify.'0 9 Even the most vigorous efforts by legal
scholars cannot vest in federal Indian treaties a substantive significance that the
federal government has consistently been unwilling to find. Thus, even though
Indian treaties reflect the principle that tribes possess some measure of retained
sovereign authority, the fact that this principle is set out in a federal treaty does
little to strengthen the principle itself.
This Article now turns to a discussion of the doctrine of inherent
sovereignty, and the Marshall Trilogy,' l°-the source of that doctrine-to see
whether inherent sovereignty offers a more secure foundation on which to
build a vision of enhanced tribal sovereignty.

This view of treaties as compacts is far from a modem construct, as is apparent from the
following statement in 1869 from the Commission of Indian Affairs:
A Treaty involves the idea of a compact between two or more sovereign
powers, each possessing sufficient authority and force to compel a compliance with
the obligations incurred. The Indian tribes of the United States are not sovereign
nations, capable of making treaties, as none of them have [sic] an organized
government of such inherent strength as would secure a faithful obedience of its
people in the observance of compacts of this character.
IND. AFF. ANN.REP., H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 41 -1, at 448 (1869).
COMM'R
107BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 270; see also id. at 274 ("Regardless of [the]
original intent [of Indian treaties], they have resulted in a complete political and economic
integration of tribes into the federal system," making "[s]eparation" of the two "practically
impossible.").
08
1 Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1623-25 (pointing out that "multicultural [feature of Indian]
treaties . . . isacknowledged in the federal government's trust relationship with [tribes], in the
canons of construction [that recognize the language and cultural barriers inherent in treaty
negotiations with tribes given their dependent status], and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
relative to Indian treaty rights," which treats legal rights granted under Indian treaties differently
than rights under treaties with foreign nations).
"°9See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing effect ofjudicial doctrines on sovereignty).
1l 0See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing Marshall Triology).
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2. Inherent Sovereignty
Most Indian law scholars posit that tribes possess inherent sovereignty
that has never been extinguished. Considered one of the foundational doctrines
of Indian law, inherent sovereignty holds that tribes may exercise powers free
of the strictures of the Constitution unless limited by treaty or by Congress."'
These powers secure for tribes the essential rights of a separate, albeit limited
sovereign, and place tribes in a unique, anomalous position in the federal
structure, as they are neither states nor foreign nations. Fundamental to the
doctrine of inherent sovereignty is the principle that tribal powers exist outside
the Constitution, making these powers extra- or preconstitutional. 112 Because
"See
'
COHEN, supra note 16, at 122 ("Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law..
* is the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe, are not, in
general, delegatedpowers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherentpowers ofa
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."). According to Gould, this "statement,
usually attributed to Cohen, first appeared in an opinion of Solicitor General Nathan R. Margold,
Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solic. Gen. 445, 447 (1934)." Gould, supra note 7, at 816 n.33;
see also id. at 816 ("Fundamental to the doctrine of inherent sovereignty is the principle that
tribal powers arise outside the Constitution-[u]nless ceded by treaty or limited by the Congress,
these powers secure for tribes the essential rights of separate sovereigns."); Garnett, supra note
15, at 443 (stating that concept of inherent sovereignty means that tribal sovereignty is "the
preexisting given from which other sovereigns' jurisdiction is subtracted .... [Ilit remains the
baseline, [which only federal law can diminish,] persisting residually and interstitially beneath
the various federal and state encroachments.").
and around
2
11 See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 97 (stating that "range of descriptions [of Indian
sovereignty] in U.S. constitutional history . .. runs the gamut[ from being either] pre- or
extraconstitutional, like foreign states[, I limited[,]" like states, or capable of "extinguishment,
like territories"). Some scholars, however, insist that the Framers of the Constitution and the
United States government, over a century after adopting the Constitution, viewed Indians as
belonging to a separate sovereign nation. In supporting this argument, they point to the Indian
3, which gives Congress the exclusive power "[t]o
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes";
to the constitutional provision that Indians are not to be counted as part of the population for
purposes of deciding state representation in Congress, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3; and to the
Fourteenth Amendment's denial of citizenship to Indians. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. See,
e.g., BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 257-69 (arguing that tribal sovereignty should be
protected as "fundamental" "political liberty," or retained fight of people under Ninth
Amendment); Robert G. McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal,
State and FederalInterests, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357, 358 n.8 (1978) (observing that
Constitution has been interpreted as granting Congress plenary power over Indian tribes); Robert
J. Miller, American Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and Its Framers, 18 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 133, 150 (1993) (observing that Framers and United States government viewed
Indians as part of separate sovereign nation); Newton, supra note 9, at 261 (positing that
protection of liberty under Fifth Amendment's due process clause protection of liberty would be
"a more secure, even if less logical repository for this right" (citing JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 34-41 (1980))). However, there is a "lack of suppleness" in the argument that the
Commerce Clause, together with various Court holdings such as Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (holding that tribes, like foreign nations, had sovereign
immunity from suit); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that Bill of Rights does not
apply to tribal governments); and Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (affirming that Indians born

470

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2005:443

these inherent sovereign powers are external to the Constitution, the Supreme
Court considers itself free to shape the doctrine's contours, giving it the status
of federal common law, and making it mutable over time.' 13 The effects of this
are discussed in greater detail in Part III.B.
The commonly acknowledged sources of the doctrine of inherent tribal
sovereignty (and-paradoxically--of the doctrines that undermine it) are three
opinions authored by Chief Justice John Marshall during the Presidencies of
John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson. 1 4 Known as the Marshall Indian
Law Trilogy," 5 ("Trilogy") the Chief Justice used three cases to delineate the
relationship between the tribes and the federal government, and, by
implication, between the federal government and the states, on matters
involving Indians. 116 The three decisions collectively stand for the propositions
that: (1) Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations" whose right to occupy
within tribes were not citizens of United States under Fourteenth Amendment), means tribes are
separate sovereign nations. The argument ignores the Court's willingness to imply congressional
power regardless of explicit textual references. Aleinikoff, The Elusive Goal of Tribal
Sovereignty 51 (Mar. 2, 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 124-26 (discussing flaws in textually based consitutional
arguments that tribes are foreign states not subject to plenary power doctrine); Newton, supra
note 9, at 239 (finding these arguments, though historically and textually appealing, unlikely to
provide 3basis for limiting federal power over Indians).
1l McCoy, supra note 112, at 358 n.8 (stating that "tribal sovereignty doctrine is
essentially a product of federal common law," and "federal courts have [the] authority to create
federal common law in an area in which a constitutional allocation of power has been made to
the federal government").
114Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (holding that laws of Georgia had no effect within
Cherokee territory); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (holding that tribes
were "domestic dependent nations," and not foreign nations, and finding Court without
jurisdiction to enjoin application of Georgia's laws on Cherokee reservation); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that defendant's title, granted by United
States, was superior to plaintiffs title, acquired from Indian tribe). Each of these opinions is
discussed in greater detail in this Section of the Article.
15
' Charles F. Wilkinson first referred to M'Intosh, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester as the
"Marshall Trilogy." DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
42-45 (1st ed. 1979). In writing about the Trilogy, the author has drawn liberally on the works
of Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall'sJudicialRhetoric, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 439, 440-41
(1996) (suggesting that "Marshall's constitutional style was neither a reflection of the dominant
judicial practices of his age ... [n]or a rejection of law in favor of politics," but an attempt "to
convince [the American public] that national institutions, [like the] judiciary, would govern
well"); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381 (1993); Jill Norgren, The
Cherokee Nation Cases of the 1830s, 1994 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 65 (1994) (recounting history of
cases). For an affirmation that Eisgruber correctly divined the task facing Federalists
immediately following the ratification of the Constitution, see generally BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN IDENTITY (Richard Beeman et
al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter BEYOND CONFEDERATION].
116See McCoy, supra note 112, at 359 (stating that Cherokee Nation and Worcester
"establish that the tribes are independent political communities subject to the restraints of their
protectorate relation with the federal government," and that these "concepts [originally]
formulated by Marshall continue to be accepted as the basis of the tribal-federal relation").
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their lands is subject to the "ultimate domain"' 17 of the federal government; (2)
tribes and the federal government are in a "guardian-ward relationship"1 18; and
(3) tribes can "govern their [internal] affairs without interference from the
states [or the federal government], except when limited by treaties or by acts of
Congress."1 19 Marshall based his theory of tribal sovereignty on the Cherokee
Nation's collective political right to self-govern-in other words, its inherent
sovereignty. According to Marshall, although tribal sovereignty was subject to
the ultimate paramountcy of the federal government, it was otherwise
inviolate. These decisions have never been directly overruled, 120 and the
principles announced in them continue to have controlling effect in the field of
Indian law, for both good and bad.
The first case in the Trilogy, Johnson v. M'Intosh, 121 involved a property
dispute between two parties, both claiming title to the same tract of land. One
claimant based his title on tribal grants "obtained... without the consent of the
United States;" the other, on "subsequent federal land patents, issued after the
[entire] area had been ceded to the United States by a tribal treaty."1 22 The
question facing the Court was whether it should respect interests in land that
were not part of the Union when the putative owner acquired them and,
therefore, were obtained "without the sanction . . . of federal laws.' 23
Underlying this question was a more fundamental problem for Marshall: on
what authority did the federal government acquire "these cessions of foreign

117Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 580 (M'Lean, J., concurring).
118

See Gould, supra note 7, at 810 n.6.
at 817.
But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 362 (2001) ("Though tribes are often referred to
as sovereign entities, it was long ago that the Court departed from Chief Justice Marshall's view
that the laws of [a State] can have no force within reservation boundaries." (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original)).
121 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
122
BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 45. Commenting on M'Intosh, Barsh and
119
120 d.

Henderson note that the Court reached the same issues on Indian title to land and tribal
sovereignty in M'Intosh that it had "finessed" in both New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
164 (1812), and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). BARSH & HENDERSON, supra
note 56, at 37-39. In Fletcher, the Court held that the purchasers from the original patentee of
land in Georgia had superior title to subsequent purchasers who got title from the state after
revocation of the original patent. Id. at 37. The Court ignored the fact that Indians occupied this
land, and that there were no indications in that record that anyone, including the state, had
bought the land from them. Id. at 37-38. The authors also point out that in Fletcher,Marshall
"neither denied the state's power to grant a fee simple estate in land it had not purchased, nor the
tribe's right to continue to occupy that land undisturbed until it chose to sell it." Id. at 38. In
Wilson, where the Court sustained tax-exempt status of land for subsequent purchasers of tribal
property even though the state legislature had repealed the tax exemption after the sale, the
Court, by basing its decision on the Contract Clause, "avoided any suggestion that the tribe
might be exempt from taxation because [it was a sovereign nation] politically independen[t]
from New Jersey." Id. at 39. In doing so, the Court implicitly accepted the state's "pretension
that, but for its grant of exemption, it could have taxed the tribe" like any other landowner. Id.
"'Id. at 45.
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' 24
territory [from Indians], and then patent them out to [private] citizens?"'
Marshall was caught between two competing interests: the desire not to disturb
previously settled expectations about land title and the desire not to dishonor
the many treaties and proclamations
protecting Indian property rights, and by
125
implication, tribal sovereignty.
Marshall resolved this dilemma by holding that Congress had the power
"to purchase and reconvey tribal lands in the two-centuries-old convention
among European nations that discovery vested in the discoverer an exclusive
'preemptive' entitlement to deal with the natives as against other European
crowns."' 126 However, the "discovery doctrine" merely vested in the
discovering nation the exclusive right to "treat for title.' 27 Marshall
reconceptualized discovery to vest title in Indian lands in the discovering
nation. He then created the fiction that Indians had been conquered from the
fact that Indian tribes had continued to "coexist" peacefully with the United
States.128 In doing all of this, Marshall ignored the dozens of international
treaties signed by the United States (and before that, by the European
colonizing nations)
and Indian tribes, and the implied fact of tribal
129

sovereignty.

124

1d. at 47. Barsh and Henderson contend that both Fletcher and Wilson, at least,
intimated "that the states could convey [fee title] in western lands without waiting for federal
action."25Id. at 47.
1 1f the Court had ruled that Indians held fee simple title to their land, then Indians could
have sold their land to anyone; such a ruling could divested landowners of certain lands acquired
by grant from Britain, France, or Spain. It would have destroyed the ability of the fledgling
central government "to control the disposition of newly acquired land outside the 13 original
states." Newton, supra note 9, at 208 n.69; see also Elizabeth V. Mensch, The Colonial Origins
of Liberal PropertyRights, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 635, 686-87 (1982) (discussing how Indian rights
in land complicated question of title to land in New York State and other New England colonies,
and stating that "[a] second ambiguity related to the delicate question of Indian rights" and
"whether a [crown] grant unaccompanied by an Indian deed was enough to defeat title based on
cultivation
and an Indian deed").
26
1 BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 47; see M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572-74
(1823) (discussing this practice). In Fletcher,the dissent opined:
What then, practically, is the interest of the states in the soil of the Indians within
their boundaries? Unaffected by particular treaties, it is nothing more than what was
assumed by the first settlement of the country, to wit, a right of conquest or of
purchase, exclusively of all competitors within certain defined limits.
Fletcher,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
127
BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 47-49.
28
1 1d. The fiction of conquest was also useful to the British during the revolution, as British
law allowed the automatic application of the laws of England only when the lands settled were
unoccupied (terra nullis), not when settled as a result of conquest. This meant that the British
could argue that the colonists did not enjoy all the rights of British citizens that the Americans
claimed as a basis for the revolution. David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History:
Conflicting Depictions of Property in the American PoliticalFounding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
464, 485
129 (1993).
Norgren, supra note 115, at 72.
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However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of
an uninhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has
been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a
country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
great mass of the community originates
in it, it becomes the law of
30
the land and cannot be questioned.
Marshall's decision in M'Intosh was the Chief Justice at his most
pragmatic 31 (and extravagant). 32 Marshall's deployment in M'Intosh of an
Americanized discovery doctrine, in which discovery became conquest,
enabled him to protect the property rights of individuals who could trace their
title to grants of land that the federal government acquired through treaties
with Indian tribes, even though this meant extinguishing Indians' fee claims to
'3 °M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591 (emphasis added). Under a more accurate
understanding of the discovery doctrine, the United States was not an owner of Indian lands;
rather it was a "protector of Indian interests in their lands and stood first in line should a tribe
choose 31to sell any of its lands." Wilkins, supra note 71, at 308.
1 According to Eisgruber, Marshall's preoccupation with showing the American public
that the new government could, in fact, govern led him to make "practical arguments about
likely results." Eisgruber, supra note 115, at 447. When Marshall's arguments rested upon a
"controversial empirical claim," which invariably they did, Marshall would merely assert or
imply the necessary facts; he "would spin out the implications of his premises rigorously and
emphatically, but leave the premises themselves unjustified and sometimes unstated." Id. at 44748. The fact that Marshall's decisions do not depend on any factual basis or historical support
may explain their lasting effect: facts can change over time and historical support can be subject
to criticism when the underlying assumptions and prejudices-which motivated the original
chain of decisions-change.
132Norgren accuses Marshall of engaging in a corrupt reading of history. For example, she
points out the falsity of Marshall's statements that, at the time that the Constitution was written,
there was no reason for the Framers to think that Indians would seek redress in an American
court of justice. Norgren, supra note 115, at 72. In fact, since the mid-seventeenth century,
Indians had been litigants in colonial and later state courts. Id. Williams, commenting upon the
discovery doctrine, states that:
Principles and rules derived from the Doctrine and its related notions of
Congressional plenary power in Indian affairs have legitimated numerous injustices
and violations of Indian human rights. Uncompensated Congressional abrogations of
Indian treaty rights, leading to takings of Indian lands and resources, involuntary
sterilization of Indian women, violent suppression of traditional religions and
governing structures, and all the other usual forms of genocide perpetrated upon
Indian people by European-derived 'civilization' represent the historical detritus of
this legal doctrine.
Williams, supra note 77, at 168-69; see also Wilkins, supra note7l, at 279 (discussing
"Doctrine of Discovery"). "European and early American land policies ... and early American
treaties, United States congressional directives, and specific comments from American officials
vividly show[] that the doctrine of discovery was merely an exclusive preemptive rule that
limited the rights of discoverers [and] their successors and ... [not] the preexisting land title of
tribes." Id. at 283. The discovery doctrine--defined as it was in M'Intosh to mean that the
federal govermnent holds fee simple title to all Indian lands-"is a clear legal fiction that needs
to be explicitly stricken from the federal government's political and legal vocabulary." Id. at
315
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that land. This affirmed the supremacy of the federal power to control
acquisition of new land, relegated Indians to mere occupancy (or use) rights to
treaty-protected aboriginal land, and divested tribes of the legal capacity
to
33
convey these lands, other than by treaty with the federal government.
In reaching his decision, Marshall also employed an empirically
unfounded view of Indians as "fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and
whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.' ' 13 4 This view of Indians
provided support for Marshall's premise that leaving Indians in possession of
the country "was to leave the country a wilderness,"' 135 and justified his
decision to find superior title to Indian lands in the United States on the basis

13 3 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559. Marshall's reasoning paralleled the reasoning used

by several of the former colonies, which had solved the question of Indian legal ("civil") rights
in land by assuming Indians had only a natural right to the soil; this became a right to occupy or
use land, but not own it-later referred to as aboriginal title. Mensch, supra note 125, at 686. For
example, "[i]n Massachusetts Bay [Colony,] ... [this] position was elaborately defended as an
inevitable deduction from the fact that a civil (as opposed to natural) right to land could be based
only upon cultivation, not mere hunting and fishing." Id. "The first right was naturall when men
held the earth in common every man soweing and feeding where he pleased; and then as men
and the cattle increased they appropriated certaine Pcells of ground by enclosing, and peculiar
manurance, and this in Tyme gave themm a Civil right." Mensch, supra note 125, at 687 n.221
(citing Eisenger, Puritan Justificationfor Taking Land, 84 ESSEX INST. HIST. COLLECTION 136
n.13); see also id. ("God admitteth it as a Principle of Nature, that in a vacant soyle, hee that
taketh possession of it, and bestoweth culture and husbandry upon it, his Right it is." (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)); PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND 398-431
(1963) (discussing how Puritans believed that unbridled natural liberties led to disruptive
disputes over landownership).
Marshall also used M'Intosh to reassure the public that it need not fear an unrestrained,
unlimited federal judiciary that might run roughshod over popular expectations. See M'Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591-93 ("However this restriction may be opposed to a natural right, and
to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the
country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may,
perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice.").
34
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590. According to Burke, there are alternative
explanations for Marshall's choice of the word "savage." First, the term may simply reflect the
common verbiage of the time. The English referred to Indians as "uncivilized" and the French
used the term "sauvage." Second, and related to the first, under then-existing principles of
international law, Europeans could exert their sovereignty over another people only if the target
population was "uncivilized" (i.e., non-Christian). Marshall's use of the term "savage" may have
been part of an effort to provide a justification for his decision under international law. Finally,
the phrase may have been an obligatory nod to the fears and biases of the other justices (and
other interest groups) that Marshall was trying to persuade. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee
Cases: A Study of Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500, 514-19 (1969). But see
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 42 (commenting that formative opinions of Chief Justice
Marshall bristle with "colonizing arrogance and are without anthropological support and moral
justification").
... MIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590 ("To leave them in possession of their country, was
to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because
they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms
every attempt on their independence.").
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of discovery alone.' 36 Marshall's view of Indians as uncivilized savages
has
137
haunted the content of federal Indian jurisprudence since he fabricated it.
The two other cases in the Marshall Trilogy, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia138 and Worcester v. Georgia, 39 also presented Marshall with
politically challenging situations. In these cases, Marshall had to confront both
a state openly hostile to the Cherokee Nation (Georgia) 140 and an increasingly
popular President (Andrew Jackson), who had no sympathy for Indian
sovereignty. 141 At the time Marshall wrote his Cherokee opinions, the country
was experiencing a revival of democratic (Populist), agrarian, and states' rights
thinking, which in 1828 culminated in the election of Andrew Jackson to the
White House and the defeat of John Quincy Adams, a leading advocate of

13 6 BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 48-49. Marshall would have been as aware of

the role Indians played in helping early settlers in the Massachusetts Bay and Virginia colonies
as we are today. As a contemporary of both Benjamin Franklin and George Washington,
Marshall would have been familiar with the admiration that Franklin had for the Iroquois, and
that Washington had for the Cherokee; he also would have been aware of the sophistication of
the respective governance structures of these tribes.
7
Newton contends that, over time, "judicial misinterpretations of the [discovery] doctrine
are in large part responsible for arguments in favor of virtually unreviewable federal power over
Indian lands" (the so-called plenary power doctrine). Newton, supra note 9, at 209. According to
Newton, the Marshall Court intended only to give the federal government "a preemptive right to
purchase Indian land or confiscate it after a war," a "glorified" first option; the "Indians...
remained 'the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession
of it." Id. at 208-09 (citing M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.) However, Newton notes that
later Supreme Court decisions described the federal government's interest in land as a title
interest and the tribal interest as [merely] a possessory one." Id. at 209. "The more the
government's interest was characterized as an ownership interest, the more it became possible to
regard the ownership of land alone as giving the government power to govern Indians." Id.; see
also Williams, supra note 77, at 169 (calling doctrine of discovery "the 'separate but equal' and
Korematsu of United States race-oriented jurisprudence respecting [the] status and rights" of
Indians).
13830 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
'31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
140 "Georgia[, in a rapid secession of laws,] set out to nullify all Cherokee law, to make
Cherokees second class citizens of color under Gorgia Law, and to claim and redistribute
[Cherokee lands] to Georgians," as well as to "arrest any Cherokee official who tried to convene
a meeting of the Cherokee government [or] any American living among the Cherokee who did
not first swear an oath of allegiance to Georgia and its laws." Norgren, supra note 115, at 67.
"The Cherokee fought back in local Georgia courts .. .by appealing [three cases] to the
Supreme Court of United States." Id.; see Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515; Cherokee Nation, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1; State v. Corn Tassel, 1 Dud. 229 (Ga. 1830) (granting writ of error on December
19, 1830).
These three cases came to be known as the "Cherokee cases."
141Infact, President Jackson was openly committed to a policy of removing Indians from
their lands. See generally WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENAISSANCE IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 424-50 (1986) (describing Jackson's Indian removal efforts); PRUCHA, supra note 83,
at 233-39 (same). Congress also favored removal of Indians from their homelands. See Indian
Removal Act of 1830, 4 Stat. 411-12 ; see also MCLOUGHLIN, supra, at 435-37 (describing
passage of Indian Removal Act of 1830).
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Marshall's party, the Federalists.1 42 There was growing public distrust of both
central government and the idea of a national economy-each of which the
Federalists promoted-and increasing anger
directed at the postwar
143
nationalistic decisions of the Marshall Court.
In the first of these cases, 144 the Cherokee Nation tried to invoke the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to enjoin Georgia from enforcing
Georgia laws on land reserved to the Cherokees under a treaty with the United
States. 145 Marshall extricated the Court "from the rough seas" 146 of federal142For more on the topic of President Jackson and the persistence of anti-federalism, see

Richard E. Ellis, The Persistence of Antifederalism After 1789, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION,
supra note 115, at 295, 307-09.
143See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (holding that intercourse
between United
States and Indians vested in federal government and that interfering Georgia laws have no
force); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (holding that Bank
of United States' articles of incorporation, enabling it to sue in federal court, were consistent
with Constitution, and that because Ohio state law imposing tax on Bank was unconstitutional
and void, circuit court correctly ordered defendants to repay money with interest); Green v.
Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823) (holding that Constitution embraced all contracts, including
Virginia-Kentucky compact at issue, and that state had no more power to impair obligation into
which it had entered than it did contracts between individuals); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821) (holding that Congress enacted Washington D.C.'s lottery statute according
to its exclusive legislative power over D.C., that Congress intended statute to be local
legislation, and that, because lottery statute was not enacted as law of United States, it did not
preempt state statutes); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that
Maryland's attempt to tax Bank of United States was unconstitutional because Maryland had no
power to burden operations of constitutional laws enacted by Congress.); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that appellate power of United States Supreme
Court extends to cases pending in state courts and that Judiciary Act § 25, which authorizes
exercise of this jurisdiction in specified cases by writ of error, is supported by Constitution);
New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812) (holding that Act of 1804 was
unconstitutional under Contracts Clause of U.S. Constitution and finding that subject of original
agreement between New Jersey and tribe was governmental purchase of extensive tribal claims,
extinguishment of which would quiet title to large portion of province). Of these, Wilson, Biddle,
and Worcester proved to be "unenforceable and were successfully resisted or ignored by the
states." See Ellis, supra note 142, at 307-08 (discussing cases). "These [unpopular] decisions
also [provoked] a series of [popular, although] unsuccessful[, efforts to amend] the Constitution.
. . to limit the powers of the federal judiciary." Id. at 307. Proposed amendments included:
placing final authority over disputes between the states and the federal government in the states
and making the Senate a final court of appeals for such disputes, a series of laws to increase the
Court's size, requiring more than a bare majority decision by the Court to invalidate a state law,
and repealing section 25 of the Judiciary Act. Id. at 307-08.
'44Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1. The Cherokee chose as their lawyers two nationally
known litigators who opposed President Jackson's policies: former United States Attorney
General
145 William Wirt and former Congressman John Sergeant. Norgren, supranote 115, at 69.
The case involved the arrest of George Corn Tassels, a Cherokee tribal leader, for the
murder of another Cherokee on the reservation. Norgen, supra note 115, at 70. After the
Supreme Court issued a writ of error, the state-in direct defiance of the Court-hanged Tassels,
asserting that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over the matter. Id. Georgia did not appear
before the Court for oral argument and refused to acknowledge any legal papers served on it. Id.
at 72. The Supreme Court eventually denied the motion for an injunction on jurisdictional
grounds. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. As Marshall himself said about the case,
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state politics by identifying for the Court's attention only the question of
whether the Cherokee were entitled to invoke the Court's Article III
jurisdiction. 47 Viewing the Cherokee Nation as neither a state nor a foreign
country enabled him to answer that question in the negative.
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable,
and, heretofore unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that
right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government;
yet it may well be doubted, whether those tribes which reside within
the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a
territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which
must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
relation to
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage[; t]heir 148
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
Although Marshall's decision in CherokeeNation avoided a constitutional
crisis and further attack on the Court from President Jackson and the
supporters of states' rights, 149 the opinion further damaged the cause of tribal
sovereignty. Even though Marshall recognized a tribe's right to govern

"[i]f Courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them
can scarcely
be imagined." Id. at 15.
146Norgren, supra note 115, at 72.
47
1 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
48
1 1d. at 17 (emphasis added); see also Newton, supra note 9, at 207 ("From these two
concepts-property interest and guardianship-the Court in the late nineteenth century gradually
developed a guardianship over Indian tribes .... "). Justice Story concurred in Marshall's view
of Indian nations as distinct, but dependent nations: "'Indians . . . were always treated, as
distinct, though in some sort, as dependent nations. Their territorial rights and sovereignty were
respected .... But their right of self-government was admitted; and they were allowed a national
existence .... ' 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 550 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1094 (1833)). However, together with Justice Thompson, Justice Story dissented in Cherokee
Nation; he argued, "the Cherokees compose a foreign state within the sense and meaning of the
constitution, and constitute a competent party to maintain a suit against the state of Georgia."
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 80. The story of the Story and Thompson dissent-the latter
of whom authored the dissent-is quite interesting: neither Justice submitted an opinion to be
published as part of the official Court record; they submitted the dissent only after Marshall,
seeing the unbalanced nature of the public record, prevailed on them to do so. Norgren, supra
note 115, at 74-75. Justice Thompson, a northerner, was a former legal apprentice to New York
State jurist and legal scholar James Kent, who was well known for his support of Indian land
rights. 49
Id.
1 Norgren, supra note 115, at 75; see also BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 53
("Deftly sidestepping a constitutional crisis, the Court disposed of the case on purely
jurisdictional grounds.").
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itself, 50 his designation of qualified nationhood for tribes (as "domestic
dependent nations") placed tribes outside the scope of the Court's Article III
jurisdiction. And while declaring tribes to be "domestic dependent nations" did
not necessarily mean they were inherently inferior or had a status outside the
scope of the law of nations,' in the same breath, he stated Indians were in a
"state of pupilage," and described the relationship between the United States
and the tribes as that of a "ward to his guardian."'' 52 Both the domestic
dependent nation and guardianship concepts undercut any notion of
independent, full sovereignty for tribes.
The third and final case of the Trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia,13 involved
the arrest of several missionaries for violating a Georgia law that required nonIndians desiring to live in Cherokee country to get licenses from the state

15

°BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 53; see also Williams, supra note 90, at 259-60

(seeing Marshall's opinion as clearly describing Cherokee Nation as capable of managing its
own affairs and governing itself.).
' 51As "domestic dependent nations," BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 275, it was
understood that tribes could not enter into treaties with foreign nations. Id. at 39. The ability of
tribes to treat with foreign nations was contested during negotiations between the fledgling
United States and Great Britain preceding the Treaty of Ghent in 1814. See id. at 40. In these
negotiations, the British argued that the tribes, who possessed much of the disputed territory,
were entitled to "territorial integrity" and would not be "'abandon[ed] ... to their fate' by the
British. Id. at 40-41. John Quincy Adams argued that such a decision would "inflict a vital
injury on the United States" and that the new government would never take Indian land unless it
did so "peaceably," and that Indians could never be considered an "independent Power." See
BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 41-43 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Marshall's concept of "a domestic dependent nation" essentially established a protectorate status
between the federal government and the tribes, which-in Marshall's era-did not extinguish
the political character of the protected nation.
[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not
surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety,
may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself
of the right of self-government, and ceasing to be a state.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560-61; see also McCoy, supra note 112, at 366 (finding
significance of Cherokee Nation as "Marshall's reasoning that the tribal-federal relation imposes
inherent limitations on tribal political independence even in the absence of specific federal
Indian legislation or a treaty provision"); Willoughby, supra note 10, at 597-98 n.18 (finding
significant spelling of "dependent" in light of Marshall's explanation of term in text, and stating
that "'[Dlependent' defines one's very extistence as contingent upon another. However
"'dependant' infers a [sic] status of need, of requiring support, and not affirmation from
another."

(citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 354 (New

College ed. 1979))). But see BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 54-57 (suggesting that
ambiguity of phrase domestic dependent nation and its contemporaneous use in English common
law has52"caused more problems than it solved").
1 Barsh and Henderson suggest that Marshall used phrases like "domestic dependent
nation," "state of pupilage," and "ward and guardianship" to describe a kind of "contractual
patronage," not "any notion of involuntary supervision." BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at
54-56 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17).
15331 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
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governor.1 54 Throwing political expediency to the wind, the Court overturned
the convictions, holding that Georgia law had no force on Cherokee land
established by treaty with the United States. 55 The Court thus delivered
a
56
strong Federalist decision in an increasingly anti-federalist environment.
In Worcester, Marshall reworked the negative principles of federal Indian
57
law that he had propounded in the two preceding cases of his Trilogy.
Contradicting M'Intosh, Marshall now said that tribal sovereignty had nothing
to do with theories of discovery, conquest, or fee ownership. 5 8 Rather, it was a
matter of inherent, collective political rights that Indians possessed no
differently from anyone else.' 59 He returned the discovery doctrine to its
original meaning and described as "extravagant and absurd" the notion that
European discovery and settlement constituted conquest or conferred title to
property under European common law. 60 Directly repudiating M'Intosh's
conquest theory,' 6' Marshall wrote that the tribes had never been conquered;
154

at 515.
The Court found Georgia's laws to be "repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties
of the United States," and to violate the political rights of the Cherokee Republic. Id. at 562-63.
The decision precipitated the first constitutional crisis provoked by the judicial branch,
something that must have horrified Marshall. Norgren, supra note 115, at 79. Georgia was
outraged by the Court's opinion. Id. Georgia Governor Lumpkin reportedly said to the Georgia
Superior Court, in response to the Court's mandate, that if it reversed its decision and freed the
missionaries, he would hang them rather than "submit to this decision made by a few
superannuated life estate Judges." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather
than issue a new decree authorizing federal marshals to free the prisoners, the Supreme Court
adjourned. Burke, supra note 134, at 525. For a full recounting of the denouement of the case,
see Norgren, supra note 115, at 79-8 1.
156It is interesting to speculate about why Marshall chose Indian tribes as the vehicle for
his Federalist political agenda. The appropriate federal-state balance in the area of Indian affairs
was a topic of serious debate during the Constitutional Convention. Marshall found the
constitutional language conferring to Congress the authority to regulate Indian affairs to be a
marked departure from the qualified federal authority that existed under the Articles of
Confederation. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 ("The shackles imposed on this power, in
the confederation, are discarded."). Perhaps Marshall saw the Constitution's resolution of the
Indian debate as a relatively easy first step in his broader federalist argument. However, a more
practical reason might have been the need for a strong, centralized, armed response to the
increasing
conflicts between Indians and encroaching white settlers.
157
But see Getches, New Subjectivism, supra note 8, at 1578, 1582-83 (discussing Justice
Marshall's impact on Indian law).
158See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543-46.
159
See id. at 544.
1601d. at 543-46 (describing European colonial charters as "grants assert[ing] a title against
Europeans only ... [that ] were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were
concerned."). Milner Ball argues that, although Marshall used language in M'Intosh that can be
construed to mean that the concept of conquest applied to tribal-European/American relations,
more persuasive language in Fletcher shows that the discovery doctrine had more to do with
how Europeans dealt with one another as they asserted and defended territorial claims. Milner S.
Ball, Constitution, Court,Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 27, 27.
16'Marshall overturned the basis for the holding in M'Intosh without ever mentioning the
case by name. See Eisgruber, supra note 115, at 457-58 (discussing Marshall's practice of not
mentioning cases by name in his opinions).
5 51d.

1

480

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2005:443

rather, the American experience with Indians had been "a continuous process
of negotiation, alliances, reconciliation, and solicitude which had always
respected tribal political integrity."' 162 While tribes had "compromised in
matters of mutual economic interest, [as] exemplified by their agreeability to
the doctrine of preemption [i.e. purchase] of their lands," they "had never
voluntarily 63relinquished their internal political authority" to govern
themselves.

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with the boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
congress. 164
Marshall also expanded on the concept of "domestic dependent nation,"
stating that "Indian nations ha[ve] always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil .... He declared that the relevant treaties
explicitly acknowledged the Cherokee's right of self-government, guaranteed
Cherokee lands, and imposed on the federal government the duty of protecting
both Cherokee land and sovereignty rights from state intrusion. 66 Neither the
Indian Commerce Clause nor the Treaty power should be construed to
authorize federal intervention in tribal affairs or "a surrender of selfgovernment," which "would be, we think, a perversion of their necessary
meaning, and a departure from the construction which has been uniformly put
62

& HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 57 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 54256); see also Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 749 (1835) ("By thus holding
treaties with these Indians, accepting of cessions from them with reservations, and establishing
boundaries with them, the king waived all rights accruing by conquest or cession, and thus most
solemnly acknowledged that the Indians had rights of property which they could cede or reserve
....
").
Because the United States had continued the policies of Great Britain, France, and Spain,
entered into treaties with tribes, and thus renounced the right of conquest, it could not now
assume63that property right. Id. at 754.
1 BARSH

1 BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 57 (interpreting Worcester).
164Worcester, 31
65

U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.

1 Id.at 559.
166

at 551-56. Worcester is often cited for the proposition that the Cherokee ceded land
to the United States, and that the treaty described "the extent of that cession." Id. at 553. All
federal Indian legislation "manifestly consider[s] the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having
a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied
[sic] by the United States." Id. at 557. "It could not, however, be supposed that any intention
existed of restricting the full use of the lands they reserved." Id. at 553; see also United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) ("[T]he treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a
grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted."). The language is also the basis
for the preemption doctrine, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 278-88.
1d.
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on them."' 167 Marshall made it clear that the tribes' relationship to the federal
government was governed by consent and the concept of dependency as it was
then understood in international law, not by any wardship or subordination
arising out of Indians' nature or primitive condition. 168 Worcester thus
contradicted the Court's characterization of tribes in Cherokee Nation as
inferior and unable to govern themselves, while leaving intact the ultimate
supremacy of the federal government in tribal matters.
The Cherokee finally prevailed in Worcester,169 and proponents of tribal
sovereignty consider the decision to be among the few high water marks in
Indian law because it recognized and affirmed the existence of tribal
sovereignty, albeit a sovereignty cabined by the greater authority of the federal
government.170 Yet, it is the language of the earlier two cases and the doctrines
they spawned--discovery, plenary power, federal trust, and preemption, never
unfortunately comprise much of
specifically overruled by Worcester-which
17 1
law.
Indian
modern
to
legacy
Marshall's
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 554.
at 542-43; see also id. at 559 ("America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean,
was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into nations, independent of each other and of the rest
of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws.").
Id. ("The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the
supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian
nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making
treaties.").
169Worcester did not prevent the Cherokees from losing their homeland and demonstrated
that Indian rights, however fundamental, were still vulnerable to violation by the Federal
Government. See generally McLOUGHLIN, supra note 141, at 411-47 (describing events leading
up to removal of Cherokee from their lands); PRUCHA, supra note 83, at 191-242 (describing
federal government's removal policy and its impact on southern tribes, including Cherokee). For
a description of the reluctance of the Cherokee to give up their homeland after winning their case
before the United States Supreme Court, see Justice Stephen Breyer, "For Their Own Good: "
The Cherokees, the Supreme Court, and the Early History of American Conscience, NEW
REPUBLIC,
170 Aug. 7, 2000, at 32.
See Getches, New Subjectivism, supra note 8, at 1582 ("Worcester lays the cornerstone
for the legal system's continuing recognition of tribal sovereignty."). Indeed, to Singer,
Worcester was a high-water mark in federal Indian law, from which the Supreme Court-and
Congress-has been determinedly "back-tracking." Singer, supra note 19, at 9. Singer argues
that the Supreme Court has engaged in "extraordinary judicial activism" that flies in the face of
Worcester. Id. at 9-10. In support of his argument, Singer cites Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676
(1990) (holding that tribal governments may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians who
are not members of tribe), Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that tribe had no power to zone fee property located within borders of
reservation but owned by nonmembers), Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)
(holding that tribes cannot regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on fee lands within
reservation, and adopting general rule that tribes can exercise regulatory authority when conduct
on such lands "threatens or has some direct effect on political integrity, economic security, or
health or welfare of the tribe"), and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(holding that tribes cannot exercise criminal authority over non-Indians, even for minor
Id.
offenses).
171Norgren points out the harm could have been much greater if either Justice Henry
Baldwin or William Johnson, both of whom voted with Marshall, had written the opinion in
167Worcester, 31

68
1 1d.
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Perhaps because Marshall never reconciled his different views of
Indians-fierce savages without natural rights (M'Intosh) and dependent on the
federal government for protection (Cherokee Nation), or organized tribes
possessing the inherent political right to self-govern (Worcester)-later courts
could use language from the earlier cases to justify infringing upon tribal
sovereignty and could ignore Marshall's later refinement of those concepts in
Worcester.17 2 For example, Marshall attempted, in Worcester, to limit the
circumstances in which Indian title could be extinguished to those involving
conquest after just wars, in which Indians had been the aggressors. In Tee-HitTon Indians v. United States,173 however, the Court construed this part of
Worcester to mean that the federal government had conquered all Indian tribes
and thereby gained title to all Indian land. 74 The language and reasoning in

Worcester. See Norgren, supra note 115, at 77-78. Justice Baldwin, a clear "Jacksonian in
matters of Indian policy," id. at 74, wrote in a separate concurring opinion in Cherokee Nation
that Indian tribes were not "political communities of any kind," Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) at 49 (Baldwin, J., concurring), that "Georgia [had] full jurisdiction over the Cherokee, and
fee simple title to their lands," id., and that the Court lacked the power to reverse these
principles. Id. at 49. Justice Johnson said the following about the Cherokees in his concurrence:
Their condition is something like that of the Israelites, when inhabiting the deserts..

I think it very clear that the constitution neither speaks of them as states or
foreign states, but as just what they were, Indian tribes; an anomaly ... which the
law of nations would regard as nothing more than wandering hordes, held together
only by ties of blood and habit, and having neither laws or government, beyond what
is required in a savage state.
Id. at 27-28
(Johnson, J., concurring).
172See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (citing Cherokee
Nation, 118 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 382). The court in Kagama upheld the Major Crimes Act, which
federalized certain offenses committed by Indians, thus removing these crimes from tribal
jurisdiction.
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on
the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their
political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no
protection. Because of local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found
are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them, and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it
the power.
Id. at 383-84; see also Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955) ("Every
American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their
ancestral ranges by force and that, even when Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return
for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of
their land.").
173348 U.S. 272 (1955). Newton describes Tee-Hit-Ton Indians as a "paradigm of the
plenary power era judicial style ... in its slighting reference to native's culture, and its repeated
invocations of the political question doctrine as [reasons to tie] the hands of the [federal]
judiciary."
Newton, supra note 9, at 248.
174
See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians,348 U.S. at 279-80.
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Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,'75 in which the Court held the arrest of
two non-Indians on a reservation by tribal police to be an unwarranted
assertion of tribal jurisdiction over the personal liberty of United States
citizens, 176 resonates with Marshall's earlier depictions of Indians as "savages."
177 The Oliphant Court also found the doctrine of inherent sovereignty to be
inconsistent with the tribes' incorporation into the territory of the United
States 178 -a territory, the Court observed,
in which the sole sovereigns are the
79
federal government and the states. 1
Over the next two centuries, congressional policies would severely erode
tribal sovereignty, and the Court would affirm many of those initiatives based
on the principles enunciated in M'Intosh and Cherokee Nation. 80 At the same
175435

U.S. 191, 210 (1978). Oliphant involved the arrest of a non-Indian for assaulting a

tribal officer. Id. at 194-95. Tribal authorities arrested a second non-Indian after a high-speed
chase over reservation highways that ended when his car crashed into a tribal police vehicle. Id.
Despite the fact that both these events occurred on reservation property, the Court held that,
absent an affirmative congressional delegation of power, Indians do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 208; see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 357-66 (2001)
(extending Oliphant to civil case, and holding that Navajo Nation lacked civil jurisdiction over
non-Indian police officer accused by tribal member of damaging property during search of his
house located on reservation). See generally Gould, supra note 7, at 842-48 (offering more
complete discussion of Oliphant).
176
Oliphant,435 U.S. at 211-12.
177 Marshall's unfortunate comparison of tribal occupation of land to "medieval tenant
farmers [who] occupied their lands at the sufferance of the 'lords of the fee,"' BARSH &
HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 49 (quoting M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592), influenced not
only the Oliphant Court, but "all subsequent thinking" about the relationship between Indian
tribes and the federal government. Id.; see also Norgren, supra note 115, at 68 ("Although the
depth of Marshall's concern for the Cherokee remains open to question, there is no contesting
the fact that, as Chief Justice, he used the Cherokee appeals to establish an American
jurisprudence of United States-Native American relations."). Marshall also likened the founding
of the British nation on the conquest of the Normans to the founding of the United States on the
conquest of Indians. BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 49.
78
' Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209; see also id. at 210 ("By submitting to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try
non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress. This
principle would have been obvious a century ago when most Indian tribes were characterized by
a 'want of fixed laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice' . . . It should be no less obvious
today, even though present-day Indian tribal courts embody dramatic advances over their
historical antecedents." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 23-474, at 18 (1834)). Aleinikoff explains that
the Court saw its decision in Oliphant as "the mirror image of Ex Parte Crow Dog."
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 107. In Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), the Court
denied federal jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crimes, saying that for a federal court to try
Indian defendants would have been to subject them to trial "not by their peers, nor by the
customs of their people ... [but by a] different race, according to the law of a social state of
which they have an imperfect conception". Id. at 571. According to Aleinikoff, Oliphant
reflected the same sense of unfairness that would be experienced if United States citizens were
prosecuted in alien courts. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 107-09.
179
0iphant, 435 U.S. at 211.
,SSee, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (sustaining application of
Dawes Act to treaty protected reservation); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)
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time, Marshall's more enlightened views of Indians and inherent tribal
sovereignty, set out in Worcester, have neither been specifically overruled nor
completely abandoned. Together with treaties protecting tribal lands, the
principles articulated in Worcester 81 should have enabled tribes to maintain
the measured separatism'82 needed to survive as discrete societies. However,
they have not. Federally induced changes in reservation boundaries have
diminished the ability of tribes to regulate activities on land once under their
exclusive domain, while the Court's use of other antitribal sovereignty
principles from the Trilogy has justified significant congressional and state
(sustaining Major Crimes Act). But see Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S.
404 (1968) (refusing to apply Termination Act of 1954 to abrogate treaty-protected fishing and
hunting rights).
81
' See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 42 (listing concepts articulated in M'Intosh,
Cherokee Nation, and Worcester as including "the doctrine of discovery, the guardian-ward
relationship, and the description of Indian Tribes as 'domestic dependent nations' and 'distinct
independent political communities' (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17;
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 519)); see also Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,
761 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("An Indian tribe's assertion of immunity in a state judicial
proceeding is unique because it implicates the law of three different sovereigns: the tribe itself,
the State, and the Federal Government."); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1916)
(holding that offense of adultery committed by one Sioux Indian against another member of
same tribe on reservation is not punishable under general federal criminal code, and stating "the
relations of Indians among themselves-the conduct of one toward another-is to be controlled
by the customs and laws of the tribe, save when Congress expressly or clearly directs
otherwise."); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896) (holding that Constitution did not
apply to grand jury indictment process adopted by Cherokee Nation to prosecute its members in
tribal court, and noting that police powers of tribe were not "federal powers created by and
springing from the constitution," but instead "existed prior to the constitution" and amounted to
retained, inherent sovereignty free from federal constitutional constraint); City of Albuquerque
v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (10th Cir. 1996) (basing Pueblo of Isleta's authority to set water
quality standards more stringent than those required by federal law on tribe's inherent sovereign
authority); Erik M. Jensen, The Continuing Vitality of Tribal Sovereignty Under the
Constitution, 60 MONT. L. REv. 3, 9 (1999) (citing Kiowa Tribe as proof that "Supreme Court
does not think that [tribal] sovereignty has disappeared"); McCoy, supra note 112, at 366-67
(explaining that Marshall's vision of "tribal-federal relation[ship as] a protectorate, within which
tribal political independence [is] largely preserved," constrained only by treaties and federal
statutes regulating relations with tribes and by nature of protectorate relation itself (characterized
by Marshall as "guardian-ward" relationship), is still extant in modem Indian law, as is "the
doctrine of equality among nations and the theory that political independence can be implied
without full or formal diplomatic recognition"). Getches stresses that United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978), reaffirmed the legal principle that tribes had "inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished," and draws similar comfort from
language in Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez, 435 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978), that gender distinctions
drawn by tribal authorities do not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment precisely because "tribes
have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed
specifically as limitations on federal or state authority." Getches, New Subjectivism, supra note
8, at 1599. But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 n.4 (2001) (demoting Worcester to
historical
anomaly of no precedential value).
82
1 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 16 ("The concept of Indian reservation is best
defined as the concrete manifestation of a guarantee of a 'measured separatism' to Indian
people." (quoting WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 4)).
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intrusion into tribal life. Much of this has occurred under the Rehnquist Court,
which has accelerated the rate at which Marshall's doctrine of inherent
sovereignty is eroding. This makes the task of resuscitating inherent
sovereignty as an independent basis for enhanced tribal sovereignty even more
daunting than before.
The Article now turns to a discussion of how these misguided federal
policies and discrepant Supreme Court decisions have eroded, but not
completely destroyed, Indian tribal sovereignty. It places particular emphasis
on tribal dependence on a separate, coherent land base.
B. The "Shifting Tectonic Plates" of TribalSovereignty'

83

Because we say we have a government of laws and not men, we hold
our government to be limited and to have no unlimited power. If the
federal government nevertheless exercises unrestrained power over
Indian nations, then what we say is not true,84and we have a different
kind of government than we think we have.1
Tribal sovereignty is composed of two legally and culturally intertwined
elements: the power of a tribe to govern both its territory and its members. But
the power to control land is the essential, constitutive' 85 element of sovereignty
for tribes, and hence is the sole focus of this part of the Article. 186 The fact that
tribes occupy a separate land base poses particular problems for any proposal
seeking to enhance tribal sovereignty and has been a continual source of
friction with their surrounding states.1 87 This Section, therefore, first discusses
why land is so important to tribes and how a tribe's relation to its homeland is
at the core of what makes Indian society fundamentally different from nonIndian society. It then describes various federal policies and Court decisions
83

Id. at 99-100 (describing tribal sovereignty as consisting of "shifting tectonic plates"
along "fault line" created by "role 'differences' might play in tribal court jurisprudence"). The
metaphor appears equally apt for any discussion of tribal sovereignty in general.

18854 Ball, supra note 160, at 61.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-55 (discussing Anaya's normative strands of
self-determination).
186
See United States v. Mazuirie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory...
."). For a slightly different view of tribal sovereignty, see POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 100
(arguing that concept of sovereignty consists of two main components: "the recognition of a
government's proper zones of authority free from intrusion by other sovereigns within the
society, and the understanding that within these zones the sovereign may enact substantive rules
that are potentially divergent or 'different' from that of other-even dominant-sovereigns
within the system"). Tribal sovereignty does not include a third power commonly associated
with the notion of sovereignty, the power to conclude treaties with foreign nations and the
implicit87power to declare war against a foreign state.
' See, e.g., Timothy Egan, New Prosperity Brings New Conflict to Indian Country, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1998, at 1 (describing friction between Goshutes and their Utah neighbors).
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that have made that core porous, despite the putative protective barriers of
federal treaties and the inherent sovereignty doctrine. Finally, this Section
looks at whether tribal societies remain sufficiently discrete to warrant the
resuscitation of tribal sovereignty to protect them, and whether they may serve
as repositories for Sandel's dispersed sovereignty.
1. The Importance of TribalLand
To lose the hunting ground was to a Cherokee like losing the Latin
mass to a conservative Roman Catholic. A sacred, ancient, and
apparently timeless tradition-something that God or the Great Spirit
had written into the fundamental structure of things-was gone
forever. 188
Land is the sine qua non of tribal sovereignty. Maintaining a separate land
base is critical for tribes not only because of land's physical attributes and the
legal consequences that flow from having a tribal homeland, but because it
allows Indians to "remain[] indelibly Indian, proudly defining themselves as a
people apart and resisting full incorporation into the dominant society around
them"; 189-a concept Wilkinson calls measured separatism.19°
Historically, and still today, tribal members rely on the wildlife and plants
found on or near their reservations for subsistence, medicine, and traditional
ceremonies. Tribes also lease their lands to energy companies for development
of subsurface resources' 9 1 and disposal of waste material, 192 and operate a
variety of commercial enterprises like hotels, ski resorts, and gambling
casinos. 193 They depend upon the productivity of these lands to support multigenerational habitation as an important, enduring, and unique feature of Indian
culture. 194 Reservations also give tribes a separate, physical place that they can
188McLOUGHLIN, supra note 141, at 92.
189 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 13 (citing WILLIAM CRUNON, CHANGES IN THE LAND

163-67 (1983)); see also Mary Christina Wood, Protectingthe Attributes of Native Sovereignty:
A New Trust Paradigmfor FederalActions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L.
REv. 109, 132-33 (1995) (identifying land, viable tribal economy, self-government, and cultural
vitality90as interlinking, essential attributes of tribal sovereignty).
1 WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 14.
191See, e.g., Ben Nighthorse Campbell, The Truth About the Indian Energy Bill, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, at www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1059139059
(July 25, 2003)
(discussing
proposed
bill
that
would
level
playing
field
for
mineral
mining
on
tribal
lands).
192See, e.g., Valerie Taliman, Opponents Call Nuke Deal Environmental Racism, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, at www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1018189423 (Apr. 9, 2002).
193See, e.g., Cate Montana, Tulalip Quil Ceda Village May Be Larger than Marysville,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, at www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=2156 (Nov. 15, 2000).
194Wood, supra note 189, at 133 ("A priority implicit in Indian land tenure is maintaining a
homeland in which both present and future generations of the tribe may live in close harmony
with the land and its resources.").
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of
close to non-Indians-enabling them to remain free from the
195 influence
white society and to retain the unique aspects of their cultures.
Tribes without land find it more difficult to gain federal recognition and
government.196
status with the federal
government-to-government
Nonrecognition means that tribes cannot assume primary regulatory authority
under federal pollution control laws for activities that take place on their
reservations. 197 Nonrecognized tribes cannot develop casinos as a source of
tribal income' 98 and are ineligible for much-needed financial and technical
assistance under a host of federal programs.' 99
The reservation also performs an important legal function for tribes, as the
Court considers the presence of tribal land to be a precondition for the exercise
of tribal sovereignty. 200 For example, on its reservation, with the exception of
195

Pommersheim notes that while the "attractions and connections [to the land] do not
prevent people from leaving the reservation, ...they do make leaving hard," and "most who
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 15-16.
leave return."
196Having a land base helps a tribe meet federal criteria for recognition-such as the
requirement that a "predominant portion of the petitioning group comprises a distinct
community and has existed as a community from historical times until the present,"- which
entitles the tribe to government-to-government relations with the federal government. 25 C.F.R.
§ 83.7(b) (2004). For example, the federal government recently authorized the use of the Internet
suffix ".gov" by tribes as part of their e-mail addresses. Washington in Brief WASH. POST, Apr.
27, 2002, at A4. See generally Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the
United States, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 271, 279-83 (2001) (discussing procedures for tribal
recognition).
197
See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000) (treating tribes as states for
purposes of administering law's standard setting and permitting provisions); id. § 1377(h)
(defining Indian tribe to mean "any Indian tribe, band, group, or community recognized by the
Secretary of the Interior and exercising governmental authority over a Federal Indian
reservation").
198See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000)
(providing legal framework within which federally recognized tribes may regulate gaming
enterprises on their land).
199See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1975)
("Nonrecognition of the tribe by the federal government ... may result in the loss of statutory
benefits,
20 but can have no impact on vested treaty rights.").
°See generally Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456-59 (1997) (holding that civil
authority of Indian tribes and their courts with respect to non-Indian fee lands within boundaries
of reservation does not extend to activities of non-tribal members); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (holding that inherent sovereignty only authorizes tribe to "punish
tribal offenders .... determine tribal membership, regulate domestic relations among members,.
. prescribe rules of inheritance for members," and "exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of tribe," but does not extend
to regulation of non-Indian hunting and fishing activities on non-Indian owned land within
reservation boundaries). But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (noting that
existence of tribal land is not by itself sufficient to support regulatory jurisdiction over non-tribal
members); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659-60 (2001) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (stating that defining principle of inherent sovereignty is not Indian ownership of
land, but whether activities in question involve non-Indians); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130, 137, 142 (1982) (upholding tribal "taxing authority over tribal lands leased by
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certain crimes, 2° a tribe exercises full jurisdiction over the activities of its
members.2 °2 But, the sovereign authority of a tribe over its members lessens as
the member moves away from the reservation boundaries, and, on the
reservation, the sovereign immunity disappears entirely over non-Indians on
non-Indian inholdings. The loss of authority is discussed in greater detail in the
next section of this Article.2 °3
nonmembers," as single exception to rule in Hicks regarding regulatory jurisdiction);
ALE1NIKOFF, supra note 16, at 112 (noting that Strate demonstrates "important conceptual shift
from Worcester's geographical approach [to tribal sovereignty] to one based primarily on
membership"); POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 91-95 (discussing how Montana and certain of
its progeny have successfully rebutted narrow presumption against tribal "legislative and
regulatory
jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation").
20 1
Congress abrogated the rule, set out in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 558-60
(1883), that tribes had exclusive jurisdiction over crimes among Indians, when it enacted the
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000) (permitting prosecution of Indians originally for
seven crimes committed against both Indians and non-Indians in Indian Country in federal
court); see also Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000) (limiting jurisdiction of
tribal courts to sentences not exceeding one year's imprisonment and $5000 fine or both, thus
giving tribes little incentive to try to exercise concurrent jurisdiction). For a more detailed
discussion of the extent of tribal court criminal jurisdiction, see POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at
80-81.202
See generally Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) ("Regardless of the
basis for jurisdiction, the federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court
to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a 'full opportunity to determine its own
jurisdiction."' (quoting Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
857 (1985)); Nat'! Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57 (holding that "whether a tribal court has
exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction" is question that must be answered by reference to
federal law, including federal common law, but that federal court proceeding is proper only upon
exhaustion of tribal court remedies); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71-72 (1978)
(holding that Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976), does not
authorize federal court to pass on validity of tribal ordinance denying membership to children of
certain female tribal members); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978) (affirming
tribal authority to punish offenses against tribal law committed by tribal members as part of
"Navajos' primeval sovereignty," sovereignty that has never been taken away from them and
that is in "no way attributable to any delegation to them of federal authority"); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 219-23 (1959) (affirming jurisdiction of tribal court over civil suit brought against
Indians by non-Indians for action arising on reservation, stating that absent governing acts of
Congress, state may not exercise jurisdiction if it would interfere with "right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them"). For a full discussion of the scope of
tribal court
civil jurisdiction, see POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 81-82.
203
See generally Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. at 648, 659 (finding invalid Navajo Nation's
imposition of hotel occupancy tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within its
reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 557-67 (holding that while tribes could not
regulate hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee land within boundaries of reservation, tribes
retained authority over non-Indians "who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members" or whose activities otherwise "direct[ly] effect the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe"). Robert McCoy explains that:
The complexity of tribal-state and tribal-federal relations renders impracticable any
effort to set forth a general set of rules which precisely define the scope of tribal
self-government. Rather, determination of the extent to which tribal self-government
is operative should be related to the tribal interests which arise in particular cases.
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What is harder for non-Indians to understand, and less obvious to us given
our more mobile, rootless way of life, is that tribes have a multi-generational,
cultural bond to their land that makes that land unique and nonfungible. °4 To a
tribe, its reservation is its "cultural centerpiece":
[I]t is the source of spiritual origins and sustaining myth, which in
turn provide[s] a landscape of cultural and emotional meaning....
The reservation is home. It is a place where the land lives and
stalks people; a place where the land looks after people and makes
them live right; a place where the earth provides solace and
nurture.205
Pommersheim suggests that the reservation should be understood as "a
physical, human, legal, and spiritual reality that embodies the history, dreams,
and aspiration of Indian people, their communities, and their tribes' '2° 6-the
McCoy, supra note 112, at 389-90; see also infra Part III.B.2.c (discussing dimming of
Worcester's bright line). The extent to which the Court continues to think that the power to tax is
a fundamental attribute of sovereignty that tribes retain (unless specifically divested of it by
federal law, or by the "necessary implication of their dependent status") has recently been
thrown into some question. Compare Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147-48 (upholding tribal severance
tax upon non-Indian lessees authorized to extract oil and gas from tribal land), with Atkinson
Trading, 532 U.S. at 648, 659 (finding invalid Navajo Nation's imposition of hotel occupancy
tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within its reservation). On the subject of dual
taxation, see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
152-59 (1980) (affirming dual tribal/state authority to impose cigarette and sales taxes on sales
made to non-member Indians on reservation); compare Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163, 167-69, 191-93 (1989) (allowing New Mexico to impose state severance tax on
non-Indian corporation producing oil and gas on reservation, even though tribe also imposed
severance tax).
204See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 13-15 ("Land is basic to Indian people:
they are
part of it and it is part of them; it is their Mother."). Pommersheim variously refers to land as a
"cultural taproot," id. at 24, and "as part of the 'sacred text,"' id. at 34. He stated, "one of the
results of over three centuries of contact has been nearly complete severing of this cultural
taproot connecting Indian people to the land." Id. at 14.
25
Id.at 14-15 (citations omitted). "Yet, paradoxically, it is also a place where the land has
been wounded; a place where the sacred hoop has been broken; a place stained with violence and
suffering. And this painful truth also stalks the people and their Mother." Id. at 15; see also
ANAYA, supra note 25, at 104-06 (acknowledging importance of land to cultural survival of
indigenous peoples and that indigenous land claims are sui generis, distinct from land claims of
other ethnic groups based on notions of property as an international human right); Tsosie, supra
note 17, at 1640 (describing land as "constitutive of [tribal] cultural identity"). Tsosie further
describes how "[m]any Indian tribes.. . identify their origin as a distinct people with a particular
geographic [place]," how that "origin ...becomes a central and defining feature of the tribe's
religio[us] and cultural world view"; she also notes how modem Indians base their "political
claims ... upon [their] distinctive cultural identity as the original inhabitants of lands" that were
"forcibly"
taken from them. Id. at 1639-40.
2 06
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 11 ("It is a place that marks the endurance of Indian
communities against the onslaught of a marauding European society; it is also a place that holds
the promise of fulfillment.").
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"irreducible touchstone of tribal posterity and well-being."2 °7 Tribal land,
therefore, is irreplaceable not simply because there are no longer other large
consolidated tracts of land on which a tribe might sustain itself, but because of
the strong spiritual and cultural attachment Indians have to their reservation.
It may be hard for us to understand why these Indians cling so
tenaciously to their lands and traditional tribal way of life. The record
does not leave the impression that the lands of their reservation are
the most fertile, the landscape the most beautiful or their homes the
most splendid specimens of architecture. But this is their hometheir ancestral home. There, they, their children, and their forebears
were born. They, too, have their memories and their loves. Some
things are worth more than money and the costs of a new
enterprise.20 8
Therefore, to an Indian tribe, land is much more than the sum of its
physical properties. In addition to the economic value that land holds for us all,
Indian land performs unique legal, cultural, spiritual, and self-identification
functions for its occupants. Without this land base, Indian tribes quite simply
cease to exist as culturally distinct societies. Full, undiminished sovereignty
over tribal lands and those who occupy or use those lands is thus essential to
the continuation of Indian tribes in the United States.
2. FederalPolicies that Have Diminished TribalAuthority over Tribal Lands
and Members
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to
their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they
dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has existed
anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the
geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.20 9
For over two centuries, the federal government's relationship with Indian
tribes "has been marked ... by... vacillation., 210° Federal Indian policies have
207

d. at 13. Pommersheim rests any hope that Indians might someday "transform [their]
modem social, economic, and political conditions" and "redefine and redirect the political, legal,
and social relationships [with] non-Indians" on non-Indians gaining a firmer understanding of
of tribal land. Id.
the importance
2 08
Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
dissenting)
209
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
21
°Christian M. Freitag, Putting Martinez to the Test: Tribal Court Disposition of Due
Process, 72 IND. L.J. 831, 833 (1997). Pommersheim is even more vivid in his denunciation of
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swung between the extremes of eradication, assimilation, and selfdetermination. Racism has also burdened these policies and has permeated
almost the entire history of white contact with Indians. 2 11 The self-claimed
these policies, calling them "schizophrenic ...as either extensive and enduring or marginal and
fleeting." POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 44; see also Johnson, supra note 11, at 654
(discussing "President Nixon's message to Congress transmitting recommendations for federal
Indian policy," and proclaiming that this policy "has oscillated between two equally harsh and
unacceptable extremes," "assimilation of tribes into the dominant culture, or promotion of selfdetermination
and tribal identity" (citing H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at 2 (1970))).
21
'For example, John Quincy Adams stated in a 1802 speech on the anniversary of the
landing at Plymouth:
There are moralists who have questioned the right of Europeans to intrude upon the
possessions of the aborigines in any case and under any limitations whatsoever. But
have they maturely considered the whole subject? The Indian right of possession
itself stands, with regard to the greatest part of the country, upon a questionable
foundation. Their cultivated fields, their constructed habitations, a space of ample
sufficiency for their subsistence, and whatever they had annexed to themselves by
personal labor, was undoubtedly by the laws of nature theirs. But what is the right of
a huntsman to the forest of a thousand miles over which he has accidentally ranged
in quest of prey? Shall the liberal bounties of Providence to the race of man be
monopolized by one of ten thousand for whom they were created? Shall the
exuberant bosom of the common mother, amply adequate to the nourishment of
millions, be claimed exclusively by a few hundreds of her offspring? Shall the lordly
savage not only disdain the virtues and enjoyments of civilization himself, but shall
he control the civilization of a world? Shall he forbid the wilderness to blossom like
the rose? Shall he forbid the oaks of the forest to fall before the ax of industry and
rise again transformed into the habitations of ease and elegance? Shall he doom an
immense region of the globe to perpetual desolation, and to hear the howlings of the
tiger and the wolf silence forever the voice of human gladness? Shall the fields and
the valleys which a beneficent God has framed to teem with the life of innumerable
multitudes be condemned to everlasting barrenness? Shall the mighty rivers, poured
out by the hands of nature as channels of communication between numerous nations,
roll their waters in sullen silence and eternal solitude to the deep? Have hundreds of
commodious harbors, a thousand leagues of coast, and a boundless ocean been
spread in the front of this land, and shall every purpose of utility to which they could
apply be prohibited by the tenant of the woods? No, generous philanthropists!
Heaven has not been thus inconsistent in the works of its hands. Heaven has not thus
placed at irreconcilable strife its moral laws with its physical creation.
John Quincy Adams, Speech at Plymouth, Massachusetts (Dec. 22, 1802), reprinted in C.
ROYCE, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY,

EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, 1896-1897, at 536-37 (1899). For other examples, see M'Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590 (referring to Indians as "fierce savages"); id. at 573 ("[T]he character
and religion of [Indians] afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the
superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy."); Nancy Carol Carter, Race and Power
Politics as Aspects of Federal Guardianshipover American Indians: Land-Related Cases, 18871924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 197, 227 (1976) ("The undisguised contempt for the native culture
was unrelieved by an open-minded assessment in any of the principal cases studied. Rather, the
Indians were described as semi-barbarous, savage, primitive, degraded, and ignorant.");
Macklem, supra note 6, at 1358 ("Given [the] obvious ethnocentrism and racism, the proposition
of indigenous inferiority cannot stand as a relevant reason for excluding Indian nations from the
distribution of sovereignty on the continent."); Singer, supra note 19, at 5 (commenting that
early policies and judicial decisions involved "redistribution [of property rights] based on
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intellectual and moral superiority of the white race justified policies that had as
their intent the replacement of a passing race whose time was over and whose
existence could no longer be justified.2 12
The history of federal Indian relations largely defies generalization
because federal-Indian policy has been so incoherent.2 13 However, it is not hard
to conclude that as a consequence of these policies, tribal sovereignty is
substantially less today than it once was, and that Indian culture finds itself on
the verge of extinction in much of our country.214
(a) Ill-Conceived CongressionalPolicies
The happiness which the Indians once enjoyed ...in their primitive
situation ...was now poisoned by bad fruits of the civilized tree
which was planted around them ...overshadowed by the expanded
this tree [many tribes] dropped, withered and are no
branches of
215
....
more

perceived racial hierarchies and transferred interests from the vulnerable to the powerful");
Williams, supra note 77, at 166 ("[O]ur present legal conceptions of Indian status and rights are
grounded in a highly contingent set of historical circumstances and suppressed discourses."); id.
at 184 ("Rarely has the dynamic relationship of American racism and the dominant caste's
economic interest been so clearly revealed within the normative fineries of national legal
Indians in their lands.").
discourse
212 as in the Revolutionary era debate on the status and rights of
See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (subjecting Indians to federal
law, which "tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their
land, but by superiors of a different race, according to the law of a social state of which they
have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their history, to the
habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the
red man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality"); United States v. Clapox, 35 F.
575, 577 (D. Or. 1888) ("[T]he reservation itself is in the nature of a school, and the Indians are
gathered there, under the charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and
which distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man.").
aspirations
213
Robert A. Williams, Jr. blames the sad state of tribal sovereignty on this nation's
colonial past:
Th[e] crisis confronting 'Federal Indian Law' today is the direct byproduct of a legal
discourse which has little to do with the 'Rule of Law,' but is instead grounded in
the peculiar but today irrelevant political history of the early Republic. The dominant
paradigm of Federal Indian Law that subordinates Indian rights of self-determination
to the expedient interests of non-Indians adequately responded to the legitimating
and rationalizing needs of a colonizing Norman usurper.
Williams, supra note 77, at 192.
214Languages and whole histories have all but disappeared from many tribes. Tribes like
the Mashantucket Pequots are making extraordinary efforts to try to recover their cultures. See
Tribal Windfall: A Chance to Reopen History, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1998, at A4.
Kay Larson,
215
McLoUGHLIN, supra note 141, at 308 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959) ("Originally the Indian tribes were separate
nations within what is now the United States. Through conquests and treaties they were induced
to give up complete independence and the right to go to war in exchange for federal protection,
aid, and grants of land.").
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During the colonial period, little attention was paid to the political,
cultural, and societal structure of Indian tribes. The rival colonial governments
relied on tribes-first as a source of food and a necessary component of the
fledgling fur industry, and later as allies in their internecine struggles.216
However, after the colonial period-between 1783 and the end of the War of
1812-this laissez-faire attitude toward Indians gradually changed.
By the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the federal
government had consolidated control over the eastern part of the country,
including its native inhabitants.2 17 The government then turned its attention to
the Western tribes, where it embarked on a policy of actively "trying to reorder
Indian political, cultural and economic institutions.,, 21 8 With the possible
exception of a brief effort to create an Indian state in Oklahoma, then called
Indian Territory, 219 the goal of these policies was to force assimilation of tribes
into white society, either by stripping Indians of their identity or by imposing
upon them a Western political structure.2 20 Under them, federal "Indian agents
assumed control of reservation institutions" and "discouraged the practice of
Indian religious and social ceremonies and festivals."'22 ' They set up "quasigovernments" on Indian reservations "that in many cases ignored Indian
216

See generally Champagne, supra note 72, at 112-18 (discussing Native American
political
217 identity).
See generally PRUCHA, supra note 83, at 1-4 (describing how Indian tribes refusing
treatment as conquered nations after Revolutionary War and white encroachment onto Indian
lands in
21 northeast unraveled treaties between Indian tribes and United States).
8See Champagne, supra note 72, at 118-19 (referring to missionaries who proselytized
relentlessly in attempt to reorder Indians in image of dominant culture, although allowing them
to keep their "kin-based, local and tribal identities"); see also McLOUGHLIN, supra note 141, at
428-47 (describing role of missionaries in Cherokee Nation Cases and in ultimate removal of
Cherokee from their traditional lands); POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 21 (describing boarding
schools operated by Christian missionaries, which "took Indian children away from their
families for substantial periods of time and specifically forbade the speaking of tribal languages
in school").
2 9
1 See Champagne, supra note 72, at 122. Smaller tribes that did not want to give up their
political sovereignty to larger tribes and tribes that did not want to leave their homelands resisted
these efforts. Id. Pressure to open up Indian Territory to white settlers and the railroads also
helped defeat the concept. Id. Federal "policy then turned to settling Indians on reservations near
their traditional
homelands." Id.
22
Jefferson was an early advocate of assimilating Indians into mainstream culture.
You know, my friend, the benevolent plan we were pursuing here for the happiness
of the aboriginal inhabitants in our vicinities. We spared nothing to keep them at
peace with one another, to teach them agriculture and the rudiments of the most
necessary arts, and to encourage industry by establishing among them separate
property. In this way they would have been enabled to subsist and multiply on a
moderate scale of landed possession. They would have mixed their blood with ours,
and been amalgamated and identified with us within no distant period of time.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Alexander von Humboldt (Dec. 6, 1813), in A JEFFERSON
PROFILE, supra note 83, at 224-25; see also Washington, supra note 104, at 956-60
(encouraging
Cherokees to adopt practices and traditions of white colonists).
22 1
Champagne, supra note 72, at 123.
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political forms. 222 The use of Indian language was actively discouraged, and
Indian youth were shipped off to boarding schools to learn Western
traditions.22 3 "Indians were encouraged to become economically self-sustaining
small landholders, who would disassociate themselves from tribal identities
and activities and adopt" the "political identities and cultures" of white
society. 224
The most destructive of these policies, in terms of its impact on tribal
sovereignty vis a vis tribal land, was the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 (also
known as the Indian General Allotment Act). 225 This law was designed to
break up the structure of tribes by destroying the reservation system.226 Viewed
charitably, the Act's purpose was to hasten the assimilation of Indians into
contemporary American society; less charitably it was yet another attempt by
non-Indians to gain control of Indian land and resources.2 27
The Dawes Act authorized the partition of tribal lands among individual
tribal members and the sale of unpartitioned land to white homesteaders.2 28
The Act's effect was to cut Indian homelands apart, to obliterate the boundary
separating Indians from non-Indians, and to reduce substantially the land under
tribal control. 229 Allowing so many non-Indians to settle on what had been
tribal lands "strained" traditional tribal cultural ways, and "undermined" "tribal
institutions. 230 Individual allotments fractionated tribal lands to a point of
nonviability, and land formerly held in trust for tribal members under the Act
222

1d.

2231d.
224

Id. Turpel questions the "cultural authority" of dominant societies (in her case, Canada

and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) to impose their will on other cultures
through law and legal language as a means of "resolv[ing] disputes involving other cultures."
Turpel, supra note 11, at 4. She challenges the manner in which that authority explains (or fails
to explain)
and sustains its authority over different peoples. Id.
225
Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 332-334,
339, 341-342,
348-349, 354, 381 (2000)).
226
president Theodore Roosevelt described the Dawes Act as "a mighty pulverizing engine
to break up the tribal mass," which "acts directly upon the family and the individual."
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 19; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 100 (blaming federal

allotment policy for "current conundrums" regarding Indian sovereignty because it introduced
significant non-Indian settlement within "reservation boundaries"); WILKINSON, supra note 49,
at 19-23 (calling Dawes Act, and policy of vigorous assimilation behind it, most devastating
historical blow to tribalism and Indian life); Frickey, supra note 9, at 14 n.68 (stating that
allotment era caused profound change in federal Indian law, which "has not been the same
since," and is responsible for "Court's abandonment of undiluted principles of tribal sovereignty
[in the case] of non-Indians in Indian country"); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27
ARIz. ST.
L.J. 1, 70-78 (1995) (discussing contemporary effects of allotment era).
227
See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 19-20.

228

id

229Id. at 20. By 1934, when the policy was terminated, Indian land-holdings had been

reduced
from "138 million acres in 1887 to 52 million acres." Id.
230
d. at 19; see also Willoughby, supra note 10, at 619 ("By gradually removing from
tribal control 'pockets' of jurisdiction within Indian country, and awarding control of those
'pockets' to the states, the longevity of tribal cultures are threatened.").
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was sold or leased by the government to non-Indians.2 3 ' The infusion of so
many non-Indians onto what had been exclusively Indian territory also became
a stepping stone for Court decisions that stripped tribes of their sovereignty
over allotted lands. 232 This had the effect of making the entire reservation more
porous to the influence of non-Indians and of easing the path to assimilation
into white society for tribal members.233
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (WheelerHoward Act of 1934) ("IRA"), 234 which, on its surface, abandoned the prior
policy of assimilation in favor of a policy that promoted tribal selfdetermination.235 The Act recognized tribal sovereignty as absolute, although
subject to Congressional limitations and federal agency approval.236 While the
Act ended the practice of allotting reservation land, it did nothing to reverse or
change the existing patterns of allotment or return to tribes sovereignty over
the non-Indian inholdings on their reservations.23 7 Indigenous governments had
23 1

See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 20-21.
See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 420-28 (1989) (holding that tribe had lost ability to control land in area where nonIndian ownership was common, and that county had sole authority to zone lands within that area,
even though land was within boundaries of tribe's reservation). For a detailed analysis of the
various opinions in this plurality decision by the Supreme Court, see Gould, supra note 7, at
876-81. For examples of other cases in which the existence of non-Indian land within the
boundaries of an Indian reservation was determinative, see Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645, 648, 659 (2001) (holding invalid Navajo Nation's imposition of hotel occupancy tax
upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within its reservation); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508
U.S. 679, 691-95 (1993) (holding that when Congress opens up reservation land to non-Indians,
effect of transfer is to abrogate pre-existing Indian rights to regulate fishing and hunting);
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
253, 269-70 (1992) (authorizing Yakima County to impose ad valorem property tax on land
within Yakima Reservation patented in fee pursuant to Dawes Act and not owned by reservation
Indians233or tribe itself).
See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463, 500-02 (1979) (holding that state could assert criminal and civil jurisdiction on
reservation under state law). The Court used a rational basis test to uphold the state law, finding
that Congress dealt with tribes based on status, not race. Id. The state's "checkerboard
jurisdiction" over tribal Indians was rational because multiple layers of jurisdiction in Indian
country were not unusual. Id. Gould blames Congress's "devastating policy of allotment[ ]" for
the Court's decision in Oliphant, which "divested tribes of criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians" based on the incorporation of tribes into the United States. Gould, supra note 7, at 84244. By the time the Court decided Oliphant, "almost two-thirds" "of the reservation's 7276
acres" was owned by non-Indians, and "only fifty residents, or 1.7%," of the "2978 living on the
reservation" at time of decision "were members of the Suquamish Tribe." Id. at 844; see also
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 90-91 (discussing effect of subsequent treaties and unilateral
acts of Congress, which diminished "a number of reservations in Indian Country," on tribal court
jurisdiction).
23425 U.S.C. §§ 461-478 (2000).
235
See DELOR1A & LYTLE, supra note 25, at 7, 146-47.
2361d. at 142-43.
237
See Gould, supra note 7, at 832-34 (discussing legislative history of IRA, and arguing
that while Act "extended the period[] during which lands were held in trust" under Dawes Act
232
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been based on "customs, beliefs, and practices [that could ]be traced to
precontact times., 238 The IRA interfered with, and in some cases destroyed,
indigenous governments by requiring tribes to conduct tribal elections and to
adopt constitutions and governmental institutions modeled after those of the
federal government in order to establish government to government relations
with the federal government and to gain access to federal funds.239
In the 1950s, assimilation re-emerged briefly as the dominant federal
Indian policy in what is known as the "termination period." During this phase,
Congress "terminated the legal existence of more than one hundred tribes" and
bands. 240 The effects of termination were extensive and wide-ranging for those
tribes that experienced it. 24 1 "Termination ended the special federal-tribe
relationship," as well as tribes' historic special status; it "transferred almost all
responsibilities for, and powers over, [terminated tribes] to the states. 242
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("ICRA") 243 is another law that,
despite its laudable intent, has been as destructive of tribal traditions, tribal
society, and tribal sovereignty as the Dawes Act and the IRA. 2 4 In enacting the
ICRA, Congress intended to impose on tribal governments some of the more
basic elements of the Bill of Rights.2 45 But, in doing this, the ICRA
and "restored unsold surplus lands to tribal ownership," it failed to reverse policies and
of Congress' allotment policy).
consequences
238
See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 25, at 18-19 ("It is crucial to realize at the start that
these have not necessarily been the forms of government that the Indian people themselves have
demanded or appreciated and are certainly not the kind of government that most Indians, given a
truly free choice in the matter, would have adopted by themselves."); see also id. at 16-27
(describing how traditional governments have not disappeared entirely); POMMERSHEIM, supra
note 16, at 22 (commenting on adverse effect of IRA on tribes); Barsh, supra note 11, at 60
(blaming "resurgence of racism in Indian country" on federal Indian policies establishing criteria
for tribal
239 recognition).
See generally, DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 25, at 7, 140-53 (describing enactment of
Reorganization Act of 1934).
Indian240
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 217 n.59.
241
But see Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 390 U.S. 404, 412-14 (1968)
(holding that termination did not abrogate tribe's off-reservation, treaty-protected hunting and
fishing242rights).
Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 139, 152 (1977); see also Champagne, supra note 72, at 124 (stating that
termination policy spawned modem "pan-Indian" movement in effort to resist loss of Indian
tribal treaty rights, "special status of Indians under the law or the Constitution," and Indian
land).
24325 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1312, 1321-1326, 1341 (2000).
244DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 25, at 212-13 (accusing ICRA of transforming inherent
tribal sovereignty, as reflected in Talton v. Mayes, "by objectifying it in institutions designed by
non-Indians"); see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 73 ("[T]he notion of strong individual
rights that could be enforced against the majority government was alien to the traditions and
customs of many tribes, where the group, not the individual, is primary."); Robert T. Coulter,
Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of
Rights, 3 COLUM. SURV. HUM. RTs. L. 49, 49-50 (1970-71) (criticizing ICRA as another
of unilateral imposition of federal standards that abridged tribal sovereignty).
example
24 5
See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 53.
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transformed tribes. Before the ICRA, tribes had been social units of
interconnecting, communal responsibilities and duties; after it, they changed
into a system of individual rights directed against tribal governments.246 The
ICRA also inserted tribal courts, with their formal rules and procedures,
between tribal members and their responsibilities. 47
The most striking aspect of the 200-year history of federal policies
towards Indians is the abruptness of the changes in those policies and their
contradictory goals. Tribes have experienced alliance, extermination, removal,
assimilation, termination, self-determination. Amazingly, they survived all of
these mostly misguided and wrong-headed efforts by the federal government to
solve the perceived problem of having alien cultures in our midst. If the
Supreme Court had acted as a check on these policies, their effects would not
have been so profound. But the Court did not, and its almost complete
deference to Congress on matters of Indian policy deprived the tribes of any
protection they might otherwise have had from these destructive policies. It is
to the judiciary's contribution toward the destruction of tribal sovereignty that
this Article now turns.
2. DebilitatingJudicialDoctrines
No act of interpretation and no elaboration of consent theory can
explain federal exercise of power and dominion over Indian tribes.
Materials about relations between the United States and Indian tribes
undermine the central tenets of federal courts' jurisprudence-that
the Constitution is the beginning of the analysis for the exercise of all
the powers of the federal government, and that, by constitutional
interpretation, the federal powers are limited and constrained.24 8

at 53, 60-61.
See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 25, at 213 (blaming ICRA and establishment of tribal
courts for "eliminat[ion of] any sense of responsibility [individual Indians] might have felt for
one another" because they no longer "had to confront one other before their community and
resolve their problems; they only had to file suit in a tribal court"). But see Iowa Mutual Ins. Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987) ("Tribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government.
.
and the Federal Government has consistently encouraged their development.");
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 57-59 (citing as indication of health of tribal sovereignty,
increasingly important role of tribal courts, which applied tribal laws and customs, in
adjudicating
disputes arising on Indian reservations).
24
8Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the FederalCourts, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 697 (1989) (citations omitted); see also Pommersheim, supra note 12, at
439 (identifying as prime themes in field of Indian law, "colonialism astride constitutional
democracy, pluralism pitted against assimilation and termination, and tribal sovereignty bristling
against trust dependence and state encroachment"). See generally Newton, supra note 9, at 19598 (blaming unbridled Congressional power over Indian affairs, particularly power to invade
tribal property and sovereignty rights, on Court's abdication of any role in defining unique status
of Indian tribes in United States' constitutional system).
2461d.
24 7
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While the Supreme Court has occasionally held that "Indian tribes [are] a
separate people capable of regulating their own internal and social
relations, ,,249 more often its decisions have stripped tribes of their independent
governing status and the protections tribes thought they had won when they
ceded land to the federal government. 250 The Court's decisions have also
eroded the buffer between the tribes and the states that Marshall established in
Worcester.2 5 1 The collective effect of the Court's Indian law decisions has left
249

McCoy, supra note 112, at 386. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978),
the Court found that a federal court was without jurisdiction to hear a complaint arising under
the equal protection clause of the ICRA. Id. at 72. It held that providing a federal forum would
interfere with tribal autonomy and self-government, and stated, "Indian tribes are 'distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in matters of local selfgovernment.' . . . As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically
been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as
limitations on federal or state authority." Id. at 55-56 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at
559). In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), the Court held that simultaneous
prosecutions of a Navajo tribal member by the Navajo Tribe and the United States, for violations
arising out of same incident, did not constitute double jeopardy. Id. at 329-30. It observed that
the fact that
Congress has in certain ways regulated the manner and extent of the tribal power of
self-government does not mean that Congress is the source of that power ....
It
follows that when the Navajo tribe exercises this power, it does so as part of its
retained sovereignty and not as an arm of the Federal Government.
Id. at 328. The Court reasoned that to authorize federal preemption of Navajo Tribe's
jurisdiction to punish its own members for infractions of tribal law would detract substantially
from tribal self-government. Id. at 331; see also Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899)
(holding that tribal custom, not state law, controlled depescendancy of land owned by deceased
member of Chippewa Tribe); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding that Bill of
Rights did not restrict Cherokee government in case involving indictment of Cherokee tribal
member for murder of another tribal member, and saying tribal powers predate U.S. Constitution
and therefore are not directly subject to its requirements); Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737,
755 (1866) ("If the tribal organization of the Shawnees is preserved intact, and recognized by the
political department of the government as existing, then they are a 'people distinct from others,'
capable of making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas, and to be governed
exclusively by the government of the Union.").
250See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over
the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning."); United
States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1882) (holding that tribal courts do not have criminal
jurisdiction over offenses committed by non-Indian against non-Indian in Indian country); see
also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 84 (stating that Lone Wolfand MeBratney are prototypical
of cases "evinc[ing] a view that the authority of Indian tribes ha[s] been severely eroded by the
increased presence and dominance of non-Indian society and that tribal sovereignty must
therefore be appropriately reduced"). Frickey observes that none of the cases in which these
principles were articulated involved disputes between Indians and non-Indians; instead, they
"were developed in [the context of] cases contesting the authority of tribes vis-d-vis the federal
or state governments or the tribe's own members." Frickey, supra note 9 at 14. These cases
contributed to the dilution of the principle of retained, inherent geographical tribal sovereignty.
Id. Giving Indians citizenship in 1924 also "undermined the simple 'we/they' context of federal
Indian policy". Id. at 16.
251 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
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tribes with a residual, contingent form of sovereignty-sovereignty by
congressional sufferance 2 52-and left them vulnerable to state displacement.
Most Indian law scholars are highly critical of the Court's Indian law
jurisprudence, especially its more recent decisions.253 Resnik finds the entire
legal history of federal-tribal relations rooted in "a discourse of conquest, not
consent," which produced virtually unlimited federal powers. Pommersheim
criticizes the current Court's view of tribal sovereignty as "theoretically
incoherent within a constitutional democracy that is premised on a central
government of limited and enumerated powers. 254 Duthu complains that the
Court has reversed the "paradigm of paternalism in the context of Indian
relations .. . ; whereas government, as a normative matter, must justify its
incursions into private individual spheres of autonomy, such justification is
virtually presumed when the government acts in Indian affairs. 255
Much of the Court's jurisprudence has centered on its prudential plenary
power and the federal trust doctrines. As the following discussion of these
doctrines shows, there is certainly a basis for this criticism.
(a) The Plenary Power Doctrine and Unlimited CongressionalPower

can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent
of the Cherokee themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with acts of Congress.").
252Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 ("The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete
defeasance.").
253
Pommersheim finds particular fault with recent Supreme Court rulings, calling them at
best "ambivalen[t]" "in the face of tribal assertions of authority on the reservation in such
diverse matters as taxing, hunting and fishing, and zoning rights." POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16,
at 51; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 107 (criticizing Court's Indian sovereignty
jurisprudence for being "a muddle"); BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 137 (criticizing
federal courts for being "just as ambiguous as Congress and even less prepared to accept
responsibility" for "defin[ing] the nature of tribal sovereignty"); Johnson, supra note 11, at 66466 (discussing hostility of Court toward Indian sovereignty, and how it is "simultaneously
whittling away at both tribal legislation and judicial jurisdiction"); Newton, supra note 9, at 195
(discussing how Court, following policy of "judicial deference [toward] federal legislation
affecting Indians[,] . . .has sustained nearly every federal [law] . . .regulating Indian tribes,
whether challenged as being beyond federal power or within that power but violating individual
rights"). Some scholars, while joining in the criticism of the decisions of the Rehnquist Court,
argue that Indian law has nevertheless been a powerful tool for tribes seeking enhanced
sovereignty. See, e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 120-21 (explaining that reservation system
provides measured noninferference); Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 8, at 267 ("Until
the mid-1980's, the Court's approach in Indian law was to continue laws in light of the nation's
tradition of recognizing independent tribal powers to govern their territory and the people within
it."); Getches, New Subjectivism, supra note 8, at 1573 ("For a century and a half, the Supreme
Court 254
was faithful to a set of foundation principles respecting Indian tribal sovereignty.").
pOMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 54.
255
N. Bruce Duthu, Crow Dog and Oliphant Fistfight at the Tribal Casino: Political
Power, Storytelling, and Games of Chance, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 171, 180 (1997); see also Frickey,
supra note 9, at 7 (commenting on how "least democratic branch has become [the] most
enthusiastic colonial agent").
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Legal scholars have identified many doctrinal villains as reasons for the
contingent nature of tribal sovereignty today.25 6 However, there is almost
universal agreement that the most "pernicious" of these is the plenary power
doctrine. 7 The doctrine was first explicitly enunciated at the turn of the last
century in Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock.2 58 In that case, the Court held that Congress
could unilaterally abrogate a treaty between the Kiowa and Comanche tribes
and the federal government, because "[p]lenary authority over the tribal
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning,
and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the government., 259 The Court
effectively gave Congress unlimited power over Indian tribes that continues
until this day.26°
The exact source of the plenary power doctrine is unclear. Williams
believes the doctrine grew out of the fictive notion-first articulated by
Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh26 1 -that upon discovery, legal title to Indian
256For example, Williams blames the crisis confronting federal Indian law today on a
"legal discourse which has little to do with the 'Rule of Law,' but is instead grounded in the
peculiar but today irrelevant political history of the early Republic." Williams, supra note 77, at
192. He goes on to state, "the great tradition in the English common law of viewing the fictive
doctrine of conquest as a source of limitation on the superior sovereign rights has been preserved
in American Federal Indian Law by the doctrine of still inherent though diminished tribal
sovereignty."
Id. at 193 (citation omitted).
257
For a scathing criticism of the doctrine and supporting bibliography, see Robert Clinton,
Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 841, 855 n.41 (1990); see also
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 46-47 (calling plenary power doctrine major confounding
factor in field of Indian law); Gould, supra note 7, at 811 (stating that because "tribal
sovereignty exists only [when] Congress ha[s] not displaced it," it has contingent, residuary
status). Gould fuses the doctrines of plenary power and federal trust responsibility into a "unitary
doctrine encompassing both Congress's power over tribes and its duties toward them, because
regardless of the application [of the plenary power doctrine, its] conceptual basis . . . (and its
power to both benefit and bring harm to tribes) remains the same-an analogy by Chief Justice
Marshall to a guardian-ward relationship between Congress and the tribes." Id. at 810 n.6.
258187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903). The first articulation of what became the plenary power
doctrine, as noted earlier, can be found in the Marshall Trilogy: M'Intosh, Cherokee Nation, and
Worcester. See supra notes 111-70 and accompanying text (discussing tribes subject to superior
power of federal government); see also infra notes 261-63 (discussing Williams' elaboration of
discovery
259 doctrine).
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564-65. In reaching this conclusion, the Court ignored
Marshall's cautionary note in Worcester that nothing in the United States Constitution justified
federal intervention in tribal affairs or the surrender of tribal self-government. See Worcester, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 553-54.
260See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) (stating that
congressional policy decisions dealing with Indians are not open to question by judiciary).
16121 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823). Discovery, according to Marshall,
"gave title to the
government by whose subjects.., it was made," and vested in the discovering nation "sole right
of acquiring the soil from the natives," "with which ight no [other nation] could interfere." Id. at
573-74. Although Pommersheim believes that Marshall seemed genuinely troubled by viewing
Indians as without natural rights, Marshall's belief "in the superiority of white republican
policy" and his recognition that doctrines like the discovery doctrine were indispensable to the
settling of America, led Marshall to frame opinions that reflected a "despotic imperialism and
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lands vested in the discovering European nation.262 Under Marshall's
description of the discovery doctrine, according to Williams, the indigenous
tribal nations inhabiting America were considered dependent, diminished
sovereigns, whose rights and status in the land were first determined by
European colonizers and later by the federal government.263 Newton finds no
basis in the Constitution for the plenary power doctrine, and finds the doctrine
highly suspect; she sees it "not so much [as a] justification[] for decisional
outcomes" but as an "abdicat[ion by the Court ofi any role in defining the
unique status of Indian tribes in United States' constitutional system or
accommodating their legitimate claims of tribal sovereignty and preservation
of property. 2 6
Whatever its origins, the "unbridled exercise" of the plenary power
doctrine has had a devastating effect on Indian tribes, and on the cause of tribal
sovereignty. The doctrine has provided the basis for Congress's "unilateral
abrogation" of treaties, as well as the ill-advised congressional policies
described in the preceding section of this Article. 265 The Court systematically
sustained congressional actions diminishing tribal sovereignty relying on this
doctrine.2 66 The doctrine remains today a major impediment to any resurrection
of tribal sovereignty unless Congress acquiesces in that action.2 67
racism . . . and attendant federal hegemony in Indian affairs." POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at
43. 262
Williams, supra note 77, at 168; see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 43-44
(calling doctrine of discovery "federal hegemony developed without constitutional safeguard or
limits," and, like Williams, seeing it as being responsible for doctrine of congressional 'plenary
power'263in Indian affairs").
See Williams, supra note 77, at 191 ("Today, under Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Johnson v. McIntosh, Indian Nations find themselves operating within a legal system that denies
them ultimate sovereignty and the right of self-determination in their lands. Under the Doctrine
of Discovery, Congress retains ultimate sovereignty over Indian Nations, and can unilaterally
strike down the exercise by tribes of even the most pedestrian forms of self-government.").
264Newton, supra note 9, at 196. Newton also blames the Court's "frequent invocation" of
the doctrine for what ails tribal sovereignty today. Id. But see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
551-52 (1974) (stating that Congress' plenary power was "drawn both explicitly and implicitly
from the
265 Constitution itself").
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 40.
266
Gould, supra note 7, at 811. Pommersheim cites what he calls "two minor exceptions"
to this statement, in which acts of Congress were declared unconstitutional by the Court. He
cites Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (holding that Indian and Consolidation Act of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2515 (amended 2000), which addressed problem of
fractionalization on Indian reservations and provided for escheatment of individual land interests
to tribe without just compensation, violated Fifth Amendment), and Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S.
665 (1912) (holding that Five Civilized Tribes Restrictions Removal Act, Pub. L. No. 60-140, 35
Stat. 312 (1908), which removed restrictions on sale and encumbrance of land held by members
of Five Civilized Tribes without just compensation, violated Fifth Amendment). See
POMMERSHEIM,
supra note 16, at 47, 218 n.73.
267
Pommersheim calls on Congress to curb its "extravagant uses" of the doctrine. See
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 189-90. Newton appeals to the courts, suggesting that they
apply heightened judicial scrutiny and the Fifth Amendment to laws affecting "tribal property
and sovereignty rights." Newton, supra note 9, at 241-43.

502

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2005:443

(b) The FederalTrust Doctrine
The federal trust doctrine grew out of Cherokee Nation, in which Marshall
described Indians as being "in a state of pupilage," and their "relation[ship] to
the United States resemble[ing] that of a "ward to his guardian., 268 Unlike the
plenary power doctrine, the Court eventually found a constitutional basis for
the federal trust doctrine in the Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty
Power.269
The theory of a trust relationship between the federal government and the
tribes, while on its face protective of tribal rights, directly contradicts any
notion of tribal sovereignty. In a trust relationship, tribes occupy a completely
dependent role, functioning as virtually voiceless beneficiaries of federal
largess, for good or ill.270 Although the Court has occasionally used the federal
trust doctrine to protect tribal interests,271 it has failed to develop a consistent
standard of trust responsibility, 272 and has never imposed such a standard on
Congress (because of the plenary power doctrine) or granted relief when the
Executive Branch has abused the trust. Congress, too, has frequently used the
doctrine to diminish the sovereignty of tribes.273
268

Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554 n.11 (1975) ("It is undisputed that the
Wind River Tribes have not been emancipated from federal guardianship and control. There is
thus no doubt that this case is properly analyzed in terms of Congress's exclusive constitutional
authority to deal with Indian tribes."); Morton, 417 U.S. at 551-52 (finding explicit
constitutional basis for doctrine of trust responsibility in Congress' power "to regulate
Commerce ...with the Indian Tribes" and in power of President to make treaties with Indian
tribes upon advice and consent of Congress). But see Newton, supra note 9, at 207 (calling
Court's "gradual[] develop[ment of] a guardianship power over Indian tribes" in late nineteenth
century "extraconstitutional"). According to Newton, this finding, together with the Court's
ruling in Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1973), that federal
power over tribal property, although "'rooted in the Constitution,' [can] be challenged when it
infringes constitutional rights," was a "major breakthrough in federal Indian law for Indians.
Newton,
supra note 9 at 231 (quoting Del. Tribal, 430 U.S. at 83).
270
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 45.
271
See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-300 (1942) (imposing
"obligations of highest responsibility and trust" on government, which may have breached that
duty by knowingly distributing appropriations to corrupt tribal council rather than to tribal
members); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923) (deciding against claim of land
patentee because federal government should recognize Indian right to occupancy as part of
"traditional American policy toward [its] dependent wards"); see also Gould, supra note 7, at
812 n.15 (listing IRA as example of Congress's use of federal trust doctrine to benefit tribes
because
272Act ended allotment policy and promised tribes measure of self-determination).
pOMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 42-44.
273Gould, supra note 7, at 834 ("[O]ver the course of more than 160 years after Cherokee
Nation announced the relationship of guardian and ward [between the federal government and
tribes], the only certainty about the congressional trust responsibility has been its continuing
power to divest the tribes of sovereignty."); id. at 811-12 (citing Dawes Act and congressional
termination policy as most infamous examples).
269
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Despite the inherent flaws of the federal trust doctrine, Pommersheim
advocates its "re-conceptualiz[ation]" as key to the restoration of tribal
sovereignty. 217 He suggests an interpretation of the doctrine as one that
"establish[es] more clearly [that] the relationship .. .[is] between equals. 275
However, if this is not done, he believes the doctrine should be abolished. 7 6
Woods also argues for a reinvigorated federal trust doctrine, but one that
277
incorporates clear standards that are actually protective of tribal sovereignty.
Regardless of the doctrine's ultimate fate, the question that concerns this
Article is whether these prudential doctrines have eviscerated Indian tribes and
their sovereignty to such an extent that not enough remains of either to serve as
a repository for Sandel's dispersed sovereignty. However, before this Article
turns to that question, it briefly examines the Court's role in attenuating the
boundary between tribal reservations and state jurisdiction. It is here that the
Court has made the most inroads into destroying the notion of tribal
sovereignty.
(c) Dimming of Worcester's Bright Line Between the States and Tribes
In Worcester, Marshall unequivocally rejected any role for states on tribal
reservations in favor of an exclusive federal-tribal relationship, basing that
decision, in part, on the tribes' own internal sovereignty.2 78 The Court,
however, gradually has allowed the states to intrude onto tribal lands, and, in
doing so, has weakened the inherent sovereignty doctrine and tribal
sovereignty. Just as troubling, the clarity of Worcester has been replaced with
the "doctrinal incoherence" of much more subjective tests, in which courts
either weigh and balance the competing interests of tribes and the intruding
274

pOMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 45.

275

id'
d. Pommersheim seems hesitant about the federal trust doctrine's termination because,
though
he views it as debilitating and having "erroneously subsumed" the federal
even
government's treaty-based legal obligations, he nonetheless worries that the federal government
might then skip out of its affirmative obligations to protect tribal lands and natural resources and
provide the tribes with social services. Id. at 41-45. However, if Indian treaties are legally
enforceable, then the "affirmative" duties contained in them impose separate "legal
obligation[s]" on the federal government, regardless of any notion of a trust relationship. Id. at
in original).
41 (emphasis
7
27Wood, supra note 189, at 111, 134 (advocating reinvigorated federal trust doctrine as
means to protect tribal separatism and sovereignty, and offering "reconstituted doctrinal model"
containing clearer standards for defining "best interests" of tribes than have been used
historically).
271 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557 ("The treaties and laws of the United States
contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that
all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union."); see
also N.Y. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 770-72 (1867) (referring to Kansas cases regarding
issue of state taxation of Indian land); Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755-57 (1867)
(finding Shawnee subject to exclusive jurisdiction of federal government and their land immune
from state taxation).
276
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state or try to determine if the federal government has preempted the state's
action. 279 This incoherence is all the more alarming because of the increased
interaction between the states and tribes in recent years, arising out of the
activities of non-Indians within the boundaries of reservations.
The Court has become the arbiter of how much governing authority
tribes may exercise, assuming a prerogative that it formerly conceded
to the political branches of government. It now gauges tribal
sovereignty as a function of changing conditions-demographic,
social, political, and economic-and the expectations they create in
the minds of affected non-Indians.2 8 °
A more recent test in which the Court focuses on the status of the actors, while
sufficiently objective, may in the long run cause the most damage to the cause
of tribal sovereignty.28 1
In Williams v. Lee, 282 the Court took its first small step away from the wall
Worcester erected between the states and tribes. 283 In Williams, a non-Indian
storeowner on the Navajo Reservation sued a tribal member in state court for
an unsatisfied debt that arose on the reservation.284 The Court could have
summarily disposed of the suit and not even entertained the question presented,
279

pOMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 144-45.

28

°Getches, New Subjectivism, supra note 8, at 1575. Getches identifies three themes that
mark what he calls the subjectivist era in Indian law: (1) the Court's retreat from established
protective canons of construction; (2) the inclination of some Justices to use "nineteenth-century
policies of allotment and assimilation as the benchmark for defining appropriate limits on Indian
autonomy;" and (3) the assumption of what had been a prerogative of the political branches of
government-to "balanc[e] various non-Indian interests in order to prune tribal sovereignty to
the Court's
own notion of what it ought to look like." Id. at 1620.
281
See Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962) ("The general notion
drawn from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia . . . that an Indian
reservation is a distinct nation within whose boundaries state law cannot penetrate, has yielded
to closer analysis when confronted, in the course of subsequent developments, with diverse
concrete situations."); see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 146-47 (stating that brief clarity
brought to tribal-state relations by Court's decision in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980), was quickly lost through inconsistent application). In Bracker, the Court
found that "the Indian Commerce Clause" and "'semi-independent position' of Indian tribes
[had] given rise to two independent but related barriers [federal preemption and unlawful
infringement] to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and
members." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381
(1886)). But see Garnett, supra note 15, at 442 (noting that "tangled intricacies" of federal Indian
law and federal criminal jurisdiction "should come as no surprise" because they are "the
inevitable by-product of multiple sovereignties exercising multiple powers derived from
multiple sources"); McCoy, supra note 112, at 384 (welcoming any movement from federal
"'pre-emption' analysis" toward analysis that examines extent of "infringement on tribal selfgovernment [because the latter] incorporates the element of tribal political independence").
282358 U.S. 217 (1959).
...
1d.at 221-23.
284

Id. at 217-18.
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by referencing the holding in Worcester barring any state jurisdiction on Indian
lands. Instead, the Court said that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them., 285 It
implicitly conceded the possibility of a legitimate role for states on those lands
if there was no such infringement. Even though the Court found the state court
without jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it opened the door to future Courts
holding differently depending on the degree of infringement-admittedly a
subjective test.286 Immediately after Williams, the Court used the
"infringement" test to protect tribes from state regulation,28 7 but later cases
used the same test to constrain
tribal sovereignty in the face of competing
288
assertions of state power.
In Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission,289 the
Court moved Williams another step away from Worcester's clear line between
the states and tribes, 290 and another step away from the inherent sovereignty
doctrine. There the Court held that since Congress possesses the legislative
285
Id.
286

at 219-20 (emphasis added).
id.
287
See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425
U.S. 463, 468-69, 480-81 (1976) (holding that Montana lacked sufficient power over Flathead
Tribe and its reservation to tax personal property of tribal members, license tribal businesses,
and tax sales to tribal members by tribal merchants); Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 387
(1976) (holding that Montana state courts lacked jurisdiction to determine custody of Indian
child whose parents were both members of Northern Cheyenne Tribe who resided on reservation
and stating "[s]tate court jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government
conferred upon the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and exercised through the Tribal Court");
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973) (holding that state could not
tax income of Navajo tribal member living on reservation when income was earned from
reservation
sources); see also McCoy, supra note 112, at 383 (discussing these cases).
288
See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (holding that tribal court
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate claim between non-Indians arising out of accident on portion of
state highway running across Indian reservation because opening tribal court for optional use of
plaintiff "is not necessary to protect tribal self-government; and requiring [defendant] to defend
against this commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar court is not crucial to
the 'political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the [tribe]' (quoting
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981))); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima, 492 U.S. 408, 414, 432 (1989) (holding that Yakima Nation did not have
exclusive authority to zone properties on fee lands within Yakima Reservation because County's
exercise of its zoning authority did not "imperil any interest" of tribe); Montana, 450 U.S. at 564
(holding that tribe did not have inherent authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on fee lands within its reservation, saying "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation"). Montana
weakened the protective benefit of the infringement test by placing extremely restrictive
conditions on what constitutes infringement.
289380
U.S. 685 (1965).
290
The irony is that Worcester is also the source of the preemption doctrine to the extent it
gave the federal government ultimate paramountcy over tribes. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6. Pet.) at
559-61.
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authority to regulate any matter arising in Indian Country, the appropriate test
to evaluate the legitimacy of a state jurisdictional claim was not a question
infringement of tribal authority, but whether Congress had preempted the field
the state sought to regulate. 291 Acknowledging that a preemption analysis
involving Indian tribes was different than that which might be conducted in
other areas of the law, the Court, in a later case, explained how courts should
determine whether a state's intrusion into tribal matters was preempted. The
court stated that any such inquiry
is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or
tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the
nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry
designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise
of state authority would violate federal law.292
By making the analysis dependent upon a "particularized inquiry" into the
various competing interests, the Court all but guaranteed more state intrusion
into tribal matters, and, just as troubling, greater indeterminacy because of the
ad hoc nature of the analysis.2 93 While the Court has occasionally applied the
preemption test to protect tribes,294 it has not consistently forestalled state
intrusions into tribal matters.295 Both the infringement and preemption tests
291Warren

TradingPost, 380 U.S. at 689-90. For a succinct description of the preemption

doctrine
292 in Indian law, see GETCHES ET AL., supra note 16, at 432-37.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1980) (using
preemption analysis to strike down state taxes on tribal logging activities conducted exclusively
boundaries of reservation).
within293
See generally POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 144-53 (expressing concern that
Worcester's original certainty about exclusivity of federal-tribal relationship has been vastly
diluted and made uncertain by Court's application of doctrine of preemption, and attempting to
bring doctrinal coherency to these cases by conceiving of them in terms of individual property
rights).294
See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 218, 221-22
(1987) (finding that preemptive federal interest in helping tribes develop their economies
precludes regulation by state); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 341
(1983) (holding that New Mexico was preempted from exercising concurrent jurisdiction over
hunting and fishing by nonmembers on tribal lands within Mescalero reservation because state
regulation would disrupt federal and tribal management program and threaten congressional
and economic development").
objective
295 of "promoting tribal self-government
The intrusion of states into tribal matters is most apparent in the area of state taxation of
reservations. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 166-68, 189
(1989) (allowing state to impose severance tax on non-Indian company producing oil and gas on
Jicarilla Apache Reservation, even though company was already paying tax to tribe, noting that
"burdensome consequence [of two taxes] is entirely attributable to the fact that the leases are
located in an area where two governmental entities share jurisdiction"); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-55 (1980)
(upholding right of tribes to impose sales tax on tribal members on reservation, but rejecting
tribes' argument that tribal tax precluded state tax, finding that no theory of tribal authority
would permit tribes to "market an exemption from state taxation to people who ordinarily would
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moved the Court a substantial distance from Worcester's reliance on the
doctrine of inherent sovereignty as an absolute barrier against state intrusion
into Indian affairs:
[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal preemption .... The modem cases thus tend to avoid reliance
on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the
applicable treaties and statutes which define the limit of state power.
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it
provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because
it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and
federal statutes must be read.2 96
A third step away from Worcester's bright line separating tribes from
states is reflected in a subtle, but devastating shift in focus in the Court's
opinions from the status of the land in question to the status of the individual
over whom tribal jurisdiction is sought. First, in Oliphant, the Court declared
that tribes implicitly have been divested of the inherent power to prosecute
non-Indians because the exercise of this power would be inconsistent with
their posture as domestic dependent nations.29 7 Next, in Duro v. Reina,298 the
do their business elsewhere."); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) (rejecting state's attempt to impose certain taxes on
Indian consumers and residents, but allowing state to compel tribe to collect state sales taxes
from non-Indians because tax was levied only on non-Indians and would only minimally burden
tribal sellers, and would not interfere with tribal government). See generally Gould, supra note
7, at 864-72 (opining that Court's tax decisions "establish[ed] pervasive state authority within
tribal 296
territory").
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (striking down state
tax income tax applied to income earned by enrolled member of Navajo Tribe derived from
work on reservation); see also Barsh, supra note 11, at 56 (observing that on present Court, this
"backdrop [has] faded into mere shadow," as Court is basing its decisions on "the race of the
parties and the judges own ad hoc ideas about federal Indian policy"). But see GETCHES ET AL.,
supra note 16, at 432 (asserting that Worcester is basis for federal preemption doctrine in Indian
law and that it, in addition to tribes' inherent sovereignty, is ground for striking down operation
of state law on Indian land).
297
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208. Gould says this shift in focus was first apparent in Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and that the Mancari Court's "focus on status, instead of
territory, in defining tribal rights.., won [for states] increasing power to regulate and tax nonIndians and nonmember Indians within reservations." Gould, supra note 7, at 813. Mancari
sustained the Bureau of Indian Affairs hiring preferences because they were granted to Indians
not as a discrete racial group, but rather as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities. Mancari,
417 U.S. at 553-54. Gould also criticizes Mancari because it enabled the Court to use the
"status-based distinction[]" rationale to limit the "equal protection rights of tribal members," and
that Mancari, and Justice Thomas' footnote in South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 n.9
(1993) (finding that tribe had lost regulatory authority over hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on tribal lands that had been "broadly opened to the public" or were not "pristine"), largely
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Court extended the reach of Oliphant to non-member Indians, rejecting
arguments that the tribe retains jurisdiction over Indians who commit crimes
on the forum tribe's reservation, but who are not members of the forum
tribe. 299 Then, in Montana v. United States,3 °° the Court held, as a general
principle, that the "exercise of tribal power [over non-Indians] beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent [position] of tribes and so cannot survive
without express congressional delegation. 3 ° I Finally, in Nevada v. Hicks,3 °2
the Court held that a Navajo tribal court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a case
brought by an Indian against a state law enforcement officer for the officer's
conduct in executing an on-reservation search warrant for an off-reservation
crime committed by that Indian. °3 By the last of these cases, the Court had
closed the era of "inherent sovereignty," which was replaced by a much more "crabbed version
of sovereignty based upon consent." Gould, supra note 7, at 813-14. But see United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1975) (rejecting consent-based sovereignty).
298495 U.S. 676 (1990).
2991d. at 693. Duro has been the basis for much scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Robert N.

Clinton, Peyote and Judicial PoliticalActivism: Neocolonialism and the Supreme Court's New
Indian Law, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 92, 99-100 (1991) (speculating that Duro and other recent
decisions stem from subconscious racism by Court, or worse, racism in subtle form of
colonialism, and saying "far from being the protector of minorities which the framers envisioned
... the Court has become a cheerleader for legal oppression of minority Indian interests and the
major force in our political system currently bent on curtailing their authority and rights");
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European
Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REv.
237, 265 (1989) (arguing that Court's decisions have deeper roots in ancient legacy of racistimperial discourse).
300450
U.S. 544 (1981).
301
1d. at 564 (emphasis added); see also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453
(1997) ("As to nonmembers, ... a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction."). Gould believes that Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), "suggested that the second exception to Montana was illusory."
Gould, supra note 7, at 881. But see Justice Blackmun's concurring and dissenting opinion in
Brendale:
[T]o recognize that Montana strangely reversed the otherwise consistent
presumption in favor of inherent tribal sovereignty over reservation lands is not to
excise the decision from our jurisprudence. Despite the reversed presumption, the
plain language of Montana itself expressly preserves substantial tribal authority over
non-Indian activity on reservations, including fee lands, and, more particularly, may
sensibly be read as recognizing inherent tribal authority to zone fee lands.
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 456 (Blackmun J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
302533 U.S. 353 (2001).
303
1d. at 355-56; see also id. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring) ("It is the membership status of
the unconsenting party, not the status of the real property, that counts as the primary
jurisdictional fact."). But see Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291 F.3d 549, 554 (9th. Cir.
2002) (holding that exercise of "search warrant against the Tribe and tribal property" interfered
with right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them), vacated, 583
U.S. 701, 704 (2003) (discussing federal common law prescription that enables tribe to maintain
action for declaratory and injunctive relief, establishing its sovereign right to be free from state
criminal process).
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elevated an individual's status to a preeminent place in its analysis of when a
state may intrude upon a tribe's sovereignty and had obliterated the
significance of land. 304 Today, the law appears to be that "[a]bsent a
congressional delegation of authority, federal preemption, or a finding of
inherent civil jurisdiction, the sovereign rights of tribes are sufficient to prevail
in disputes between tribes and tribal members only. 3 °5
Given centuries of assault on their way of life and their capacity to be
islands of difference in our country, what remains of tribes and their capacity
to exercise constitutive and/or ongoing self determination?
3. Tribal Sovereignty Today: "A Glass HalfFull or HalfEmpty?"
The glass is half full or half empty. Tribal rights often exist, but not
always. Tribes are entitled to some recognition, but not too much.
Tribes have sovereignty, but not inconsistent with their dependent
status. In light of this paradoxical inclusion and exclusion, parity and
hierarchy, theoretical incoherence, and destabilizing results
predominate. °6
Tribes, which began their interaction with Europeans and the federal
government "outside the republic, [have become involuntarily] absorbed...
into the republic, internal sovereigns of a limited kind" through policies of
allotment, assimilation, and termination. 30 7 These ill-conceived-and in some
cases ill-intended-policies have constrained the ability of tribes to govern
their lands and members, and stripped from them their economic, natural, and
cultural resources base, making it more difficult for them to survive on what
land remains theirs. Tribal efforts to assert treaty-based rights to water, fish, or
3

°4Gould, supra note 7, at 814.

305

1d. The record on tribal sovereignty in the lower federal courts has been a little more

encouraging for the tribes. See, e.g., Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 364, 366-67 (9th Cir.
1982) (applying tribal health and safety regulations to non-Indian owners of grocery store on
reservation); Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900, 902-03 (10th Cir.
1982) (authorizing tribe to zone non-Indian land on reservation to prevent land from being
subdivided by private developers); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservation v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 1982) (regulating riparian rights of nonIndian landowners on reservation); Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Cmty. v.
Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp. 1042, 1043, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (enjoining siting of asphalt
and cement plant on non-Indian land within boundaries of reservation-like holding in
California); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Ind. L. Rep. 3025, 3028 (W.D. Wash. 1982)
(requiring
non-Indians to hook up to tribal sewer systems).
306
pOMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 50-51.
307
See id. at 48-49 (calling this "involuntary annexation"); see also Clinton, supra note
257, at 847 (noting that in strictly "Lockean social compact terms, Indian tribes never entered
into or consented to any constitutional social contract by which they agreed to be governed by
federal or state authority, rather than by tribal sovereignty"). But see Monette, supra note 77, at
632-33 (suggesting that tribes "consented" to become part of federal system of government
when they entered into treaties with federal government).
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land, as discussed previously, have met with only limited success in court and,
in some cases, actually led to reductions in previously held rights. 30 8 Non-legal
initiatives by tribes to reclaim their heritage, protect their environment,
strengthen what remains of their internal
economies, and to exert political
309
muscle only have drawn political ire.
As discussed in Part V.B, Congress and the Executive Branch have
intruded, at will, into traditional tribal government and society. The Court has
not only sustained these initiatives, but steadily eroded the tribes' right to
govern their lands. Under the Court's prudential plenary power doctrine,
Congress "can unilaterally strike down ... even the most pedestrian" exercises
of tribal governmental authority,3 1 ° leaving tribes subject to the unchecked
power of the federal government. The doctrinal inconsistency and incoherence
of the Court's oscillating jurisprudence on the issue of the extent of state
jurisdiction over tribal matters, and the destructive principles announced in its
decisions, have left tribes without a coherent foundation on which to rest any
defense to future state assaults on their sovereignty.311
308

See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 176-78 (1977) (holding
that doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not preclude state from regulating fishing
activities
30 on Puyallup Reservation).
9See, e.g., Indians and Washington State Are at Odds over Alcohol Ban, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2000, at A21 (describing Yakima Nation's recent efforts to ban sale of alcohol on its
reservation, which provoked Washington's Attorney General to sue tribe on theory that Yakima
Nation cannot impose its regulations on the 2000 nonmembers who live on reservation); Eric
Pianin, Tribes Take Aim at Old Foe: Rights Issues Spur Campaign to Oust Sen. Gorton, WASH.
POST, Apr. 3, 2000, at Al (discussing Native American plan "to raise millions of dollars to
unseat31him").
°Williams, supra note 77, at 191.
31t
Frickey, supra note 9, at 3-8, 13; see also id. at 4-5 ("Given the lack of guidance in
positive law, the complexity of the issues, and the tangled normative questions surrounding the
colonial displacement of indigenous peoples to construct a constitutional democracy, it is also
not surprising that the resulting decisional law is as incoherent as it is complicated."). Frickey
goes on to show how the current Court's decisions are rooted in doctrinal incoherence and in
"normatively unattractive judicial colonial impulse[s]," id. at 7, and how the Court has displaced
the "elegant formulation of Indian law principles" in favor of what he calls case-by-case
common-lawmaking rooted in "felt necessities." Id. at 27. Similarly, Aleinikoff notes that Indian
law
does not form a coherent whole. It is the product of more than two centuries of case
law, over which time relations among the federal government, the states, and the
tribes have changed dramatically. There is little doubt that cases now viewed as
foundational might well be decided differently if they came before the Court for the
first time today. But constitutional law is frequently more sediment than theory, and
Indian law is no exception.
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 113 (citations omitted); see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at
8 (calling Indian law little more than "a variegated admixture of attitudes and doctrines,
including constitutional shortcomings, a poverty of coherent theory, consistent exploitation, and
only intermittent concern for human rights"); JOHN R. WUNDER, "RETRAINED BY THE PEOPLE:" A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 3-4 (1994) ("[T]he unique evolution of
Native Americans in American law defies rational categorization. Historical periods from 1791
to 1991 are characterized by the frequent wholesale restructuring of that relationship .... Federal
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Without question, Indian tribes today are substantially less secure in their
land base and their ability to self-govern than when Chief Justice Marshall
conceived of them "as distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial. 3 12 But while Worcester placed tribes outside state and national
politics, M'Intosh and Cherokee Nation provided the foundation for cases
subjecting tribes to the "plenary power" of Congress, 313 and to the meddling
influence of the states. 314 The Court's ambivalence toward notions of inherent
sovereignty and its doctrinal confusion over the ability of tribes to tax,
prosecute criminal behavior, and to regulate hunting, fishing, and land use in
the face of contradictory assertions of state power, have left tribes operating
within a legal system that clouds the legitimacy of such actions.
Indian law scholars like Aleinikoff believe that the Court's Indian law
jurisprudence has helped reduce tribes from their historic role as separate (if
dependent) sovereigns to no more than aggregations of members, and has
removed almost any semblance of tribal territorial sovereignty. 3" Gould says
these judicial holdings "manifest[] an almost callous disregard for
congressional intent" reflected in the repeal of the Dawes Act 316; he calls tribal
Indian jurisprudence is in constant conflict: It acknowledges limited forms of sovereignty within
a forced union; it recognizes Indians as special groups that require special treatment in special
circumstances, and it places Native American rights at the disposal of Congress rather than
constitutional interpretation."). But see Getches, New Subjectivism, supra note 8, at 1654
(arguing that foundational principles can still be found in Indian jurisprudence and advocating
return to them to protect tribal self-determination).
312 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
313
See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 696-97 (holding that there was no tribal court jurisdiction
over crimes that nonmember Indians committed on reservation); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208
(holding that Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians); Lone
Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568 (affirming power of Congress to abrogate federal Indian treaty); United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886) (upholding application of Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153, to two Indians indicted under Act for murdering another on Hoopa Valley
Reservation);
see also discussion of cases supra Part III.B.
314
See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355-56, 363-66 (holding that tribal court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain action against state game warden who had searched house of tribal
member on reservation for evidence of off-reservation crime); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (holding that tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over dispute
between two non-Indians arising from traffic accident occurring on reservation); South Dakota
v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 683-84, 691 (1993) (prohibiting tribe from regulating hunting and
fishing by non-Indians on land within reservation that was taken from tribe for use by federal
government); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
444-45 (1989) (holding that tribe lacked zoning authority over land on reservation owned in fee
by or leased to non-Indians); Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (holding that tribe lacked power to
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple
by non-Indians).
315ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 96; see also Garnett, supra note 15, at 441 ("[T]he
sovereignty of a community that is unable to articulate, promulgate, and vindicate its moral
commitments through the criminal law ...

is ...

diminished ....

[It] is less able to 'speak its

values'316and to perpetuate these values through character-formation." (citations omitted)).
Gould, supra note 7, at 814.

512

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2005:443

31 7
sovereignty, as a result of these decisions, "sovereignty by consent.
Pommersheim describes the doctrine of tribal sovereignty as "almost
evanescent" in the face of federal hegemony, blaming its incorporeality on the
"incompatibility of the treaty, trust relationship, and Plenary Power
doctrines. ,,318 Pommersheim also finds that the absence of a constitutionally
based limit on the exercise of federal authority under the plenary power
doctrine has made the situation worse, because it leaves the tribes unprotected
in any conflict with states or the federal government. 319 Without a clear
constitutional or coherent doctrinal limitation on congressional erosion of tribal
sovereignty, tribal sovereignty is a "destabilized sovereignty . . . literally
oxymoronic
and at odds with a national jurisprudence of integrity and
320
stability.
Yet, while Indian tribal sovereignty has been severely diminished as a
result of misguided federal policies and Supreme Court decisions, the
reduction in tribal sovereignty has not been complete. "Indian Tribes remain
distinct, albeit 'dependent,' sovereigns, and they retain inherent, though
limited, powers of self-government" over their land and their members.3 21
3"Id. at 853. Gould believes that tribes maintained their inherent tribal sovereignty during

the historical period because "[viast areas of the country were unsettled, [which] facilitat[ed]
policies and treaties that separated Indians from non-Indians. As the pressure for land by whites
increased, however, Congress ended the territorial separation of many tribes through the
allotment policy. Although Congress repudiated this policy in the 1930s, it did not restore the
territorial authority of tribes." Id. at 815. "[T]his failure, coupled with decisions in which the
Court diminished the importance of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty" resulted in the current
consent-based
paradigm. Id.
3 18
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 50. Pommersheim also criticizes the Court for its
recent abandonment of foundational Indian law doctrines-which had been "grounded in some
reasonable attempt to understand history and the unique position of the tribal sovereign in a
constitutional democracy" in favor of a "series of historically superficial and intellectually
deficient . . . pronouncements" that have undermined tribal sovereignty over their homelands.
Pommersheim,
supra note 12, at 442-43.
3 19
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 39 (contrasting tribes with states, which have
protection of Tenth Amendment, which plays "pivotal [role] in structuring the [federal-state]
discourse on federal-state sovereignty," by providing "constitutional baseline" for any discourse
on federal-state sovereignty); see also WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 117-18 (noting that
Constitution does not provide baseline because federal-tribe relationship is arguably in part
"preconstitutional" and in part "extraconstitutional"); Resnik, supra note 248, at 675 n. 16, 67980 (commenting on significance of federal-tribe relationship developing outside Constitution
and thus beyond reach of formative dogma limiting and constraining federal powers). But see
Monette, supra note 77, at 618-19 (arguing that tribes occupy "soveriegn plane" as states in our
federal system of government and, therefore, same restraints that govern federal
government/state relationship and state/state relationship should govern relationships between
federal government and tribes and states and tribes).
32°POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 54-55.
321
Garnett, supra note 15 at 434-35. Recognizing that the claims of tribal Indians are
legally and politically distinct from other ethnic or minority groups is essential, because courts
are unlikely to uphold tribal authority in contests with surrounding states if tribes are viewed, at
most, as disadvantaged groups. See Frickey, supra note 115, at 424 n.180 ("Because the
structural and constitutive bases for the [Indian Treaty] canon have become obscured, Native
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The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, "inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty, which has never been extinguished."
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is
subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes
retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still
possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or
statute3 2or
by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
2
status.
Just as clearly, despite the evanescent nature of tribal sovereignty as legal
doctrine and the resultant precarious nature of tribal authority over tribal lands
and members, the tribes themselves have survived as separate, distinct and,
vibrant subcultures in this country.
The important aspect of the story of the red man is his stubborn
refusal to give up his tribal identity and become simply another
American citizen. While the years have shown a partial assimilation
of other groups, only the red man has stood firm, resisting all efforts
to merge him with the groups that surround him. Whether the battle
is on the banks of the rivers of Washington state, in remote
reservation mission stations, on the streets of the large cities, or the
Americans have suffered the same interpretative fate as racial minorities."). But see Johnson,
supra note 11, at 715 (listing among "many characteristics of sovereign government" tribes have
retained since Worcester, power to "enact their own civil and criminal laws, establish and
empower their own tribal courts, exercise criminal jurisdiction over their members, determine
criteria for tribal membership, control inheritance rights, and retain civil jurisdiction over nonIndians where a vital tribal interest such as health or safety is involved").
322United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, (1978) (quoting COHEN, supra note 16, at
122). Cohen said that Indian sovereignty adhered to "three fundamental principles" that:
(1) [a]n Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign
state[;] (2) [c]onquest renders [them] subject to the legislative power of the United
States and, in substance, terminates [a tribe's] external powers of sovereignty ...,
e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect
[its] internal sovereignty [and] (3) [tribal] powers are subject to qualification by
treaties and by express legislation of Congress . . . save [those actions,] full powers
of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted
organs of government.
COHEN, supra note 16, at 122-23. (emphasis added). Pommersheim rejects Cohen's third
principle in part "because it recognizes the ability of Congress to extinguish tribal powers,"
"reflects the image of the benevolent colonizer, and [because] it is doctrinally insufficient to
establish a more stable and enduring conception of tribal sovereignty." POMMERSHEIM, supra
note 16, at 52-53; see also Newton, supra note 9, at 205 (noting that "integrity of tribal
sovereignty rest[s] precariously on the whim of Congress owing ... to the [Supreme] Court's
extraordinary deference to the political branches' exercise of the foreign affairs power in their
dealings with the Indians").
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lonely island of Alcatraz, there is something uniquely different about
Indian people that sets them apart from other Americans.32 3
Indian Country today consists of approximately 55 million acres, 314
reservations and approximately 1.9 million people, half of whom live on or
near tribal land.324 While conditions on many of these reservations are
shockingly bad-one third (perhaps as high as two thirds) of Indians living on
reservations fall below the poverty level, unemployment rates are as high as
sixty to seventy percent, life expectancy is below the national average, and
infant mortality is above the national average-they are improving. 32 5 Indian
gaming, tourism, and other forms of economic development are beginning to
end the downward economic spiral in some parts of Indian Country.326 The
323

JENNINGS C. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 399 (1971); see also
D'ARCY McNICKLE, THEY CAME HERE FIRST 283 (rev. ed. 1975) ("Indian societies did not

disappear by assimilating to the dominate white culture, as predicted, but assimilated to
themselves bits and pieces of the surrounding cultural environment. And they remained
indubitably Indian, whether their constituents lived in a tight Indian community or commuted
between the community and an urban job market."); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT

393-94 (1984) ("Many
. . . urban Indians maintained tribal connections with the reservations, but second and third
generations of Indians in cities often had no reservation experience at all. These city dwellers,
for the most part, steadfastly maintained their identity as Indians."); Johnson, supra note 11, at
649 ("The study of Native American history teaches that the overriding, but rarely articulated,
policy of Canada and the United States towards Aboriginals was to get them out of the way so
that their land could be settled and developed by whites."); McCoy, supra note 112, at 357
("Indian tribes have endured the hardships of such federal policies as removal from their native
homelands, forced assimilation into the mainstream of American society, and complete
termination of their relation with the federal government. Remarkably, they have maintained
their separate identities."); Turpel, supra note 11, at 33 (arguing that "from early colonization
until the present time, no government or monarch has ever genuinely recognized Aboriginal
peoples as distinct Peoples with cultures different from, but not inferior to, their own... [their]
ways of life should be tolerated or respected except in the most paternalistic and oppressive
terms."); James Belich, Empire and Its Myths 8 (Apr. 27, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (stating that Indian tribes have endured as separate, distinct communities, and
adaption
324 to white ways should not be confused with adoption of white ways).
These statistics, and those that follow, are drawn from GETCHES ET AL., supra note 16, at
7-26, unless otherwise noted.
325POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 7. "Per capita income for Native Indians was slightly
more than $8,300, the lowest of all racial groups in the U.S. and less than half the level for the
entire population." GETCHES ET AL., supra note 16, at 15; see also Timothy Egan, New
ProsperityBrings New Conflict to Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 1998, at Al (stating
that unemployment in Indian Country is greater than thirty percent; nearly one third of the
Indians who do have jobs earned less than $10,000 a year in 1995, last full year surveyed; and
Indians326have highest rate of alcoholism, suicide, and child abuse in country).
Gambling alone generates over six billion dollars a year for tribes. Approximately a
third of all tribes operate some form of gambling enterprise, and while the revenues are unevenly
spread, they have brought newfound wealth to many tribes. Egan, supra note 325; see also
William Claiborne, Oneidas Are Betting on Mexican Casinos, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2001, at
A12 (describing agreement between "Oneida Indian Nation [and] Mexico to develop and
manage Las Vegas style casinos in the Pacific coast resorts" of Acapulco and Mazaltan). Tribes
FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS
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outflow of young members from reservations may be slowing, and, in some
situations, reversing itself.327 Many tribes appear to be going through a cultural
renascence, in which they are rediscovering their traditions and roots, 328 and
affirmatively asserting their rights to land and natural resources. 329 john
Ecohawk, Executive Director of the Native American Rights Fund, describes
this resurgence of tribal rights as "the civil rights movement for Native
own approximately one percent of the nation's total commercial timber land as well as valuable
mineral rights, which generated $142 million in revenues, in 1991, for tribes and individual
Indians. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 16, at 22-24. Additionally, tribes own or operate several
lucrative resorts and businesses, like the Cherokee's electronics manufacturing plant in
Oklahoma, the Choctaw's greeting card company in Mississippi, the Blackfeet's steel housing
frame manufacturing company in Montana, and the Gila River Tribe's office and industrial park
in Arizona. Id. at 24.
327According to Aleinikoff, reservation population increased by "18 percent (from 370,125
to 437,431 residents) between 1980 and 1990 (almost twice the rate of overall U.S. population
growth)," and "the number of persons counted as Indian by the 1990 census was 43.4 percent
greater than the number in the 1980 census (from 1.3 million to 1.9 million respondents) ....
The 2000 census reported further sustained growth in the 1990s. Almost 2.4 million persons
identifed themselves as American Indian or Alaska Native, and a total of 4.1 million listed those
categories either alone or in combination with other racial categories." ALEINIKOFF, supra note
16, at 328
123.
See, e.g., James Brooke, Indians Proudly Revive a Tradition of Running, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1998, at A20 (discussing revival of Indian running tradition, which "has its roots in the
spiritual tradition" and "increases pride, self-esteem (and] cultural identity" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Kay Larson, Tribal Windfall: A Chance to Reopen History, N.Y. TIMES, July
26, 1998, at A31 (describing recent opening of Mashantucket Pequot Indian museum in
Mashantucket, Connecticut, built with proceeds from one of most successful gambling casinos
in country).
329
See, e.g., Egan, supra note 325, (describing Skull Valley Band of Goshutes's efforts to
lease part of its land for temporary storage of high level civilian nuclear waste, use of intemet by
Coeur D'Alene Tribe to launch international on-line lottery, success of Assiniboine and Gros
Ventre Tribe in stopping expansion of major gold mine by using their sovereign status to protect
water and land bordering mine, and success of Isleta Pueblo tribe in forcing City of Albuquerque
to spend $300 million to clean up Rio Grande before it flowed through Indian lands); Andrew
Engelson, Tribes Fight to Clear the Roadsfor Salmon, 33 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 2, 2001, at
5 (describing efforts by Puyallup Tribe to improve salmon runs and threatened tribal lawsuit
based on state's treaty-based obligation to maintain at harvestable levels salmon not listed under
Endangered Species Act); Steven Lee Myers, Cold War Over, Air Force Must Compete for
Space, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1998, at A24 ("To them this is all desolate-rocks and scrub land..
•.But to us this is our bible," quoting Terry D. Gibson, a member of Shoshone-Paiute Tribal
Council, protesting plans by Air Force to use tribe's ancestral homelands for training flights);
Michelle Nijhuis, Return of the Natives, 33 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 26, 2001, at 1
(describing Nez Perce Tribe's efforts to reintroduce wolves into Idaho wilderness and at same
time reinvent its political future). An interesting parallel movement is occurring among tribes in
Canada, particularly in British Columbia, where tribes have asserted claims to land and
resources based on prior occupation of those lands. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, Canada and
British Columbia 's Largest Indian Group Taking Steps to FirstPermanent Treaty, N.Y. TIMES
INT'L, Mar. 11, 2001, at 14 (describing signing of Nuu-chah-nulth tribe's first treaty with
provincial and federal governments, "giv[ing] the Indians self-rule, a large cash payment, and
shared control with non-Indians of ...old growth forests and other natural resources"); see also
Anthony DePalma, CanadaPact Gives a Tribe Self-Rule for the FirstTime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
1998, at Al (giving west coast Indians control of land and legal rights to run their own nation).
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Americans," made possible by the fact that more tribes are finding the
resources to hire their own lawyers to prosecute their rights. 330 But history
teaches-and the present bears witness to-the fact that success brings
reactions from the majority culture, which fears displacement and loss of
power. "People who have rarely given a second thought to the natives in their
midst suddenly find there really are four major levels of government in
America: Federal,' 331
state, local and tribal. Until recently, one of them was nearly
always invisible.
Thus, although federal policies and the Court's Indian law jurisprudence
have diminished tribe's sovereign power over their lands and members, their
power has not been extinguished. Nor has the unique cultural legacy of tribes
been extinguished; in fact, that legacy is experiencing a revival today (albeit, in
some cases, it may be recollected and reconstructed).332 Therefore, there is
clearly something there to be saved. But the continued preservation of these
societies requires more help than the traditional doctrinal support for tribal
sovereignty can provide.
Except for brief periods, the traditional foundations for Indian sovereignty
discussed in this Part of the article have largely failed the tribes. Hence, there
is an urgent need to find a more solid theoretical purpose for tribal sovereignty
to reverse the downward trend for tribal self-governance and to protect
burgeoning tribal economies and societies. In the abstract, enhanced
sovereignty might rest on a theory of federalism. But a federalism
conversation, which proceeds under the twin assumptions of consent of the
governed and limited central authority, is not (and never has been) the
330

Egan, supra note 325 (quoting John Ecohawk); see also Johnson, supra note 11, at 67678 (opining that one of greatest factors contributing to survival of Indian race has been American
legal profession, which, once used as tool against Indians and tribes, is now increasingly being
used in331tribe's favor to protect tribal rights and concerns and to further tribal autonomy).
Egan, supra note 325; see also id. (quoting former Rep. Merrill Cook of Utah, referring
to new tribal gaming and nuclear storage proposals, as saying "I don't think this is what the
Founding Fathers had in mind. It's just not right, this use of sovereignty. The implications are
frightening for us as a nation."); POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 179-83 (commenting on
backlash against Indian gaming). A letter to the editor of the Ridgefield Press in Connecticut
expressed this concern:
I have a problem with a group of people, who, because of their ethnicity, can
move to within one mile of my home and be exempt from the taxes that I must pay.
It should not be a legal right that Native Americans can get any land, and do as
they please, because of tribal recognition. Especially when so many are against it.
What is to keep them from taking over the entire state? This will not improve
their lot. Only a select few will benefit. Do you really believe that real Native
Americans will get the money?
I don't believe that Native Americans should be able to purchase land and
build a casino. How did it come to be that Native Americans are exempt from the
law of the land?
Paul Payne,
Letter to the Ed., RIDGEFIELD PRESS, Apr. 25, 2002, at 5A.
332
See Tarlock, supra note 47, at 560-61 (questioning extent to which today's tribes are
postmodern constructs rather than legitimate subcultures, citing as example tribes that eliminated
blood quantum as requirement for membership).
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paradigm for federal-tribe, or state-tribe relations.333 In reality, tribal relations
with the federal government and the states are governed by a "very different
paradigm

. .

.,one rooted in a discourse of conquest, not consent," which has

resulted in "virtually unlimited . . governmental power[]" over Indian
affairs.334 A federalism discourse that does not recognize "Indian tribes as
participant sovereigns" has "enervate[d] [the concept of] tribal sovereignty"
and left it without a secure place in our federal structure of government.335
"Tribal aspirations for political and economic self-governance, state
desires for exclusive regulatory control within their borders, and federal efforts
to maintain a preeminent role in Indian affairs are factors that still frame the
current debates on [tribal sovereignty.] '33 6 This Article now turns to the
question of whether republican theory might do a better job of protecting what
remains of tribal sovereignty than the traditional doctrines of treaty-based and
inherent sovereignty, or than some version of federalism. The next Part asks
whether republican theory offers a more compelling rationale for enhancing
tribal sovereignty that would allow these vibrant subcultures to survive.3 37 To
answer this question, Part IV examines three strands of republican thinking
that support enhancing tribal sovereignty and one that is problematic. It
explores the extent to which tribes might qualify as dispersed centers of civic
republican governance.

333

See Resnik, supra note 248, at 679-80.

334

Duthu, supra note 255, at 179 (emphasis added); see also Resnik, supra note 248, at 696
("Instead of the expected (if complex) references to consent and to a federal government of
limited powers, other, often unspoken rationales-conquest, violence, force-are the primary
sources of the power exercised by the federal government over Indian tribes."); Singer, supra
note 19, at 8 ("Court's attack on American Indian property and sovereignty constitutes a
continuing
conquest of American Indian nations.").
335
Duthu, supra note 255, at 179 n.43.
336
1d. at 199 (noting conflicting pressures in context of gambling in Indian Country);
see
also McCoy, supra note 112, at 423 ("Tribal political independence is dependent on the ability
of tribes to assert their powers of self-government over their members and territory. The exercise
of tribal powers inevitably produces some conflict with state and federal interests. But the tribal
sovereignty doctrine, if properly applied, can accommodate these competing interests and at the
same time permit tribes to maintain their political independence.").
337Eric Posner suggests two other rationales for transferring greater sovereignty to tribes:
(1) "transferring resources" to "groups [who] are sufficiently cohesive.., and pursue goals that
are consistent with the state's" "is a more efficient method for obtaining [these] goals than
conventional regulation of individual action"; and (2) external regulation can undermine a
group's own ability to self-regulate, discussing antidiscrimination laws as an example. Eric A.
Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence ofLegal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective
Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 136-37 (1996). However, since tribes do not necessarily
replicate the state's norms, Posner's rationale may be inapposite.
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IV. SOME HELPFUL AND TROUBLESOME ELEMENTS OF REPUBLICAN THEORY

The gift of republicanism, as an explanatory concept, lay [and
continues to lie] in its ability to do so much disparate interpretative
3 38
work.

Modem republican scholars draw from the republican thinking that
animated the founding of this country to respond to perceived ills in modem
American society. 339 The goal of this Part is to identify those strands of
republican theory that might be used to reanimate tribal sovereignty. The
author is aware of the historiographic criticisms of republicanism 340 and of the
term's indeterminacy, but nonetheless proceeds out of a belief that even a
rudimentary recitation of republicanism's principles, particularly as brought up
to date by Sandel and others, might be illuminating for purposes of
reconceiving and reenergizing Indian tribal sovereignty in the twenty-first
century.
The author's hypothesis is that republicanism, a doctrinal cornerstone of
this country's emergence as a nation,34' offers the strongest theoretical basis
for the concept of tribal sovereignty. This Section extracts several principles
from republican thinking that seem particularly well suited to providing a
rationale for a more robust tribal sovereignty than either of the traditional bases
discussed in Part V. These principles are: (1) a government based on the
33

8Rodgers, supra note 13, at 38. But see Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful,
97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1663 (1988) (quoting John Adams: "There is not a single more unintelligible
word in
339the English language than republicanism.").
See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 2, at 6 ("And yet, for all its episodes of darkness, the
republican tradition, with its emphasis on community and self-government, may offer a
corrective to our impoverished civic life."); see also Kerber, supra note 338, at 1664 (referring
to modem republicanism as "civic humanism"); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493 (1988) (defending "republican revival" and its modem "civic republican strain"); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1539 (1988) (declaring
"founders
[to be] liberal republicans" and defending liberal republicanism against its detractors).
340
See, e.g., Kerber, supra note 338, at 1668, 1671-72 (commenting that "classical
republican discourse was a language of political nostalgia in the 1790's," in tension with liberal
thought even then, taking Michelman and Sunstein to task for seeking a nonexistent, "nuanced
republicanism, [i.e.] participation without exclusion, virtue without elitism," listing some of
classical republicanism's less attractive features, and noting that "[i]t was not the civic humanists
to whom women, blacks, Jews, and the marginalized groups of modem times have ... turn[ed]
for solutions"); Rodgers, supra note 13, at 38 (criticizing historians who overemphasize
influence
of republicanism on this country's emergence as nation).
34 1
See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 242-43 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed.,
1937) (defining distinctive characteristics of republican form of government); see also Sunstein,
supra note 339, at 1558 ("[E]lements of both pluralist and republican thought played a role
during the period of the constitutional framing."). But see BEYOND CONFEDERATION, supra note
115, at 9 (noting that concerns of framers of Constitution-"the restraint of the ceaselessly
aggressive tendencies of power, the maintainance of the public virtue, and the filtration of
talent"-were "peculiar to a world that is now very distant from our own," and current concerns
involve "modem notions of democracy, nationalism, and pluralism").
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consent of the governed; (2) individuals who are capable of self-government,
willing to be civically engaged, and do not act out of their self-interest; and (3)
individuals who have ties to a particular place and/or community, in which
they can practice citizenship. In addition, to the extent modern republicanism
now embraces diversity as a virtue, difference has been added as a fourth
principle. This Part proceeds in three sections. First, in Part IV.A, the three
principles mentioned above are described in greater detail. Part IV.B. then
briefly explains how these republican principles contribute to a more coherent
theoretical solution to the problem of tribal sovereignty. Finally, in light of
these principles, Part IV.C. analyzes whether tribes are themselves
communities that could qualify as Sandel's dispersed centers of republican
governance.34 2
A. FormativeRepublican Principles
1. Government Based on the Consent of the Governed
Under republican theory, since each individual is a source of sovereignty,
and polities have a natural right to self-define and self-determine their
existence, the concept of citizens sharing in the act of governing occupies a
central position in both classical 343 and modern republican thinking. 344 This
idea of self-government, "that governance [is] the collective responsibility of
the people who are governed," is the most universal concept in republican
342

Each writer on republicanism selects her own list of features. For example, Sunstein
lists "deliberation in government," "political equality," "universality, or agreement as a
regulative ideal," and "citizenship" as aspects of classical republicanism worthy of contemporary
support. Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1539. Paul Brest selects "citizenship, political equality, and
deliberative decisionmaking." Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward
Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 (1988). The author has selected other features,
drawn from Sandel's DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT, because of their particular relevance to the
question of enhanced tribal sovereignty. See SANDEL, supra note 2, at 6-7 (listing, among other
attributes of republicanism, its "emphasis on community and self-government," and "civic
engagement").
3 43
See generally, 1, 3 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1-32, 92-137 (Ernest Barker trans., 1946)
(commenting on civic virtue and political participation as intrinsic to liberty, and stating that we
are free only insofar as we exercise our capacity to deliberate about common good and actively
participate in public life of free republic).
3See Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1556 ("Republican[s] ... place a high premium on
citizenship and participation, and thus seek mechanisms both for citizen control of national
institutions and for decentralization [of] local control, and local self-determination."); see also
ANAYA, supra note 25, at 75 (calling self-determination "principle of highest order" "within the
contemporary international system," noting that United Nations Charter and other major
international legal instruments have affirmed that principle, and that it is now "widely
acknowledged to be a principle of customary international law" even to have force of
"peremptory norm," to be "jus cogens"); SANDEL, supra note 2, at 117 ("According to [the
republican] tradition, liberty depends on self-government, and self-government depends on the
members of a political community's identifying with the role of citizen and acknowledging the
obligations that citizenship entails.").
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thought.3 45 Madison considered "essential" to a government based on
republican thinking that it "be derived from the great body of society," and that
"all its powers [come] directly or indirectly from the ... people. 346 Jefferson
said "[c]ivil government being the sole object of forming societies, its
administration must be conducted by common consent, ' 347 and defined a
government as being more or less republican depending on the element of
popular election. 348 Acting collectively to self-govern is so basic to republican

34 5

See Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight from Substance, 97
L.J. 1633, 1634 (1988) ("With only a little loss of accuracy, [republicanism] could be said
to have embraced all those thinkers who thought that political power should be exercised by the
people or their representatives, and not by a single individual with royal prerogative power.");
see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816) [hereinafter Jefferson
Letter], reprinted in A JEFFERSON PROFILE, supra note 83, at 262 ("And I do believe that if the
Almighty has not decreed that man shall never be free, (and it is a blasphemy to believe it) that
the secret will be found to be in the making himself the depository of the powers respecting
himself, so far as he is competent to them, and delegating only what is beyond his competence
by a synthetical process, to higher and higher orders of functionaries, so as to trust fewer and
fewer powers in proportion as the trustees become more and more oligarchical."). The belief that
the purpose of the Constitution was to enable the people to govern themselves well was also
central to the thinking of Chief Justice Marshall. See Eisgruber, supra note 115, at 472
(observing that this foundational belief led Marshall to conclude that Constitution should be
interpreted insofar as possible in ways that were "conducive to the happiness of the American
people," and that "[h]is rhetorical strategy attempted to show that Constitution was work of
American people by showing that it was conducive to [their] happiness"). Eisgruber also says
that Marshall recognized that these "twinned perspectives" gave rise to two interconnected
Constitutional defects, concessions to state sovereignty and slavery, which he could not correct,
but which had to wait for the Reconstruction Congress. Eisgruber refers to these defects as
America's "flawed founding," and notes that "one cannot demonstrate the goodness of a
profoundly
defective Constitution." Id. at 473.
34 6
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 341, at 243-44. James Madison went on to say that
this government "is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited
period, or during good behavior." Id. The Framers established what they called a "confederate
republic,'.... an assemblage of societies,' or an association of two or more states into one state."
THE FEDERALIST No. 9, supra note 341, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton heralded the fact
that the proposed Constitution "so far from implying an abolition of the State governments,
makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct
representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important
portions of sovereign power." Id. Hamilton gently criticized Montesquieu for selecting Lycia as
the "model of an excellent Confederate Republic" because the Lycian "common council ...
appoint[ed] . . . all the judges and magistrates of the . . . cities" in the confederation,
something-he
is at pains to point out-that the Framers did not do in the Constitution. Id. at 53.
34 7
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 84 (William Peden ed., 1955).
34
8Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in A JEFFERSON PROFILE,
supra note 83, at 278-80. For this reason, Jefferson considered the House of Representatives to
have "the purest republican feature[s]" of the three branches. Id. At the same time, Jefferson
complained to John Adams that "what the term might, or should, mean beyond a kingless
government, over how many political and social arrangements its 'mantle' could be distended,..
. was permanently in conflict." Rodgers, supra note 13, at 38 (citations omitted).
YALE
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thinking that it is considered by some to be is a formative concept,349 such that
350
liberty, itself, is best understood as a consequence of self-government.
Political deliberation is a critical part of self-governing. 35 1 In republican
thought, most rights are either the precondition for, or the outcome of, an
undistorted deliberative process, but they are never "natural or prepolitical. '35 2
For believers in republicanism, political conversation "'moralizes' [and
externalizes] the process of government by requiring citizens and their
representatives to formulate conceptions of the common good in the course of
justifying their claims,"--"induc[ing] us to assume the 'moral point of view'
' 353
that lies at the heart of most ethical-political systems.
2. Committed Individuals Imbued with Civic Virtue
While the republican tradition vests self-government with many virtues, it
also imposes responsibilities on citizens and their representatives, and it
requires politics that cultivate the quality of character that self-government
requires.354 Indeed, to the that extent liberty, in republican thinking, depends
upon the capacity of citizens to govern themselves, only citizens possessing a

349

See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 339, at 1503 ("In the strongest versions of
republicanism, citizenship-participation as an equal in public affairs, in pursuit of a common
good-appears as a primary, indeed constitutive, interest of the person."); see also SANDEL,
supra note 2, at 348 (describing American civil rights movement as "moment of empowerment,
an instance of the civic strand of freedom" and noting that these struggles "displayed a higher,
republican freedom-the freedom that consists in acting collectively to shape the public
world."); Michelman, supra note 339, at 1529-32 (describing "emergent social presence and
self-emancipatory
activity of Black Americans" as a quintessentially republican moment).
350
See SANDEL, supra note 2, at 26 (stating that personal liberty requires being "member of
a political community that controls its own fate[] and participat[ing] in the decisions that govern
its affairs").
351
See Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1548 (noting that "the belief in political deliberation[,
which] cover[s both] ends as well as means," "is a distinctly American contribution to
republican
352 thought").
See id. at 1549-51 ("Republicans are .. .unlikely to take existing preferences and
entitlements as fixed" and consider "[b]oth [to be] permissible objects of political deliberation,"
thus they are not "hostile to redistribution ... of wealth and entitlements" and "the republican
emphasis on the social conditions for republican deliberation, . ..point powerfully [toward]
equalizing
353 political influence").
Brest, supra note 342, at 1624; see also SANDEL, supra note 2, at 5 ("According to
republican political theory ... sharing in self-rule ....means deliberating with fellow citizens
about 354
the common good and helping to shape the destiny of the political community.").
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 6-7; see also H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1703, 1710-11 (1988) (criticizing Sunstein's republican revival for failing to offer
"credible theory of social transformation," which is necessary to make plausible his optimistic
conclusion that "untransformed persons ... will be capable of conducting a deliberative and
transformative politics" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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sense of civic virtue have that capacity.3 55 In the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, Madison stated:
I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have
virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there
no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation.
No theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us secure.
To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or
happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. If
there be sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community, it will be
exercised in the selection of these men; so that we do not depend on
their virtue, or put confidence in our rulers, but in the people who are
to choose them.3 56
Therefore, "self-government[, in a republican polity,] depends on the members
of a political community . . . acknowledging the obligations that citizenship
entails.,, 357 "More than a legal condition, [republican] citizenship requires
certain habits and dispositions, a concern for the whole, an orientation
to the
358
common good," and "active engagement in the life of the polity."
[R]epublican theory interprets rights in the light of a particular
conception of the good society-the self-governing republic. In
355

SANDEL, supra note 2, at 126, (quoting John Adams, "[Plublic virtue is the only
foundation of republics. ... There must be a positive passion for the public good, the public
interest, honour, power and glory, established in the minds of the people, or there can be no
republican government, nor any real liberty." (alteration in original)); see also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson, to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in A JEFFERSON PROFILE, supra note 83, at
56, 60 (commenting to Madison from Paris on what he liked (and did not like) about new
government that they were forming, and saying that citizens, who are educated to see that
"preserve[ation I of peace and order" is in their interest, are "the only sure reliance for the
preservation of our liberty.").
3563 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 536-37 (1888)); see also id. at 1561 (finding even
more remarkable that "Madison suggested that republican government calls for more virtue from
the citizenry than 'any other form' (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 55, supra note 341, at 365
(James Madison). But see FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 341, at 337 (James Madison) ("A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience
has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.").
357
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 117.
35sId. (stating that these conditions "require constant cultivation" or practice, and that
"public life that fails to nurture these practices or is indifferent to their fate fails to cultivate the
virtues essential to self-government as the republican condition conceives it"); see also Martin,
supra note 30, at 302 (making point similar to Sandel's regarding "committed engagement in the
life of the polity" and "willing commitment to the commond good"). Madison also believed that
the common, or "public good," was derived through a deliberative process carried out in
government institutions, insulated from the immediate pressures of self-interested politics. See
generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 341, at 53-62 (James Madison) (commenting on
advantages of republican form of government).
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contrast to the liberal claim that the right is prior to the good,
republicanism thus affirms a politics of the common good. But the
common good it affirms does not correspond to the utilitarian notion
of aggregating individual preferences. ... whatever they may be, and
try to satisfy them. It seeks instead to cultivate in citizens the
qualities of character necessary to the common good of selfgovernment. Insofar as certain dispositions, attachments, and
commitments are essential to the realization of self-government,
republican politics regards moral character as a public, not merely
private, concern. In this sense, it attends to the identity, not just the
interests, of its citizens.359
In republican thought, only by being actively engaged in political life can
citizens acquire "a sense of civic virtue that transcends narrow self-interest and
impels a certain type of political involvement." 360 "Cultivating in citizens the
virtue, independence, and [cultural] understandings such civic engagement
requires," therefore, "is a central aim of republican politics." 361 Indeed, Sandel
calls such an aim a "formative ambition" of a republican form of
government.362 A republican government, he says, "cannot be neutral toward
the moral character of its citizens or the ends they pursue. Rather, it must
undertake to form their character and ends in order to foster the public
concerns on which liberty depends. 363
3. A Place (or Community) Within Which to Practicethe Art of Citizenship
In republican thinking, key to achieving good citizens, in other words,
individuals who are committed to the idea of the public good through civic
engagement, is having a community within which individuals can practice their
citizenship-a locality in which citizens can "practice" the art of citizenship
and be engaged in the political process. Such involvement helps "to educate
359

SANDEL, supra note

360

2, at 25 (emphasis added).

Martin, supra note 30, at 310; see also Brest, supra note 342, at 1623 (arguing for

"decentralization
and democratization... of constitutional discourse and decisionmaking").
36 1
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 274.

362

1d. (emphasis added). Unlike Sandel, who relies entirely on the political process and
public institutions to make sense of popular conversation and to inculcate in people the habit of
attending to public things, Michelman and Sunstein rely on the courts. See generally Michelman,
supra note 339, at 1493-94 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to show how
republican constitutional theory can lead to stronger judicial protection of individual rights);
Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1576-85 (discussing how "contemporary controversies look quite
different if viewed through the lens of the republican tradition," how "[s]ome of these
controversies involve public law doctrine in the courts," and how courts' "rationality review [of
statutes]
recalls republican themes" because it requires "an element of deliberation in politics").
363
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 127; see also id. (quoting John Adams, "[I]t is the part of a
great politician to make the character of his people, to extinguish among them follies and vices
that he sees and to create in them the virtues and abilities which he sees wanting").
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people in the exercise of citizenship by cultivating the habits of membership
364
[and by] orienting people to common goods beyond their private ends."
Republicanism, therefore, "promotes self-identification with and wholehearted participation in that society that is functionally one's own." 365 The
republican tradition teaches that to be free is to share in governing a political
community that controls its own fate, and emphasizes the need to cultivate
citizenship through particular ties and attachments to an individual's
community.3 66 Statelessness is a disaster from a republican viewpoint, because
it "precludes engagement in the life of any polity," and thus inhibits the
promotion of civic virtue and achievement of the public good.36 7
Since self-government in a republican polity requires both
political communities that control the destinies of their citizens and
citizens who identify sufficiently with those communities to think
and act with a view toward the common good, there must be a
community, a place with which 368
citizens can identify, to have a
successful republican government.
364Id. at 117.
365
Martin, supra note 30, at 318.
366
See SANDEL, supra note 2, at 350 ("Since the days of Aristotle's polis, the republican
tradition has viewed self-government as an activity rooted in a particular place, carried out by
citizens loyal to that place and the way of life it embodies."); see also ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER,
THE DANCE WITH COMMUNITY: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE IN MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL

THOUGHT 63 (1991) (describing community from republican viewpoint as being polity where
"common good rules and public concerns triumph over the goals of the self-interested
individual. The ideal is a place where citizens are united in public action and public spiritedness,
reinforced by a rough equality, common respect, and basic human virtues, above all where
'disinterested regard for the welfare of the whole . . . civil virtue,' holds sway." (emphasis
added) (citations omitted)); SANDEL, supra note 2, at 202 ("[S]elf-government requires political
communities that control their destinies, and citizens who identify sufficiently with those
communities to think and act with a view to the common good." (citations omitted)); William
W. Fisher III, Stories About Property, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1776, 1789-90 (1996) (reviewing
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC

OF OWNERSHIP (1994) and commending Rose's view "that classical republicanism was just one
variant of a general outlook toward politics, society, and property widely held by Western
Europeans prior to the late eighteenth century" that "placed much stock in 'long-standing ways
of doing things,"' was "[h]ostile [towards] centraliz[ed] power and to the equalization of
individuals' fortunes and 'privileges,"' and which "championed 'local particularism'-[the]
preservation of the... many social and political organizations that lay outside the control of the
increasingly powerful European monarchs"); Tarlock, supra note 47, at 555 (stating that "the
core meaning" of communitarianism is to view "community [as] an abstraction for the 'common
good"')). For a discussion of the republican conception of community, see generally FOWLER,
supra367
note 366, at 63-79.
Martin, supra note 30, at 310-11.
368
See SANDEL, supra note 2, at 347 ("Practicing self-government in small spheres ...
impels citizens to larger spheres of political activity." (citing DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 87, at
68)). The environmental mantra "think globally, act locally" is the inverse of this approach, as
global thinking is to impel local action. Both approaches, regardless of the direction of the
energy flow, emphasize the importance of acting at the local level.
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Communities provide the "shared historical, cultural, political, and,
ultimately, normative context," in which the discussion of political alternatives
can take place. 369 "Americans have traditionally exercised self-government as
members of decentralized communities," and these communities were, in turn,
the source of American democracy.37°
Jefferson, remarking on the
effectiveness of local government, said:
How powerfully did we not feel the energy of this organization [local
government] in case of the embargo? I felt the foundations of the
government shaken under my feet by the New England townships.
There was not an individual in their States whose body was not
thrown with all its momentum into action; and although the whole of
the other States were known to be in favor of the measure, yet the
organization of this little selfish minority enabled it to overrule the
union.3 7'
Modern republican thinkers realize that this participation can take place in
a wide variety of private as well as public institutions outside the formal

369

Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1593 (1988).
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 205. This strong tradition of political localism is one of the
many areas where strands of republican thought from the founding has had a profound influence
on American culture throughout our history to the present. See Garnett, supra note 15, at 43334, 433 n.5 (describing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), as "reflect[ing] a new
appreciation for the 'first principles' of federalism, subsidiarity, and localism," noting that
"[Il]ocalism reflects a conviction, widely shared by the Framers, that 'those closest to the matters
to be dealt with best knew what ought to be done,"' and quoting Justice Black in Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), who said that "experience in making local laws by local people
themselves is by far the safest guide for a nation like ours to follow." Id. at 548 (Black, J.,
concurring)); see also SANDEL, supra note 2, at 208 (discussing JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND
ITS PROBLEMS
(1927,) regarding importance of communities).
371
Jefferson Letter, supra note 345. Jefferson also argued that local government held the
key to preventing power from being "concentrat[ed].. . in the hands of the one, the few, the well
born or the many," and urged that counties be divided into wards so that "every man is a sharer
in the direction of his ward-republic ... and feels that he is a participator in the government of
affairs, not merely at an election one day in the year, but every day." Id.; see also JEFFERSON,
supra note 347, at 93 (comparing "savage Americans," who had "no law," with "civilized
Europeans," who had "too much law," and commenting "that great societies cannot exist without
government. The Savages therefore break them into small ones."); ROBERT F. KENNEDY, To
SEEK A NEWER WORLD 55-62 (1967) (calling Bedford-Stuyvesant "an experiment in politics, an
experiment in self-government" and "a chance to bring government back to the people of the
neighborhood," and lauding community development corporations and other neighborhood
bodies, when "given sufficient responsibilities and support, 'as a way of translating Jefferson's
vision" of "dividing the country into small political districts" and "to regenerate civic virtue" in
modem era); Woodrow Wilson, Speech at Sioux City, Iowa (Sept. 17, 1912) ("If America
discourages the locality, the community, the self-contained town, she will kill the nation."),
reprintedin SANDEL, supra note 2, at 216.
370
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channels of electoral and legislative politics, 372 and can be as unstructured as
"talk among citizens." 373 Michelman comments that
much of the country's normatively consequential dialogue occurs
outside the major, formal channels of electoral and legislative politics
. . . .[It occurs] in the encounters and conflicts, interactions and
debates that arise in and around town meetings and local government
agencies; civic and voluntary organizations; social and recreational
clubs; schools ...; managements, directorates and leadership groups
of organizations of all kinds; workplaces and shop floors; public
events and street life.374
These "arenas" of citizenship should "be counted among the sources and
channels of republican self-government and jurisgenerative politics. '375 He
sees this "non-state centered notion of republican citizenship .. .both [as]
historically [very] American and
[as] congenial to a characteristic strain in
3 76
revivalism.
civic
contemporary
372

Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1551; see also SANDEL, supra note 2, at 348, 350 (stating
that citizens must constantly practice citizenship qualities in their families, neighborhoods,
places of worship, trade unions, political movements, or local government; noting that "[slelfgovernment
today requires a politics that plays itself out in a multiplicity of settings, from
neighborhoods to nations to the world as a whole"; and labeling as "civic virtue distinctive to
our time the capacity to negotiate our way among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes
conflicting obligations that claim us, and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties give
rise"); Brest, supra note 342, at 1624-25 ("Political discourse-including legal and
constitutional discourse-takes place in a wide variety of institutions, including conventionally
'private' organizations like the family, corporation, union, and civic association as well as in
referenda, elections, conventions, school boards, city councils, legislatures, and courts.");
Michelman, supra note 339, at 1531 (stating that place where this "normative[] consequential
dialogue occurs [is most often] outside major, formal channels of electoral and legislative
politics"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714 (1988)
(noting how "[n]ormativepluralism ... envisions an ongoing and desirable role for groups that
are social but not public-groups intermediate between individuals and the state" (emphasis
added)). But see Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1574-75 (complaining that elevating importance of
intermediate organizations undervalues distinctive capacities of state and ignores fact that
private373power wielded by intermediate organizations can be oppressive).
Brest, supra note 342, at 1625.
374
Michelman, supra note 339, at 1531. But see Sullivan, supra note 372, at 1719 (taking
issue with "short shrift" both Michelman and Sunstein give to involuntary groups, despite their
embrace of voluntary groups, and noting that while they have both "thrown militarism,
fraternity, and misogyny overboard, [they] have not abandoned the [republican] tradition" on
issue of "voluntary associations"). Michelman borrowed the term "jurisgenerative" from Robert
Cover. See Michelman, supra note 339, at 1502; see also Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1983) ("Thus it is that the very act of constituting tight communities
about common ritual and law is jurisgenerative by a process of juridical mitosis. New law is
constantly created through the sectarian separation of communities. The 'Torah' becomes two,
three, many
Toroth as surely as there are teachers to teach or students to study.").
375Michelman, supra note 339, at 1531 (citations omitted).
376
1d. (citations omitted).
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4. Embracing Difference-A Solution to the Problem of Homogeneity

There is one serious potential problem with relying on republicanism as a
theoretical basis for enhancing tribal sovereignty: the perceived importance of
homogeneity and exclusivity to the theory.37 7 The "incommensurable" values
of self-contained, culturally nomic communities, like tribes, could make it

difficult, even impossible, to achieve the core republican enterprise in the
larger society-the deliberative (or dialogic) search for the universal good (a
single, public-regarding point of view) 378 Further, incorporating the concept of

social pluralism (in other words, diversity) into republicanism's "national
conversation"--as this article suggests should be done-creates a multiperspective conversation that "bristle[s] with [the] danger of faction[s] and...
[individual] preferences . . . [the very things] republican[s] most
condemn[] ., 379 Tribes offer differences in perspective based on culture and
377

Neither homogeneity nor exclusivity is achievable today in this country because of the
heterogeneity of modem American society and the enduring strong populist strand in our system
of core beliefs. See Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1565 (commenting that political theory that is
"comfortable with firm social hierarchies, [emphasizes] the role of tradition," and is dependent
on "organic conceptions of the state that [finds] common interests among members of different
social classes" is totally "incompatible with modem beliefs" and exists "awkwardly" with
republicanism's "commitment to political equality"). The importance of exclusivity, and its
dependence on homogeneity, in republican thinking, is a principal target of its critics. See, e.g.,
Abrams, supra note 369, at 1603 (wondering "whether it is possible to re-animate the broadly
participatory strain of republican thought without triggering the danger of popular coercion" and
criticizing both Michelman and Sunstein's use of republicanism to address tradition questions of
legal theory); Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609, 1612-13 (1988) (questioning whether revival of republican notions of common
good and
active citizenship is good for blacks given "oppressive roots" of these notions).
37 8
Sullivan exposes this problem in her critique of Michelman's Law's Republic and
Sunstein's Reviving Republicanism. See Sullivan, supra note 372, at 1709, 1720-21 (suggesting
instead "normative pluralism," which rejects both republicanism's "pursu[it of a] shared
normative understanding and a single common good" and "do[es] not mind keeping communal
life fractionated and outside the state," and pluralism's vision of politics as "a struggle among
persons who are autonomous bundles of presocial wants" (emphasis added)); see also Epstein,
supra note 345, at 1633 (favoring "Lockean emphasis on limited government and private
property" over modem republicanism for "offer[ing] a superior response to the pluralist
nightmare" of unguided decision making); Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some
Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1652 (1988) (questioning
"whether, given the state of twentieth-century American political institutions, the republican
ideal of deliberative decisionmaking may be in tension with other republican goals, such as
equality, participation, reflective innovation, and universalism"); Jonathan R. Macey, The
Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673, 1673 (1988) (criticizing
republican revival for not appreciating sufficiently, as pluralists do, "frightening power of man
to subvert the offices of government for... evil ends"); Powell, supra note 354, at 1708, 1710
(finding republican notion of deliberative democracy "flawed," and expressing concern with its
underlying premise "that free and equal deliberation among political equals will lead to
,uniquely correct' political decisions" in absence of "character formation," given "modern
West's37atomistic individual[s]").
9Sullivan, supra note 372, at 1717.
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ethnicity that may be too pronounced and difficult to overcome in many cases,
which is why the classical republican model was exclusive and homogenous.
However, Michelman and Sunstein, perhaps in their desire to show the
relevance of republican principles to our times, embrace diversity as part of
that tradition. They call diversity a republican virtue, not a vice, which
contributes to all-important political dialogue and does not detract from or
threaten that conversation.380 While expanding the circle of citizens to
encompass genuine diversity "greatly complicates republican thinking, ' 381 by
making more difficult the achievement of a "normative consensus," the two
scholars take pains to show how that is no longer the single aim of republican
thinking.382 Indeed, according to Sunstein, "republicans see disagreement as a
creative and productive force, highly congenial to and even an indispensable
part of the basic republican faith in political dialogue. Discussion and
deliberation depend for their legitimacy and efficacy on the existence of
conflicting views. 38 3 Therefore, Sunstein says "[m]odern republicanism is...
38

°See Michelman, supra note 339, at 1504 ("In republican thought, the normative
character of politics depends [not only] on the independence of mind and judgment, [and] the
authenticity of voice, [but,] in some versions of republicanism[, on] the diversity or 'plurality' of
views that citizens bring to 'the debate of the commonwealth."'); see also Sunstein, supra note
339, at 1571 ("[B]asic republican commitments will tend in the direction of guarantees of
political deliberation, including the basic rights of political participation; the republican beliefs
in political equality and citizenship will generate strong antidiscrimination norms . . .and
republican approaches will attempt to promote deliberation among multiple voices in the
political
381 process.").
See Michelman, supra note 339, at 1554 ("For if republican jurisprudence depends on
jurisgenerative politics, jurisgenerative politics in turn seems to depend on the existence of a
normative consensus that can hardly survive the diversification of the political community by the
inclusion of persons of widely and deeply differing experiences and outlooks."); see also
Sunstein, supra, note 339, at 1554-55 (defining "republican commitment to universalism" as "a
belief in the possibility of mediating different approaches to politics, or different conceptions of
the public good, through discussion and dialogue" to achieve, where possible, "substantively
correct outcomes, understood as such through the ultimate criterion of agreement among
political
382 equals").
Michelman, supra note 339, at 1506, 1527; see also Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1555
(contrasting republicanism with pluralism and extolling republicansim's ability to serve common
good). But see Abrams, supra note 369, at 1603, 1608 (worrying that Michelman's and
Sunstein's attempt to "[r]ecover[] the popular strain in republican theory" may trigger popular
coercion); Epstein, supra note 345, at 1636 (stating that neither scholar seeks "refinement of
classical doctrine," rather each has proposed "new theory which borrows selectively, and
seductively, from the past" (emphasis added)); Sullivan, supra note 372, at 1722 (agreeing with
Epstein that diversity cannot be incorporated into republicanism without fatally "undermin[ing]
the republican model," but praising both scholars for trying valiantly to find place in republican
thought for diversity and "rainbow republicanism that would incorporate perspectival differences
of various
383 hues.").
Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1575-76. Sunstein notes the "irony" in "invok[ing]
repulicanism as a basis for rejecting [exclusionary] practices," but overcomes this by saying
"[t]he use of the republican aspiration [of political equality] counteract[s the] republican
practice" of exclusivity; this is just an illustration of a common practice-using "cultural [or
traditional] commitments ... to revise cultural practices." Id. at 1581. Thus, republicans do not
quarrel with pluralism's search for diversity, but disagree with the pluralist view of politics as a
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not grounded in a belief in homogeneity; on
the contrary, heterogeneity is
384
necessary if republican systems are to work.
Michelman echoes this thought when he says that the republican dialogic
process no longer requires a "final dissolution of difference," such that
everyone agrees-rather "validation [can] occur[] when participants ... come
to 'hold the same commitments in a new way."'' 385 This "capacity[y] for
dialogic self-modulation," coming to the same commitments in a new way, is a
"process of personal self-revision [taking place as a result of] social-dialogic
stimulation," and requires an individual who can be "reflexively critical
[about] the ends and commitments" that she has already made.386 To be such a
person requires the perspective of individuals who are different from oneself.
In this way, Sunstein and Michelman's conception of self and political
freedom makes a virtue of plurality.
[O]ur embodied identity and the narrative history that constitutes our
selfhood give us each a perspective on the world, which can only be
revealed in a community of interaction with others ....A common,
shared perspective is one that we create insofar as in acting with
others we discover our difference and identity, our distinctiveness
from, and unity with, others. The emergence of such unity-indifference comes through a process of self-transformation and
collective action ....
Through such processes we learn to exercise political and moral
judgment. We develop the ability to see the world as it appears from
perspectives different from ours. Such judgment is not merely
applying a given rule to a given content, . . it means learning to
recognize a given content, and identifying it properly. This can only
be achieved insofar as we respect the dignity of the generalized other,
who is our equal, by combining it with our awareness of his or her

"struggle [between self-interested groups] for scarce social resources." Id. at 1587. For modem
republicans, the challenge is how to maintain a "belief in universal[ truth]" revealed through
robust discussion among citizens with "different conceptions of the good life," and not to slide
into the "failings of [interest group] pluralism." See id. at 1554-55 (noting that "compromises
[may be] necessary" when "differently situated individuals and groups [cannot] resolve their
disagreements through conversation," accepting that there may be "political [winners and]
losers," and suggesting that topics like religion "should be entirely off-limits to politics").
384
1d. at 1576.
385
Michelman, supra note 339, at 1527 (quoting H. PITKIN, FORTUNE ISA WOMAN:
GENDER AND POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI 279 (1984)); see also
Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1555 ("[D]ifferently situated individuals and groups will frequently
be unable to resolve their disagreements through conversation," and "[i]t would be fanciful to
suggest that different conceptions of the good life can or should always be mediated through
politics.").
386
Michelman, supra note 339, at 1527-28.

530

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2005:443

concrete othemess. What we call content and context in 387
human
affairs is constituted by the perspectives of those engaged in it.
In fact, to both Sunstein and Michelman, modem republican deliberation
requires participation specifically by people who are at the margins of the
political process-those who may actually seek to disrupt the conversation, not
those at the center.38 8 Similarly, the pursuit of political freedom through law
requires the inclusion, not exclusion, of hitherto excluded absent voices of
emergent, self-conscious groups. 389 In this version of republicanism,
differences and disagreements do not disappear from republican political lifethey are they very mainstay on which it is built.
Government based on the interlocking concepts of self-determination and
consent of the governed, individuals committed both to the common good and
active engagement in the life of their community, and a place within which one
can practice and perfect the civic virtues that guarantee liberty: these are three
major strands of republican thought that remain robust today. Michelman's and
Sunstein's reformulation of traditional republican principles to incorporate
diversity as a necessary, transformative part of the political dialogueparticularly including in the national conversation groups at the margin of
political life-overcomes one of the major weaknesses of the theory if it is to
be used to support the concept of enhanced tribal sovereignty. The next two
sections of Part IV explore how these principles contribute to a more coherent
theoretical solution to the problem of tribal sovereignty and how their
application to tribes is essential if they are to survive as discrete centers of
norm generation and dispersal in our society.
B. What Republicanism Has to Offer on the Question of Enhanced Tribal
Sovereignty
According to republican theory, the elements described above are
essential to legitimate government. As a corollary, the presence of these
387SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA 348-49 (1985).

388Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1576; see also Michelman, supra note 339, at 1507
(positing theory that pluralism is essential part of"constitutionalist practice").
See Michelman, supra note 339, at 1529-30 (calling "transformative" "the primary and
crucial role of . . . the emergent social presence and self-emancipatory activity of Black
America[]," its "oppositional understandings of [its] situation," and "its relation to [the] . . .
Constitution"). Sunstein notes that republicans could dismiss proportional voting because it
depends on seeing "the political process as a self-interested struggle . . . for scarce social
resources, that discourage[s] political actors from assuming and understanding the perspectives
of others, and ... downplays the deliberative and transformative features of politics." Sunstein,
supra note 339, at 1585-89. However, republicanism could also support the concept because it
improves the deliberative process by giving each group a "piece of the action[, and] . . .
increase[s] the likelihood that political outcomes will incorporate some understanding of the
perspective of all those affected[,] ... [and] recognize[es] the creative functions of disagreement
and multiple perspectives for the governmental process." Id.
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elements-consent of the governed achieved through political deliberation,
individuals committed to the common good who are civically engaged, a sense
of place and/or community where that dialogic engagement takes place, and
the modern republican virtue of diversity-could be seen as a prerequisite to
enhanced sovereignty. In fact, notions of self-determination and consent of the
governed, central to arguments in favor of tribes possessing greater
sovereignty, are very republican. Indeed, self-determination today is an
aspirational norm of indigenous peoples around the world-a foundational
principle, not only in our political system, but also in the contemporary
international legal system as reflected in the United Nations Charter and other
major international legal instruments.390 Yet, Indian tribes never willingly
consented to anyone else governing them, nor to having anyone else rule their
land.39 1
Citizen empowerment through political deliberation and action is at the
heart of both traditional and modem republican thought. In contradistinction,
we have consistently subjected tribes to "the antonym of deliberation"-"the
imposition of outcomes" by others, particularly by Congress and the Court.392
We have denied tribes what we claim for ourselves-the basic republican right
of self-determination through deliberation, which, in turn, has denied them
liberty. We have even taken away from tribes the space within which they can
practice citizenship free from outside interference and cultivate the civic
virtues among their members that such engagement requires.
By denying tribes their sovereignty, and thus excluding them from
meaningful political deliberations about their future, we have not only deprived
tribes of their liberty and their right to determine their own futures, but have
enervated our national conversation by keeping from it different perspectives,
which are critical to our collective search for the universal, common good.
Worse, we have deprived our deliberations of their "legitimacy and efficacy"
39 0

ANAYA, supra note 25, at 75; see also id. at 109 ("The international community
recognize[s that] classical colonial institutions of government [are] contrary to self-government
because they subject[] people to 'alien subjugation, domination and exploitation."' (quoting
Declarationon the Granting ofIndependence to ColonialCountries and Peoples, U.N. GAOR,
15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, 1, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961))). Self-government is considered a norm

of "self-determination"; even though the exact content of what constitutes self-government may
vary from nation to nation, at its core, it is the notion "that government [should] function
according to the will of the people governed," making "[s]elf-government stand[] in opposition
to institutions that disproportionately or unjustly concentrate power." Id. at 109-12 (stating that
ability of peoples to define themselves through exercise of political power and self government
is also aspirational norm of modem sovereignty).
391ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 121 (stating that meaningful self-determination for tribe
means "right to choose [its own] goals and means within a set of community values"). To
Aleinikoff, Indian citizenship should be empowering; in his view, however, the Court has
wielded "citizenship as a sword [to] cut[] down what it views as undemocratic, race-based,
rights-denying assertions of tribal power over nonmembers." Id. Aleinikoff finds his vision of
tribal self-determination "[m]ore republican than liberal" because "it stresses public deliberation
about 392
the kind of community citizens want to create, maintain and pass on." Id.
See Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1550.
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because we have kept from them conflicting views.393 A governing process that
subordinates politically weak groups, like tribes, or limits their participation in
the political process by requiring them to be like the rest of us, contradicts the
basic republican principle of citizenship, which "manifest[s] itself in [notions
of political equality and] broadly guaranteed rights of participation" in the
deliberative process.394
Republican principles may also be better than liberal principles when it
comes to protecting the "cultural otherness" of distinct communities-like
tribes-because republicanism acknowledges the importance of cultural
interests to the development of a more vital relationship between rights and
responsibilities.3 95 By asserting the a priori rights of the individual and
imposing duties upon everybody else (including the state) to respect those
rights, liberalism has marginalized tribal conceptions of justice and property,
which are manifested as communal obligations. 396 Liberalism's disregard of
tribal communal rights and emphasis on private rights has resulted in a
"disruption in cultural, linguistic, and family values of Native Peoples, a
breakdown in relations between Native communities, and ultimately, a threat
to a distinct Native way of life. 397
393

1d. at 1575-76.

394d. at 1541. Sunstein argues that the republican norm of political equality, which
he

aligns closely to his other three republican principles-"faith in deliberation," "citizenship," and
"universalism"--acts to prevent both the exclusion of particular groups from the deliberative
process and outcomes from that process that act to "subordinate politically weak groups." Id. at
1557. Our treatment of tribes has violated this norm and has caused both the exclusion and
subordination
of tribes.
395
See id. at 1571 (arguing that all four of basic republican commitments fit within liberal
tradition, and that basic "republican beliefs in political equality and citizenship will[, among
other desirable outcomes,] generate strong antidiscrimination norms . . . [and] promote
deliberation among multiple voices in the political process"); see also Will Kymlicka, Two
Models ofPluralism and Toleration, in TOLERATION 81, 95 (David Heyd ed., 1996) (arguing that
liberal society cannot be intolerant of insulated minorities-like tribes-who reject ideal of
individual
396 autonomy, and advocating right to revise or deviate from norm).
See, e.g., Leon E. Trakman, Native Cultures in a Rights Empire Ending the Dominion,
45 BuFi. L. REv. 189, 203-05, 209 (1997) (noting how "liberal" preference for individual rights
and individual ownership has displaced native concepts of communal stewardship). Trakman,
however, does not argue for the displacement of Western liberal rights, as Sandel might, but for
"the incorporation of different systems of values within them," such as native conceptions of
communal interests in land. Id. at 211-12. According to Kymlicka, while "any form of group
rights that restricts the civil rights of group members[, such as the Pueblo theocracy, may be]
inconsistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality," this does not give liberals license
"to impose [these] principles on groups that do not share them." Kymlicka, supra note 395, at
95. Many factors must be considered before any such decision is made, "including the severity
of rights violations within the minority community, the degree of consensus in the community
on the legitimacy of restricting individual rights, the ability of dissenting group members to
leave the community . . . , the existence of historical agreements" like treaties, which guarantee
minority communities freedom from interference, and "the nature of the proposed intervention."
Id. at 95-96.
397
Trakman, supra note 396, at 209.
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Leon Trakman argues that "shifting from [the liberal] conception of rights
[that is] limited only externally by the rights of others to a conception of rights
[that is] limited internally by responsibilities that inhere in the values
underlying those rights," will better encompass Native American interests.39 8
He argues that the interests of those who need to benefit from these
responsibilities are not sufficiently acknowledged in law, and the "liberty of
society as a whole," will be diminished if these interests are not protected.399
A rights culture is more accommodating when it imposes
responsibilities upon those who exercise rights not to undermine the
cultural interests of others upon whom those rights impact. It is more
reconciliatory when those rights are not only self-regarding, but also
regarding of others. It is more vital when relating rights to
responsibilities advances the interests of a plural society itself. These
goals are satisfied within a revitalized rights regime in which cultural
values and interests occupy central legal stage, in place of lasting
subordination.40 0
Liberty, according to Trakman, is "most just," when it recognizes the impact of
individual rights "upon the traditions, customs and practices of cultural
communities. '40 1 Trakman's proposals fit squarely within the republican
tradition, and like Sandel, he believes that granting culturally distinct
communities this level of respect may require granting them additional
political rights.40 2
The concept of subsidiarity (or localism) reflects republican principles
and contains norms that also support enhancing tribal sovereignty in this
country. Subsidiarity, like republicanism, advocates granting greater autonomy
to local units of government while not abandoning completely "the importance
of [a] strong, centralized political authority" to assure that local action is
compatible with the overriding objectives of the central state. 40 3 Like
39

Id. at 219-20.

399

4

1d. at 240.

°Id. at 239.

4 01

1d.
° 1d. at 238 ("[R]espect for the autonomy of the members of minority cultures requires
respect for their cultural structure, and that in turn may require special linguistic, educational and
even political rights for minority cultures.").
403Garnett, supra note 15, at 478. This brief discussion of the benefits of subsidiarity (or
localism) is drawn principally from Garnett, supra note 15, at 478-79 nn.329-32; see also id. at
479 (citing W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law-American
Federalism Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 61, 67 (1995), for proposition that while
"subsidiarity principle protects individual liberties through the diffusion of coercive power," it
goes beyond federalism in its preference for local government); Mary Ann Glendon, Civil
Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1996, at 39-40 ("Describing 'subsidiarity' as 'the principle of
leaving tasks to the smallest social unit that can perform them adequately."'). Cf. Judith Resnik,
Federalism'sOptions, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 465, 486 (1996) ("[O]ne might make claims for
4 2
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republicanism, subsidiarity also protects the "internal lawgiving structures
within local communities., 40 4 Robust local government "promotes both
individual and community self-determination and accountability," and
"allow[s] a community to express its norms [and] define itself through its
aspirations and prohibitions. 4 °5 In this way, local communities preserve their
unique identities, which, in turn, promote diversity of expression among
distinct communities. Subsidiarity, with its reliance on the republican principle
of governing in small places and its celebration of cultural diversity, therefore
40 6
provides additional support for dispersing greater sovereignty to tribes.
Thus, republican principles support tribal claims for enhanced
sovereignty. If tribes are strong enough in their self-identity to determine their
future as tribes, despite centuries of assaults on their sovereignty and culture,
and if their members are capable of engaging in that process, then the
republican principles that animated the formation of this country-and still
animate political life today---entitle them to greater autonomy.40 7
The final section of this Part looks at whether tribes qualify for the
application of republican principles. To assist in making this determination, the
Article returns to three of the previously identified strands of republican
thought: government as the collective responsibility of the governed (consent
of the governed), committed citizens imbued with a sense of civic virtue (civic
engagement), and a place within which to practice citizenship (community). As

state governance based on [the states'] capacities as 'laboratories' generative of new rights or of
educational and participatory opportunities, as enablers of affiliations to governments born from
proximity, as useful or limited competitors, as autonomous centers of governance that provide at
least some choice of ...rules, [and] as co-conversationalists in norm development."). But see
ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS 94-95 (1997) (worrying that republicanism's
purely "local" view of community that celebrates small, insular groups clinging to traditional
bonds,4 is "a prescription not for harmony but for balkanization[, intolerance,] and conflict").
°4See Garnett, supra note 15, at 479.
405
1d. Like subsidiarity, cultural pluralism esteems and "promote[s] the integrity of diverse
cultures[, particularly indigenous culturesI within existing state[s]." ANAYA, supra note 25, at
110. Cultural pluralism joins the idea of a republican-democracy-a government that governs as
close to the people being governed as possible-with the preservation of cultural integrity. Id. It
supports granting greater "spheres of governmental or administrative autonomy for indigenous
communities, while seeking to ensure [their] participation ... in all decisions affecting them."
Id.; see also id. (stating that "any diminishment [of this] authority or alterat[ion] .. . [in]
indigenous institutions of autonomous governance," conflicts with international instruments,
which "uphold[] the right of indigenous peoples to 'retain their own customs and institutions."'
(quoting Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal peoples in Independent
Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382)). Like subsidiarity, cultural pluralism advocates the
republican principles of dispersed sovereignty and civic engagement, and finds these things
essential
for preservation of indigenous cultures.
406
See Garnett, supra note 15, at 480 (discussing value of subsidiarity principle for
"rejuvenat[ing] ...Tribes as political communities").
407See id. at 440 (pointing out that allowing federal government to second-guess tribal
communities' acts of self-expression through tribal laws is "unavoidably[ ] paternalistic and ...
inconsistent with a robust understanding of self-determination").
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they are for most Americans, these principles are formative, foundational
norms for tribes.
C. Indian Tribes as Centers of Civic Republican Governance
Tribes historically functioned as centers of republican governance until
federal Indian policies made serious inroads into that structure. Tribes
practiced (and continue to practice) government by consent, required (and still
require) their members to be civically engaged, and depended (and still
depend) upon a place within which to practice the art of citizenship to maintain
their societies.4 °8
Observers of Indian tribal government in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century described it as both democratic and republican.4 °9 Well
before first contact, "[t]he Iroquois had created a system of government that
provided for checks and balances to prevent the concentration of individual
power, and also maintained a wide range of personal freedoms. 4 10 "The
Iroquois' unwritten constitution, the Great Law of Peace, separated military
and civilian affairs and provided for freedom of religion, women's suffrage,
referendum, veto, and recall, ' '4 1 and provided that a peace chief could not be a

408Of course, those tribes who have lost their homelands and no longer have land that they
can claim as their own are disadvantaged in this respect, although the memory of those lands
may be just as important to those tribes as the actual land is to reservation Indians. See JACK
CAMPIsI, THE MASHPEE INDIANS 158 (1991) (describing struggle of Mashpees to retain their
identity as tribe in face of imposition of different forms of government, "adoption of English as
[their] principal language," and loss of their land, and listing "attachment to ancestral land; even
though it is no longer theirs to control," as important part of what it means to be Mashpee); see
also Frank Clifford, Exploiters or Stewards Of Nature?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1998, at Al (noting
tension in some Native American communities between conservationists and business interests);
Stephanie Strom, Indians Fight to Regain Lands Lost to Railroad,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2002, at
A18 (describing one Native American's attempt to reclaim land that had fallen into hands of
private ownership); Don Van Natta, Jr., Where Tribe Saw Promise, Democrats Saw Pledge,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at Al (discussing Oklahoma tribe's failed attempt to reacquire
valuable land).
4°gSee Monette, supra note 77, at 657-58 (explaining how application of "republican
democracy" shows that "trib[al] sovereignty, including the power to hold and convey territory,
arose and
existed from within, independent of Europe, the Union, the states or their people").
410Miller, supra note 112, at 143.
4 11
1d. The Iroquois tribe was not alone on giving women the right to vote. The Shawnee of
Ohio and Pennsylvania, the Virginian Algonquians, the Delawares and the Ottawa and Miami
tribes of Ohio all allowed women to vote and participate in tribal decisions. 15 SMITHSONIAN
HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS: NORTHEAST 216, 261, 627, 684, 782 (William
Sturtevant & Bruce G. Trigger eds., 1978) [hereinafter SMITHSONIAN HANDBOOK]. The
Potawatoni women signed several of the tribe's treaties with the United States, id. at 617, and a
female chief of the Powhatan Nation signed the 1677 Treaty at Middle Plantation with
representatives of the British Crown. HELEN ROUNTREE, POCAHONTAS'S PEOPLE 100 (1990).
Iroquois women also "selected new chiefs," "had the power to recall [and] replace an
unsatisfactory chief," and the "power to stop war parties." Miller, supra note 112, at 143.
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war chief.412 Their Constitution called for a "yearly council of all tribal chiefs,
during which [Iroquois] Confederacy policies were [deliberated and]
determined by unanimous vote. 413 Storing, commenting on the influence of
the Iroquois Nation on the Framers, described it as "genuinely democratic,"
because "[w]ith [Indians,] the whole authority of government is vested in the
whole tribe., 4 14 Another
early scholar saw the Iroquois as "an absolute
4 15
Republick by itself."
The Iroquois were not the only tribe that employed republican principles
in its government. John Kinzie, in an 1818 letter to Lewis Cass, Governor of
Michigan Territory, noted that "[a]ll Potowatomi Indians voted, making the
tribe 'perfectly republican.', 4 6 In most tribes, a council or senate made
decisions, and "most tribes allowed any tribal member to be heard on an
issue. 4 17 Thomas Jefferson, who studied the traditions, languages, and
governance structures of the Virginia Indian tribes, said of those tribes:
But it is said, that they are averse to society and a social life. Can
anything be more inapplicable than this to a people who always live
in towns or clans? Or can they be said to have no "republique," who
conduct all their affairs in national councils, who pride themselves in
their national character, who consider an insult or injury done to an
individual by a stranger as done to the whole, and who resent it
accordingly. In short, this picture is not applicable to any nation of
Indians I have ever known or heard of in North America.4 18
412

Miller, supra note 112, at 143; Id. (citing

429).

413

SMITHSONIAN HANDBOOK,

supra note 411, at

1d. "The Iroquois confederacy was comprised of [first] five, and later six, [chiefs from]
different Indian nations .... " The confederacy "formed during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries and was fully developed . . .in 1630," at the time of first contact with French
explorers. Id. at 142-43.
4144 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 107 (1981).
4152 CADWALLADER COLDEN, THE HISTORY OF THE FIvE INDIAN NATIONS OF CANADA, at
xvi (1902).
4 16
SMITHSONIAN HANDBOOK, supra note 411, at 732 (quoting Letter from John Kinzie, to
Lewis Cass, Governor of Michigan Territory (May 14, 1818) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
417
Miller, supra note 112, at 145. "The Delaware established councils of up to 200 voters."
Id. at 145 n.95. "The Cherokee also used large councils as advisors to their chiefs," in which
"every tribal member voted ... and had a voice." Id. "At Cherokee town councils, the entire
population could speak and decisions needed unanimous votes." Id. Tribal, or town councils,
also governed the Creek and the Chickasaw. Id.; see also JEFFERSON, supra note 347, at 202-07
(describing
tribal governments of several Virginia tribes).
4 18
JEFFERSON, supra 3457, at 202; see also Miller, supra note 112, at 148-49 (stating that
Jefferson praised tribes for having "no law but that of nature," being able to "enjoy[] peace,
justice, liberty, and equality," and for adopting republican form of government). According to
Robert Miller, the fact that Indians, who were in a "state of nature," "adopted a republican form
of government .. .reinformed Jefferson's belief that republican government was natural to
mankind." Id.
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The republican principle of having a place within which to practice the art
of being a good citizen is (and always has been) central to tribal society. Indian
tribes have always had a concept of territory and boundaries. Most tribes
assigned hunting territories to villages or lineages, which other tribes and tribal
members knew of and respected. 419 Tribes also recognized (and still recognize)
territory through mythical or sacred claims,
and the burial sites of lineages and
420
clans marked territory for many tribes.
Today, a tribe's traditional homeland is the "centerpiece of contemporary
Indian life."'42' Tribal lands and their resources are not only sustaining for the
tribe, but are the tribe's cultural and spiritual base-where ancestors are
buried, and spirits live-and the very topography can provide cleansing and
rebirth.42 2
You cannot understand how the Indian thinks of himself in relation
to the world around him unless you understand his conception of
what is appropriate; particularly what is morally appropriate within
the context of that relationship. The native American ethic with
respect to the physical world is a matter of reciprocal appropriation:
appropriations in which man invests himself in the landscape, and at
the same time incorporates the landscape into his own most
fundamental experience.4 23
The commitment to these lands "undergirds all . . . legal struggles 24
inn
Indian Country about land, water, natural resources and jurisdiction.a
Indeed, Wilkinson, affirming the value of different perspectives in the national
419

Champagne, supra note 72, at 114-15 (describing how, for Creek Indians, villages
served as primary political unit, and individual members of Creek society identified with village
ceremonial square of mother's "matrikin"). See also WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND

58-66 (1983) (describing how hunting territories were assigned and protected); Champagne,
supra note 72, at 116 (describing how, during colonial period, Western concepts of fee title
ignored 0and superceded tribal systems of assigning and protecting territories).
42Champagne, supra note 72, at 116.
421
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 7; see also Getches, New Subjectivism, supra note 8, at
1593 (stating that "tribal land ownership grew by sixteen million acres from 1972 to 1992," and
that number of Indians "under tribal governing authority" has also substantially increased since
middle422of twentieth century).
Deloria and Lytle note that while Indians may have "surrendered the physical
occupation and ownership of their ancestral lands [through bargained for exchanges or treaties],
they did not abandon the spiritual possession [of those lands, which] had been a part of them."
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 25, at 11. This strong attachment to tribal ancestral home land
has led Indians-like the Cherokee, who sued to prevent the construction of the Tellico Dam and
the flooding of the Little Tennessee River where their ancestral town was originally located-to
resist actions that might degrade those lands, even if no longer "geographical[ly] proximat[e]" to
them. 423
Id.
N. Scott Momaday, Native American Attitudes to the Environment, in ON NATURE 115
(Daniel
Halpern
ed., 1987).
4 24
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 8.
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conversation, suggests that we have much to learn from this tribal reverence
for place:
We need to develop . . .an ethic of place. It respects equally the
people of a region and the land, animals, vegetation, water, and air.
An ethic of place recognizes both that western people revere their
physical surroundings and that they need and deserve a stable,
productive economy that is accessible to those of modest incomes.
An ethic of place ought to be a shared community value and ought to
manifest itself in a dogged determination of the society-at-large to
treat the environment and its people as equals, to recognize both as
sacred, and to insure that all members of the community not only
search for, but insist upon, solutions that fulfill the ethic.425
Thus, the reality of the reservation reflects the principle of dispersing
government to a place small enough for citizens to practice citizenship and be
transformed by that experience.
Although Indians have been partially assimilated into modem American
society, the existence of a tribal community remains an important defining
feature for most Indians, even those who live in urban areas.426 The "ethnic
boundaries" of what it is to be Indian are "tribal in nature," and "tribal
membership is at the core of Indian personal identity, [making tribal
membership] much more than a shifting political value choice or voluntary
association., 427 Tribes are homogeneous communities, in which ancestors,
history, tradition, and rituals are shared, and where individual tribal members
acquire a "homogeneity of purpose and outlook" simply by being born and
maturing within a tribal community.428 As a result, tribal Indians have as a
425

Charles F. Wilkinson, Law and the American West: The Search for an Ethic of Place,
59 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 405 (1988) (emphasis added); see also id. at 407 (observing that
Indians "possess individuality as people and self-rule as governments, but they are also an
inseparable part of the larger community, a proud and valuable constituent group that must be
extended
the full measure of respect mandated by an ethic of place").
426
See Newton, supra note 9, at 244 (stating that "overwhelming majority of Indians ...
seek to remain 'tribal members,"' and citing DARCY McNICKLE, NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM 7
(1973), for proposition that Indians who do not live on reservations "form distinct Indian
communities
to preserve, as much as possible, the core of a native tribal style of life").
427
1d. ("The Tribe is a projection of the autonomous individual Indian."). Tarlock,
however, argues that tribal culture has become a post-modem construct because of the "fluidity"
of tribal membership. Tarlock, supra note 47, at 562. Such fluidity allows Indians to enter and
exit from tribes and to revive and reinvent their identity with ease, and creates the "theoretical
possibility [that] new cultural minorities [might] . . .form through self-construction, just as
traditional minorities can seek to 'deconstruct' their inherited identities." Id.
428DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 25, at 18. Deloria and Lytle find homogeneity within
Indian tribes to be a distinguishing feature when compared with the American experience. Id. at
17-18 ("Customs, rituals, and traditions are a natural part of life, and individuals grow into an
acceptance of them, eliminating the need for formal articulation of the rules of Indian tribal
society.").
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"world view[] a warm, deep and lasting communal bond among all things in
nature in a common vision of their proper relationship," which cements a
"collective culture., 429 Jefferson pointed to tribes, "whose 'only controls are
their manners, and the moral sense of right and wrong,"' as430proof "that citizens
could act [out of] a spirit of public virtue in a democracy.,
As land is key to the survival of tribes as distinct peoples in the twentyfirst century, so is the survival of tribalism. But it is tribalism, with its
communal features, that has repelled many Americans.
Tribalism is not an association of interest but a form of
consciousness which faithfully reflects the experience of Indians. It is
a normative system. The entire history of the federal relationship
with tribes is a history of attempts to subvert this consciousness and
replace it with the naked, alienated individualism and formal equality
of contemporary American society.431
Yet it is tribalism that makes tribes particularly suited to fit within the
republican construct. Tribalism is the polar opposite of the "naked, alienated
individualism" that modem republican thinkers believe is destroying modem
American society.432 Indian tribes are model republican communities because
of-not in spite of-their communal existence.
The fact that the federal government unilaterally made all Indians United
States citizens early last century 433 could be seen as confusing the issue of
4 29

BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at vii.
Miller, supra note 112, at 149 (quoting BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS
108-14 (1982)); see also JEFFERSON, supra note 3457, at 93 (expressing reservation that Indian
4 30

society4 31with its redeeming virtues might not be possible for large numbers of people).
BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at viii. The authors remind us that, for Indians,
tribes are their only "consensual government" and that the entire history of "tribal-federal
relationship" has been premised on evolution of Indians from "'primitive' tribalism to 'civilized'
society." Id.; see also Carter, supra note 211, at 227 ("To the white observer, the lack of
proprietary interest generally displayed by tribal members was repulsive and backward.
Removing the 'herd' instinct was deemed by some to be the key to civilizing the Indian.");
Newton, supra note 9, at 240 (complaining that "entire history of Indian law [is] marked by
judicial deference to congressional will[,] . . . [which] has resulted in the imposition of policies
undermining
Indian [tribal] identity").
432
See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 2, at 24 (criticizing liberal democracy, and procedural
republic that is its manifestation, "because it cannot, sustain the kind of political community and
civic engagement
that liberty requires").
433
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000))
(making all Indians "born within the territorial limits of the United States" citizens); see also
Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1622 (stating that when United States originally treated with Indian
tribes, it had no intention of incorporating them into Union as citizens, and since Indians born on
reservation were deemed not to have been born in the United States, they were excluded from
basic birthright citizenship rights under Fourteenth Amendment); see also id. at 1634-35 ("[T]he
Constitutional relationship of Indian people to the United States rests upon their membership in
sovereign governments and not upon their identity as citizens of the United States."); Elk v.
Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment did not make Indians
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whether Indians have retained citizenship in their sovereign tribe or, by law,
have shifted their political loyalties to the federal government. 434 To the extent
Indians owe no civic allegiance to their tribes, then under republican dogma,
tribes might not be qualified to be centers of dispersed governance. However,
there is no evidence of any lessening in tribal loyalty or tribal self-identity by
individual Indians. In fact, the converse is true. Political loyalties among
modem Indians, while varying from tribe to tribe, are for the most part still
given to "local family, clan, religious, village, or regional groupings., 435 These
identities continue to operate within (and despite) the legal, cultural, and
political constraints and institutions that the dominant society has imposed on
the tribes.436
The result is that tribal Indians today are citizens of "independent" and
"overlapping sovereigns"-the United States and their tribe-and possess "the
attendant rights [of,] and responsibilities" toward, each.437 As citizens of more
than one polity, members of Indian tribes have done what Sandel feared might
be difficult for non-Indians-functioned as "multiply-situated selves" in an
increasingly complex, multi-layered political world.4 38 They have shown that
they are capable of traversing the multiple civic loyalties that call upon them
for allegiance, and of governing themselves simultaneously in the small sphere
of their tribe without losing their capacity to engage in political activity at a
higher governmental level.

citizens). Federal Indian policy has allowed the tribes to "determin[e] their own membership,
and, in some cases, citizenship," when the two were different. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 25,
at 18. But see CAMPISI, supra note 409, at 19, 153-54 (describing failed efforts of Mashpee to
self-define
and gain federal recognition).
434
For Monette, the concept "of dual citizenship for tribal members is not troubling
because the respective governments exercise separate, [albeit] overlapping spheres of authority."
Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1622; see also Monette, supra note 77, at 619, 631-32 (seeing dual
citizenship as form of "compact federalism" and possible solution to problem of diminished
tribal sovereignty because it justifies treating tribes on "same plane" as states with same
protections, like equal footing and preemption doctrines). But see Tsosie, supra note 17, at
1622-23 (noting Porter's belief that "1924 Citizenship Act [was] genocidal," and that resultant
"split identification of citizenship ... [was] designed to ensure the ultimate destruction of
distinctive tribal political identities" (citing Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh
and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American
Citizenship
upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 166-68 (1999))).
435
Champagne, supra note 72, at 111 (noting that historically, pan-Indian organizations or
confederations, like Iroquois and Tecumseh, "did not supersede tribal and subtribal identities,"
but were
436 formed in response to common threat or goal).
1d. at 112.
437
Monette, supra note 77, at 630 n.83; see also McCoy, supra note 112, at 367 n.49
(noting that "concept of 'dual sovereignty,"' which "suggests that one group of people can be
subject to the control of more than one government," also "supports Marshall's views of the
tribal-federal
relation" as protectorate that does not diminish political rights of weaker nation).
438
See SANDEL, supra note 2, at 350 (discussing difficulty of citizens having to sustain
capacity to "think and act as multiply-situated selves" because "it is easier to live with the
plurality between persons than within them").

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

No. 2]

Assertions of strengthened tribal sovereignty, therefore, are well grounded
in traditional republican thinking, and tribes are well placed in the modem
civic republican world. In fact, the survival of Indian tribes as discrete, nomic
communities depends on the application of these principles to the tribes.
However, strengthened tribal sovereignty challenges not only the territorial
integrity of the United States and the coherency of our federal structure, but
also our vision of ourselves. The Article will now address these challenges.
V. PROBLEMS POSED BY ENHANCED TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

It is a delicate balance, being in, but not fully of, the United States.

39

This Article has shown that the republican notion of dispersing
government to a small enough place for citizens to practice citizenship and be
transformed by that experience fits well with the reality of Indian reservations.
It has further shown that the communal features of tribalism resonate with
republicanism's concept of a committed citizenry imbued with civic virtue.
However, tribalism's communal features repel many Americans, and the
tribes' need for a separate land base greatly complicates the task of granting
tribes greater sovereignty. The question is how to strike a dynamic, nurturing
balance between a more robust vision of tribal sovereignty-which would
preserve Indian communities as cultures of difference in American societyand the majority's need to retain and protect an identity of shared values and
expectations. 44
Indians have been committed through time to remaining "indelibly
Indian," proudly defining themselves as a people apart and resisting
incorporation into mainstream culture. 441 "[A] pivotal ingredient [in realizing
tribal sovereignty in our country] is understanding and implement[ing] an

4 39

Matthew Purdy, Our Town, to Senecas, Casinos Cut Deep and Opened Old Wounds,

N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2001, at A23.
440
The legal claims raised by these newer concerns can be seen as efforts to redefine
the implications of equal citizenship, to expand the meanings that define the
American civic culture. The creation of these new meanings does not imply either a
group's secession from the national community or an individual's separation from a
smaller community founded on race or religion or ethnicity. Rather it implies a more
inclusive reconstitution of our national community of meaning.
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 21213 (1989) (citation omitted). Tarlock points out how "the western experience with cultural
minorities has been the practice of tolerat[ing them]" and how "[t]oleration has taken the form of
either exemption from uniform laws or allowing (or [in the case of Indians,] requiring) groups to
isolate themselves from the dominant culture." Tarlock, supra note 47, at 556.
441POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 13.
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indigenous vision that [is allowed to] develop free from interference in its local
settings."" 2 Recognizing and protecting cultural differences
"involves recognizing that the entire perceptual and conceptual
apparatus one has previously relied on for knowledge about the
world may be faulty. It involves remaking the map of the world one
carries about in one's head so that the gaps appear, generating the
recognition that they need to be filled. And since it is in relation to
this interior map that one locates and identifies oneself, it involves
being ready to meet
some unfamiliar and sometimes unwelcome
443
images of oneself.,

But tribes offer a very different normative vision of life in the United
States, which makes their sovereignty claims threatening to mainstream
America. 4 " By offering a competing nationalism, they make the political
integrity of our country "contestable.",44 5 Not surprisingly, these claims have
triggered, and continue to trigger, repressive reactions. These reactions have
included war, genocide, removal, bans on ceremonial practices and the use of
native languages, and similar misguided efforts to eradicate tribalism and
assimilate tribal Indians into mainstream society.
Further, as this Article has stated several times, the survival of Indian
tribes as distinct communities "depends[, in large part, up]on a separate land
base[, in] which tribal governments, economies, and cultures may flourish."" 6
442Id. at 2. Getches sees "[t]he Court's [new] subjectivism [as] creat[ing] a treacherous

undertow, pulling tribes into the societal mainstream and straining the indigenous cultural bonds
that hold them together as societies." Getches, New Subjectivism, supra note 8, at 1595.
443Turpel, supra note 11, at 40 n.88 (quoting Clare Dalton, The Faithful Liberal and the
Question of Diversity, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1-2 (1989)).
444One of the fundamental differences between Indian tribes and the dominant society
involves group rights-as opposed to individual rights-in land. The ability of at-risk groups,
like Indian tribes, "to maintain their distinct cultures [is] undermined by individual property
rights that disrupt traditional patterns of resource use and social organization." Tarlock, supra
note 47, at 566-67. Richard White observed that "[t]he greatest losers in the capitalist
transformation of the West were those who tried to maintain existing communal economies ....
Many Indian economies quickly buckled under this assault . . . all Spanish and Mexican land
grants in California were valid, [but] ... by the time the commissioners and courts validated the
grants, squatters, moneylenders, and the very attorneys whom the rancheros had hired had
drained the rancheros of their resources." RICHARD WHITE, "IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE
OF MY OWN ": A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST

237-38 (1991).

445Walker Connor, The Politics of Ethnonationalism,27(1) J. INT'L. AFF. 1, 10-12 (1973).
But see Pommersheim, supra note 12, at 450 (stating that struggle of Indian tribes for selfrealization and sovereignty is occurring within, not without, parameters of dominant system, as
pursuit of "reasoned independence" and equality, not "the consistent rejection of the dominant
way of law
or policy").
6
44 Wood, supra note 189, at 111; see also id. (advocating use of trust doctrine to protect
tribal land because those lands are equivalent to beneficial interest); ANAYA, supra note 25, at 97
(identifying lands and their resources as norm of self-determination for indigenous peoples);
Oren Lyons, Law, Principle, and Realty, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 212 (1992)
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Depending on how it is done, restoring a more robust sovereignty to tribes over
their land and their members might threaten the territorial integrity of the states
in which they are located 447-even the integrity of the federal union. Unless
these newly strengthened tribal governments are integrated into the federal
framework, there is also a risk they will become isolated, self-governing
islands of difference-what Williams calls "special racial preserves"challenging our national vision of a blended society.448 Empowering these
reserves more might act to intensify conflicts between Indians and non-Indians,
and further complicate the difficult business of governing this diverse and
fractured country.449
Even if one accepts that the Constitution protects cultural diversity,
such protection need not, and cannot, be equated with a right to selfgovernment for all diverse groups. To argue that the concept of
liberty can be extended so far would encourage anarchy under the
guise of pluralism ....Thus, the Constitution's allocation of powers
recognizes that self-government is a precious and limited resource
that must not be unduly fragmented.45 °
("[A]fter two hundred years of federal process to disenfranchise our people from our language,
from our culture, from our nations, and finally from our lands, we are now in danger of losing it
all. Our title is absolute. We are sovereign. As long as we stand and proclaim title, the U.S. has a
problem. Because we have title."); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red
Squirrel Pinatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a
Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1133, 1153 (1994) ("Without the land ... there is no
tribe."); Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Native
Nations on Environmental Issues: A PartialCritique of the Clinton Administration's Promises
and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 740 (1995) ("Without an ecologically viable land base and
an adequate supply of corollary resources to support a tribal community and economy,... true
autonomy is beyond the grasp of the native nations.").
447For example, enhancing tribal sovereignty would undermine the view of the tribal-state
relationship that the current Supreme Court holds. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62
(2001) ("Ordinarily, it is now clear, an Indian reservation is considered part of the territory of the
State." 8(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
44See David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as
Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REv. 759, 774 (1991) ("If Indian law . . . rest[s] on racial distinctions, ...
and reservations are [seen as] special racial preserves, their existence poses a challenge to the
vision of an individualist, integrated American polity."); see also ALE1NIKOFF, supra note 16, at
118 (positing that for current Court, idea that Indian sovereignty represents "devolution" to
racial or ethnic group "undercuts an individualistic, non race-based constitutionalism that lies at
the heart of much of the current Court's work").
449See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 119-21 (noting that modern version of this conflict
can be found in phrase "special rights," used by opponents of Indian treaty-based fishing and
hunting rights and gambling, who argue that Indians are more equal than other citizens); see also
Afwerki, supra note 34, at 20 (stating that "[p]olitics of segregation, neglect, and exclusiveness
only fuel the attitudes of alienation, provoking aspirations to self-rule in the aggrieved parties,"
and often cause eruption of "bloody conflicts"); Payne, supra note 331 (complaining about these
special45rights).
°Newton, supra note 9, at 264. Newton argues further that while "[n]either the morality
of promise keeping nor the value of cultural diversity can create an absolute right to tribal

544
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But strong centers of difference are important to a vibrant society. While a
pluralistic society may contain the seeds of its own destruction,45 1 only such a
society presents an "other" against which to test and ultimately reify dominant
values.452
In a fundamental sense, indigenous peoples preserve and embody
alternate life-styles that may provide models, inspiration, guidance in
the essential work of world order redesign, an undertaking now
primarily associated with overcoming self-destructive tendencies in
the behavour of modem societies .... Societal diversity enhances the
quality of life, by enriching our experience [and] expanding cultural
resources. In essence, protecting the Aboriginal viewpoint is not a
paternalistic undertaking; it is increasingly 453recognized to be an
expression of overall enlightened self-interest.
The challenge for a pluralistic society is finding a way to preserve the
autonomy of difference without destroying the capacity to form consensus that
enables government to function-what Chantal Mouffe refers to as the
"tension between the logic of identity and the logic of difference." 454 Indian
tribes offer such an "other," but the fact that their normative vision is so
different from that of the majority of Americans makes reaching consensus
very difficult.
The central government defines the political space within which
sovereignty claims, like those that tribes put forth, are made.45 5 The way in
sovereignty[,] ... these values can be raised to urge the courts to scrutinize strictly any attempt
to dilute
tribal sovereignty over tribal land and members." Id. at 265.
45
'See Kymlicka, supra note 395, at 103 n.26 (referring to Rawls' conclusion that
"religious and ethnic conflicts [based on different conceptions of good are] divisive and
destabilizing" because they are backed by "high degree of self-identification and the potential
for some kind of organizational and leadership structure," and commenting that task of
identifying
most feasible "model[] of tolerance" is of particular importance).
452
CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL 152 (1993); see also Sunstein, supra
note 339,
at 1575 (extolling diversity and disagreement as "creative and productive").
453
Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In ParticularIndigenous Peoples), in RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES, supra note 32, at 23. Unfortunately, Indians are subjected to extensive stereotyping,
which has facilitated their oppression and exclusion from American society. See Tsosie, supra
note 17, at 1660 (saying that media's portrayal of American Indians both as "noble savages" and
as "bloodthirsty
savages" has "had negative impacts").
454
MOUFFE, supra note 452, at 133; see also Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 12 (1987) (recognizing that both acknowledgment and denial of difference
can perpetuate inequality); Tarlock, supra note 47, at 555 (stating that cultural claims are based
on distinctiveness and existence of another culture, either in form of other groups or mainstream
culture).
45 5
See Garnett, supra note 15, at 439 ("Ever since Worcester, the Indian Tribes' precarious
status as sovereign nations has been measured by . . . their ability to resist the jurisdictional
encroachments of rival state and federal sovereigns.").
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which the central government institutionalizes the national culture determines
whether there is space for different cultures to survive and flourish. "A
particular state's policy toward" cultural difference, whether it sets the stage
for strife or secession, or provides an arena in which cultural difference is
supported, is vital.456 A state's constitution and legal system have a proactive,
dominant role in defining and mediating issues of cultural difference. 457 The
fact that the United States Constitution and legal system are descended linearly
from a specific and well-articulated legal and philosophical tradition, however,
makes it difficult to open that system to new concepts that arise from quite
different, even alien, traditions, like those practiced by Indians, without
destroying the country's foundational principles.4 58
From the perspective of the dominant society, the question is how
much "subversion" and "invention" should be tolerated and
encouraged ....The United States has often made claims about the
richness of its pluralist society-made claims that the loss of state or
tribal identity would not only be a loss to states and tribes, but would
also harm all citizens because of the benefit of living in a country in
which not all are required to follow the same norms. Some deepseated emotional respect for group governance may be at work here,
some sense that these self-contained communities
are
"jurisgenerative" . . . and that their traditions and customs must
sometimes be respected and preserved. In the tribes, cities, states and
regions of the country, one can find not only individuals, but also
individuals as part of a community-a community that has had
continuity over time. In these communities there are social ties, there
is a shared history, there is a network of relatedness. In contrast, the
federal system appears to some as individualistic and atomistic. We
are attracted by these smaller institutions, these subsets, these
multiple sovereignties; we like the scale, the sense of history, the
intimacy.459
This country's national culture, however, "is not [and never has been]
constituted by a single ethnic background or a narrowly understood
genealogical history. '46° It coexists with many other agendas, cultural
practices, and beliefs.4 6' Michelman and Sunstein's incorporation of diversity
456

Levin, supra note 22, at 172-73.

457See id. at
458
See
459

173.

id. at 171-78.
Resnik, supra note 248, at 750-51; see also SANDEL, supra note 2, at 347-48 (citing de
Toqueville and Jefferson as favoring local government). See generally Levin, supra note 22, at
171-78 (arguing that nation-state should recognize cultural difference and ethnic diversity in
order to
foster "national reinvention" and avoid "fatal rigidity").
46 0
Martin, supra note 31, at 304.
46
1

1d
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into traditional republican thinking is recognition of this fact of American life.
But, coexistence is a far cry from granting discrete subcultures, like tribes, the
right to disassociate themselves from the national enterprise by allowing them
to follow fundamentally different legal and constitutional norms on their own
separate land. Even Sandel, in Democracy's Discontent, does not suggest how
this might be done. Allowing tribes to operate outside the political and
geographic compact that otherwise binds us as a society while preserving an
"other" for the majority to define itself against, challenges our capacity to
maintain a territorially cohesive, coherent, and integrated national government.
[I]ndigenous peoples, to the extent that they centre their grievances
around encroachments upon their collective identity, represent a
competing nationalism within the boundaries of the State. Such
claims, posited in a variety of forms, challenge two fundamental
statist notions-that of territorial sovereignty, and that of a unified
'nationality' juridically administered by governmental organs.462
Trachtman argues that "territory is an increasingly inaccurate proxy for
community ...[because] society is increasingly varied and plural, existing at
many vertical levels and in many functional sectors, . . . with increasing

disregard for national boundaries., 463 Enhancing tribal sovereignty should
cause almost no impact to the territorial integrity of the United States, because
Indian tribes already have a discrete land base that has been withdrawn from
the public domain, or reserved for exclusive Indian use under treaties or
executive orders.464 Nonetheless, allowing 314 reservations and nearly two
million citizens to drop out of the United States by restoring to tribes full
sovereignty over their lands, resources, and members, is not insignificant. 465
[Territorial] self-government is a highly explosive issue. States are
reluctant to allow territorial self-government, for it transforms an
amorphous group of people whose claims were hitherto domestic
matters into a visibly separate national identity, into a nation or the
supra note 453, at 18 (emphasis added). Falk recognizes that granting indigenous
peoples sovereignty over their persons and lands challenges the "sense of settled rights of
existing sovereign States, threaten[s] a reduction of control by the central government, or even
the dismemberment of the State, [and causes] conflicts between indigenous peoples and postindigenous developments." Id. at 33-34. But see McCoy, supra note 112, at 392 ("The existence
of... reservations minimizes the impact that recognition of tribal [political rights will have] on
the territorial
integrity of United States.").
463Trachtman, supra note 22, at 406 (citations omitted).
464See McCoy, supra note 112, at 391-92; see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes . . . are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary
organizations."'
(citations omitted)).
465These statistics are drawn from GETCHES ET AL., supra note 16, at 8-14, and are based
on 1990 census data. The Navajo Reservation, which is the largest reservation, contains over 15
million acres, spans four states, and is home to over 219,000 people. Id.
462Falk,
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seeds of a nation; and this group of people would be more able to
invoke the principle of self-determination, to extend its claims and
even take them to an international forum .... It would appear that
self-determination and territorial stability were incompatible
principles.46 6
The application of republican principles to this problem means that
notions of national territoriality cannot defeat a subculture's legitimate request
for self-determination.
The principle of territorial stability cannot invalidate that of selfdetermination, as self-determination is the ultimate governing
principle, whereas territorial stability is not so much a principle as an
institutional reality of international law. We could say that
compliance with the principle of self-determination is the essence,
the real legitimacy of a status quo, while territorial stability stands
for formal, institutionalized legitimacy.46 7
But, republican principles also advise that granting enhanced political rights to
groups with radically different normative visions will make governing at the
national level difficult-perhaps beyond even Michelman's and Sunstein's
alchemy-because these differences will undermine, not enhance, the
transformative search for the common good or regulative ideal.46 8 There are
basic, constitutive differences between the core systems of beliefs held by
tribes and those held by -most United States citizens. 469 As noted previously,
most tribes reject the ideas of individual rights and autonomy in favor of group
rights, communal obligations, and communal interests in land.47 ° Ironically,
466

1srvAN BIB6, THE PARALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE REMEDIES
71
(1976).467
1d. at 75.
468
Sandel questions whether it is "possible in a pluralist society as diverse as ours," to
govern by what he calls a "common good" because of the difficulty of identifying with the
"good of the whole." SANDEL, supra note 2, at 202; see also Jensen, supra note 49, at 392
(stating that "sense of community within small groups . . . [runs the risk of leading] to
factionalism," and distinguishing community from recent revival in "communitarianism," which
is "focused
on recreating a sense of duty to the larger society").
469
See Turpel, supra note 11, at 34 ("Aboriginal cultures are the manifestations of a
different human (collective) imagination."); see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 100
("From the federal perspective, when the 'other' is the state, the differences are likely to be
relatively slender because of the similarity of origin and experience. When the "other" is the
tribe, the potential for difference is rather large for there are great differences in origin and
experience.").
470
See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 16, at 25 (citing Fred Coyote, Land Holds Families
Together, in I WILL DIE AN INDIAN 15 (1980)); see also Jensen, supra note 49, at 388 (arguing
that "basic human right" in communal society is "group right," not individual right); Tarlock,
supra note 47, at 566 (stating that greatest threat to survival of aboriginal cultures has been
imposition of rights-based norms, which undermine traditional patterns of resource use and
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what makes Indian tribes ideal republican communities-the fact that tribal
members see themselves as part of an interconnected web of responsibilities
and duties-also separates them from fundamental, majority beliefs in
individualism and individual rights. 471 As tribes have no parallel social or legal
construct to the concepts of individual rights, individual autonomy, and private
property, the two worldviews are simply incompatible.4 72
At another, even more troubling level, the idea of Wilkinson's measured
separatism contradicts deeply held beliefs in this country that favor
assimilation and reject separation by race or ethnicity. Enhancing tribal
sovereignty runs the risk of creating separate, racial (or ethnic) subnationsthe "nightmare of racial homelands. 4 73 Eisgruber says using segregation to
"enhance [and preserve] ethical [or normative] diversity" only "harms political
unity [and] encourages people to distrust ... their fellow citizens" who may

social organization); Turpel, supra note 11, at 29 (commenting on how group property rights
directly contradict dominant ethic of individual property rights). But see Kymlicka, supra note
395, at 89-94 (exploring two models of tolerance, one based on idea of individual freedom, and
other based on group rights). This is not to say that tribes never assert group rights against the
government. "[L]and claims [by tribes, as well as assertions of separate] language rights,
[requests for] representation in political institutions, [and even for] veto power over certain kinds
of policies," are typical of group rights that can be (and in many cases are) made "against the
larger 471
society." Kymlicka, supra note 395, at 98 n.4.
See Epstein, supra note 345, at 1633 (criticizing Michelman and Sunstein for failing to
take account of theories that have "Lockean emphasis on limited government and private
property," which "offer a superior response to the pluralist nightmare" that both scholars
describe).
472
Turpel, supra note 11, at 30; see also Jensen, supra note 49, at 388 ("[T]raditional
Indian societies . . .reflect political philosophies that are much more communitarian than the
political philosophy guiding the rest of the American population."); Macklem, supra note 6, at
1337 ("[C]ultural incommensurability should be reflected . .. in the design of government
institutions."). To the extent that a tribe might believe it necessary to teach its members values
that will prepare them for life in tribal society as opposed to preparing them for life off the
reservation, as a way of maintaining its cultural heritage, a stage is set for conflict with the
dominant culture. Kymlicka uses the example of Canadian Mennonites and Hutterites-who
object to public school teaching materials because they "promote an ideal of citizenship that is in
conflict with their religious ideals of person and society-to illustrate the conflict that can occur
between values of discrete subcultures based on religious beliefs or ethnicity". Kymlicka, supra
note 395,
473 at 102 n.23.
Williams, supra note 448, at 822. But see BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 246
("The mere fact that a political unit has a racial characteristic does not render it racist.").
Eisgruber sees this dilemma as quintessentially a republican one, because republicans value
"dissident sub-communities" as sources of dissent in a reflective, constitutional scheme.
Christopher L. Eisgruber, The ConstitutionalValue of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 87, 9091 (1996) (citing examples of "regrettable [fact] that the young women [in Board of Education
of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), must] grow up in a
starkly sexist culture," and "that the Amish children in [Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972),] will [have trouble] becom[ing] astronomers and lawyers"). Republicans "respect[]
[these] sincere efforts to pursue a [separate] vision of the good"--which might turn out to be
correct-but because the majority embraces a particular conception of the good, they "regret[]
the extent to which dissident sub-communities deviate from that conception." Id.
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look different or maintain a different way of life. 4 74 When the government
endorses such efforts, for example, by creating a separate homeland or
reservation, it assumes that its citizens cannot overcome (or at a minimum
47 5
come to tolerate) their differences (through dialogic self-modulation) impugning the ideal of political unity and foundational republican principles.
While republican thinking offers useful theoretical support for a more
robust form of tribal sovereignty than currently exists, it also reveals the
enormity of the practical problems associated with enhancing tribal
sovereignty when the differences between tribes and the rest of society are so
great. Republican thinking only creates an imperative for strengthening tribal
sovereingty to enable tribes to survive as discrete centers of norm generation
and dispersal, and enrich our national conversation by their presence; it does
not resolve the question of how this may be done. A very large question
remains as to how the role of tribes in our federal system can be strengthened
without destabilizing that system through conflict or by creating separate racial
nation-states within our boundaries. Part VI proposes to work its way through
these problems first by confronting what it might mean to separate the tribes
from the territorial boundaries of the United States, and then by examining
other institutional solutions that might permit tribes to remain within the
United States without plunging our country into internal strife.
VI. SOME INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
Modern republicanism is . . . not grounded in a belief in
homogeneity; on the contrary, heterogeneity is necessary if
republican systems are to work. As we shall see, this understanding
will call for institutional innovations.476
To survive as discrete and unique cultures, Indian tribes need sufficient
independent sovereign authority over their members, lands, resources, legal
and social institutions, practices, and mores to stay separate from (and resist)
the demands and incursions of other, alien cultures. The tribes' placement in
our federal structure as "domestic dependent nations"-protected only by the
interpretative tropes and preemptive tenets of atrophying legal doctrines, and
by the limited moral and legal suasion of treaties and notions of trust-has left
them vulnerable to assimilative pressures and other forms of cultural assault. It
474

Eisgruber, supra note 473, at 95. But see Falk, supra note 453, at 33 ("Indigenous
peoples increasingly resist integration and assimilation and seek above all to re-establish
connections with their traditional lands and traditional ways of life, [which makes them
unprepared] to accept the paternalistic judgment of the dominant civilization that what is
important
475 is to enable them to participate equally in and gain access to the modem world.").
Michelman, supra note 339, at 1527-28.
476
Sunstein, supra note 338, at 1576.
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is no exaggeration to say that tribes today run the risk of becoming little more
than quaint curiosities, remnants of our collective historical memory.
This Article suggests that while federal policies and the Court's Indian
law jurisprudence have diminished tribal sovereignty, that sovereignty has not
been entirely lost, nor have tribes disappeared into American society. This
Article further posits that what is required to protect and enhance what remains
of tribal sovereignty is its reinvigoration under the same republican theories of
governance that flourished at our founding and are today animating proponents
of devolution, like Sandel. The question is how to strengthen the presence of
tribes in our federal system without destabilizing that system through conflict
or by creating separate, race-based nation-states within our boundaries. 4
Tribes, as separate centers of sovereignty, have never fit easily into the
bipolar allocation of power between the states and the federal government.47 8
Ceding additional sovereignty back to tribes can create problems, as doing this
not only confers "special political rights" on culturally (and racially) distinct
peoples, but also allows the potential resolution of governance and social
issues in ways that conflict with non-Indian norms.479 While some
destabilization of our structure of governance may be warranted to preserve
tribes as diverse, nomic communities and thus to gain the benefits of
Michelman and Sunstein's heterogeneous republican society, too much could
slide our governing system into chaos, and our land into a patchwork of
separate nations.480
477

8ee Eisgruber, supra note 473, at 88 ("Th[e] public debate requires
the presence,
preservation, and generation of diverse views, but such views must be integrated into the public
arena rather than marginalized into protected enclaves."); see also Robert W. McGee, The
Theory of Secession and Emerging Democracies: A ConstitutionalSolution, 28 STAN. J. INT'L.
L. 451, 471 (1992) (recognizing that problem with applying theory of secession is protecting
"the rights of minorities who remain within the borders of either the former parent state or the
new independent
state").
478
8ee Garnett, supra note 15, at 478 ("The Indian Tribes are in many ways
an anomaly in
this system; it is not quite clear how they 'fit in' to our Constitution's scheme."). But see
generally Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of
ConstitutionalRequirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1129, 1132-33 (1999)
(arguing in favor of "geographical constitutional nonconformity" as method to preserve
community
self-governance, and citing tribal courts as places where this is achieved).
479
Macklem, supra note 6, at 1354-55; see also Jensen, supra note 49, at 389-90 (agreeing
that "immunity of tribes from constitutional limitations is not a problem of constitutional
dimension," but questioning system in which tribal members, are subject to "unconstrained,"
"constitutionally recognized entities-the tribes"--and finding point of tension between
principles enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and sovereignty
based 48
on race).
°But see Robert W. McGee, A Third Liberal Theory of Secession, 14 LIVERPOOL L. REv.
45, 63 (1992) (challenging seriousness of problem of nation states (or enclaves) within nations
by pointing to Vatican City, which successfully seceded from Italy and is surrounded by Rome).
One way to address this challenge might be to see the dilemma as a partial reallocation of
sovereignty to tribes, not a reduction in the central government's authority. Trachtman calls this
the "law of conservation of sovereignty," in which the existing "allocation of power and
responsibility [of a state] is never lost, but only reallocated." Trachtman, supra note 22, at 400.
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There have been many proposals for enhancing tribal sovereignty. Some
say the only solution for tribes is to withdraw from the territorial United States.
Others suggest ways of doing this within our existing system, making tribes
more like states. Still others suggest the application of constitutional doctrine
to redress the imbalances created by the plenary power doctrine. This Article
suggests that each of these proposals is flawed in some way that either over- or
undercorrects the problem. Giving tribes a limited power to nullify laws that
imperil their continued separate existence, by recognizing that they have that
right, however, does no violence to our federal structure. Doing this also stops
well short of territorial balkanization and does not threaten majority-held
beliefs. Although such a proposal introduces some additional complexity into
our political system, it will not make that system any less stable. But, gaining
and maintaining this power requires the accession of Congress and the
Supreme Court. This may be possible through the application to tribes of
republican principles.
A. Secession
Treaties, despite their diminished legal status in the United States, provide
a normative basis 48 1 for tribes to claim the right to withdraw from the territorial
United States.482 Secession by Indian tribes is theoretically impossible because,
unlike the southern states, they are not part of the Union; however, restoring
tribes to their full, precolonial nation-state status could be considered the
equivalent of secession, as tribes would, in effect, take their lands with them.

In the international forum, this reallocation is referred to as "pooling of sovereignty," in which
states, for example in the European Union, "giv[e] up [some measure of] national sovereignty
[so that] member states may increase the scope of their influence, both within the European
Union and in external relations." Id. However, the situation with tribes is the obverse from that
facing the member states of the European Union as it is the Union, not the member states, that
would be ceding authority back to the tribes to enable them to function independently of the
Union.481
See Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1636 (viewing Indian treaties and Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo as instruments of "intercultural justice," under which "claimants are seeking to establish
the moral obligation of the United States to honor its treaty promise[] to respect the land and
rights of the distinct ethnic groups that it has incorporated through conquest").
cultural
482
See Macklem, supra note 6, at 1359-60 (worrying that "recognizing [sub]units of
[government] based on indigenous difference [conflicts with the concept of] territorial . . .
federalism," and could as easily lead to rejection of dual citizenship and shared loyalties and
move toward separation or secession); see also MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY,
Humanities Press 181 (1982) ("Once admit any right of secession whatever, and there is no
logical stopping-point short of the right of individual secession, which logically entails
anarchism, since then individuals may secede and patronize their own defense agencies, and the
State has crumbled."). But see Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination:A Territorial
Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L. L. 177, 184 (1991) ("The only countervailing principle, that of
the territorial integrity of existing states, suffers from a suspect historical association with
monarchy and feudalism.").
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Several Indian law scholars support this result. 483 This author does not, for the
reasons developed below.
According to Brilmayer, only separatist claims that are based on claims to
territory have any legitimacy, given the competing norm of territorial
integrity.4 84 To the extent that Indian treaties are seen as being premised on the
illegitimate conquest of tribal lands, they provide a normative basis for tribes
to claim a return to full sovereignty over those lands (in other words,
separation).485 The fact that, over time, that land base has dwindled even
further as a result of federal policies and judicial decisions undermining and in
some cases abrogating these treaties only adds to the normative legitimacy of
treaty-based claims to separation.
However, even morally and factually sound historical claims to territory
may not justify altering the status quo to rectify past wrongs.48 6 Brilmayer
483See Russel L. Barsh, Indigenous North America and Contemporary InternationalLaw,
62 OR. L. REv. 73, 123-25 (1983) (arguing for return of full nationhood to tribes); Jensen, supra
note 49, at 396 (finding some Indian tribes to be "prime candidates" for secession because of
their "acknowledged territory[,] a history of separation from the dominant society and resistance
to full assimilation[,] and [partial] self-government"). On secession generally, see Brilmayer,
supra note 482; Allen Buchanan, Federalism,Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion, 37 ARIZ.
L. REv. 53 (1995); James E. Falkowski, Secessionary Self-Determination: A Jeffersonian
Perspective,
9 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 209 (1991).
484
See Brilmayer, supra note 482, at 178-79 (stating that normative force behind selfdetermination claims does not derive from distinctiveness of group, but from group's right to
specific land; to be persuasive, separatist argument must also present territorial claim); see also
Falkowski, supra note 483, at 209 n.2 (noting International Commission of Jurists opinion that
once people choose to join as state, "that choice is a final exercise of the right to selfdetermination" and they lose the right to secede "under the principle of the right to selfdetermination" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); id. at 210 n.5 ("If selfdetermination refers to 'the freedom of a people to choose their own government and institutions
and to control their own resources,' there seems to be a striking contradiction between the right
of 'all peoples' to self-determination and the right of a state to its 'territorial integrity' the latter
precluding secession." (quoting Ved. P. Nanda, Self-Determination in InternationalLaw: The
Tragic Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad(West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 321, 326 (1972)); Garth Nettheim, 'Peoples' and 'Populations'-IndigenousPeoples
and the Rights of Peoples, in RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 32, at 125 (observing that
indigenous peoples' claims, deriving from dispossession of their lands and consequent
destruction of their culture, distinguishes them from other peoples, and that for indigenous
peoples,
485 land "is the issue")).
See McGee, supra note 480, at 65-66 (listing as Anthony H. Birch's first justification
for secession situation where "region [has been] included in [a] state by force and its people have
displayed a continuing refusal to give full consent to the union" (citing Anthony H. Birch,
Another Liberal Theory of Secession, 32 POL. STuD. 596, 599-600 (1984)). The other reasons
Birch lists as justifying secession-where "[t]he national government has failed ... to protect
the basic rights and security of the citizens of the region;" where "[t]he democratic system has
failed to safeguard the legitimate political and economic interests of the region;" and where
"[t]he national government has ignored... [a] bargain between sections that was entered into as
a way of preserving the essential interests of a section that might find itself outvoted by a
national
486 majority"-also resonate with the cause of tribal sovereignty. Id.
Brilmayer, supra note 482, at 177-78 (noting conflict between "principle of selfdetermination [entitling] every 'people' . . . to its own nation-state" and equally venerable
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suggests a more thorough examination of the claims to be sure that they do not
rest on earlier historical wrongs or other factors, justifying a defense of adverse
possession. 48 ' Given the length of time that has passed since the wrongs
against the tribes occurred and the fact that non-Indians have largely resettled
what once were tribal lands-making some Indians numerical minorities even
on their own reservations-a defense of adverse possession to such claims may
well be appropriate.48 8 Allowing tribes to separate would create other inequities
and problems not mentioned by Brilmayer. For example, allowing reservation
tribes to withdraw from the territorial United States because they have land
claims would disfavor urban tribes who lost all of their land as a result of the
same iniquitous federal policies that diminished the sovereignty of the landed
tribes. Small landed tribes would have a much harder time surviving without
the protection and economic support of the United States than would tribes
with larger reservations.489 Additionally, allowing tribes with large reservations
to withdraw could have a devastating impact on the territorial integrity of the
states within which they are located, and could make governing at the state
(and national) level a nightmare. 490 Therefore, the cost of secession, regardless
of its normative and emotional appeal, is too high--especially for the tribesfor it to be an institutional solution to the problem of tribal sovereignty.
"principle of international law, which upholds the territorial integrity of existing states").
Brilmayer, however, says that "consent of the governed does not necessarily encompass a right"
of dissatisfied people to secede from a given political unit; rather "[it only requires that within
[an] existing political [system,] a right to participate through electoral processes be available" to
those individuals. Id. at 185. He also notes that "tacit consent can be attributed to a state's
inhabitant's [sic] only when the state has legitimate power over its territory." Id. at 187.
Brilmayer worries that the "rhetoric of consent obscures the importance of territorial claims." Id.
at 189. But see Eisgruber, supra note 473, at 95 (listing conformity to religious law as principled
reason487
entitling group to separate).
Brilmayer, supra note 482, at 199-201.
488
See id. at 200 (noting that new settlers tend to legitimize status quo). But see id. at 201
(stating that use of force-"naked conquest"-does not justify an adverse possession defense).
This means that tribes, who lost much of their land through conquest, may well be able to claim
a moral or legitimate right to separate despite the resulting inequities to non-Indian landholders.
489Economic survival would be a major problem for most tribes that secede, regardless of
their size. For small tribes, holding little (or no) territory, "full nationhood [would be]
implausible;" for large tribes, excluding the successful gaming tribes, without "substantial
severance payments [from the government], secession . . . would mean economic disaster."
Jensen, supra note 49, at 396. Tribes might have to enter into a series of bilateral agreements
with the United States (or other countries), to offset the economic and security advantages they
now enjoy as part of the United States. The success with which tribes did this would depend on
their size and bargaining power-meaning that only the largest, wealthiest tribes could entertain
this possibility.
49°For example, if tribes were able to withdraw, they could enter into their own trade
agreements with foreign nations-perhaps even establishing trade barriers that disfavor the
United States-as well as arrangements with other countries that could create security threats on
our own shores, of no little concern in this post-9/11 world. Some reservations contain critically
important supplies of energy and mineral resources, which could be sold to other countries, and
thus lost to this country, or returned only at an exorbitant cost.
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B. Federalism
The high costs of allowing tribes to secede from the territorial United
States warrants an examination of alternative ways in which they can practice
what Buchanan calls "internal rights of self-determination"-political rights
that are exercised within the state.491 In other words, if space can be found for a
more robust tribal sovereignty within our system of government, tribes need
not withdraw into independent nation-states to gain the benefits of selfdetermination. Perhaps federalism, with its separate but partially overlapping
legal orders, offers the space within which these different normative systems
can coexist and interrelate without the disruption and inequities created by
secession. 492

While it is a basic tenet of our constitutional democracy that citizens
relinquish some of their liberties in exchange for protection against the chaos
that would result if there were no rules, this does not necessarily result in a
single source of legal authority, nor does it force harmonization of different
legal cultures.4 93 Neither the republican nor the democrat seeks "to empower

the dominated with the voice of the dominant, but to open up the dominant
discourse to the transformative voice of the dominated., 494 Democratic as well

491

Buchanan, supra note 483, at 54. Buchanan acknowledges that exploring alternative
forms of self-determination for groups within a state, "rather than assuming that selfdetermination means 'replicating' states" (what he refers to as "multiplication of states"), "may.
. . transform our conception of political authority-and ultimately the state itself-much more
radically than any [solution] that may result from merely fragmenting [or multiplying] states."
Id. at 492
55.
The following discussion of federalism does not envision creating another horizontal
level of government for tribes, which seems both politically unlikely and impractical, given the
multiplicity, diversity, and scattered locations of tribal land. Rather, federalism is examined to
see if the concept might be expanded to accommodate tribes as stronger sovereigns. Federalism,
however, offers a solution only for tribes with land, not for landless tribes whose members have
intermixed with other groups. See generally id. at 55 (discussing federalism as "plausible
alternative" to secession, but suggesting two "theses" that should "temper enthusiasm for
federalism").
493
See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 16, at 33 (noting that Horace Kallen "challenged the idea of
the melting pot, arguing that America . . . was becoming a great republic consisting of a
federation or commonwealth of nationalities" (citing Horace Kallen, Democracy Versus the
Melting Pot, 100 NATION, Feb. 18 & 25, 1915, at 190 & 217)); see also GETCHES ET AL., supra

note 16, at 29 ("Should the role of the law be to homogenize society? Or should it be flexible
enough to preserve difference and diversity?"). But see Newton, supra note 9, at 264 ("[T]he
Constitution[] ... recognizes that self-government is a precious and limited resource that must
not be494
unduly fragmented.").
Allan C. Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs': Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103 HARv. L. REv. 555,
565-66 (1989) (book review); Turpel, supra note 11, at 34 (discussing Michelman and
Sunstein's belief that republican deliberation requires participation by those at margin of
political process). This tolerant view of cultural differences is quite different from the reaction to
tribal departures from the dominant cultural norm, which is characterized by "domination and
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as republican ideals are contested.495 Republicans realize that to maintain
political stability, these different ideals and perspectives must be attended to so
that groups with different legal norms and moral habits are preserved as a
source of contesting legal and social norms.496
Federalism accepts the Sandelian idea of overlapping citizen identities
and the sharing of governmental power among different levels of
government. 497 It is also malleable enough to have accepted, over time, an
control," protection, and gradual civilization-what Turpel describes as assimilating "these
'others'.. . into the yardstick culture." Id. (emphasis added).
495
See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 2, at 320 ("The civic conception of freedom does not
render disagreement unnecessary. It offers a way of conducting political argument, not
transcending it."); Michelman, supra note 339, at 1527-28 (describing process of "dialogicselfmodulation" (emphasis added)); Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1575 (declaring that disagreement
is "indispensable part of the basic republican faith in political dialogue").
496See Singer, supra note 16, at 1840. Legal polycentrists also see the legal order of society
as consisting of many subgroups possessing different legal norms, experiences, and moral
habits-the antonym of an exclusive, systematic, or harmonized hierarchical ordering of
normative propositions that derives solely from the nation state. See Thomas Wilhelmsson,
Legal Integration as Disintegration of National Law, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY:
CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN LAW 127 (Hanne Petersen & Henrik Zahle eds., 1995)
[hereinafter LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY] (arguing that conception that legal order is "harmonious
and systematic whole," in which "[l]egal doctrine transforms the legal order into a [unified] legal
system," is challenged by conflicting models of social ordering); see also Anna Christensen,
Polycentricity and Normative Patterns, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY, supra, at 239-40 (asserting
that it is important "to discern new normative patterns in this heterogeneous assembly of legal
norms, moral habits, arguments, cases and situations floating around in the legal and moral
sphere of society"); Inger-Johanne Sand, From the Distinction Between PublicLaw and Private
Law-to Legal Categories of Social and Institutional Differentiation, in a Pluralistic Legal
Context, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY, supra, at 88 (noting that legal polycentrists view legal
system in country as having "many centres of interpretation, application, and enforcement");
Singer, supra note 16, at 1840 (positing that society is composed of many subgroups possessing
different legal norms, experiences, and moral habits); Survya Prakash Sinha, Legal
Polycentricity, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY, supra, at 43 (calling this view of society "axiological
pluralism"). Tribal courts are legal polycentric institutions because they neither "reproduce [nor]
replicate the dominant canon appearing in state and federal courts," nor "reflect pre-Columbia
tribal standards and norms." POMMERSHEIM, supra note 16, at 99. Rather, they reflect the fact
that "tribal resistance .. .to colonization and assimilation" has created a sui generis legal
reality-an amalgam or reconciliation of different, often conflicting norms resulting in"a unique
jurisprudence [forged] from . . . materials created by the ravages of colonialism and the
persistence of tribal commitment to traditional cultural values." Id.
497See MORTON GRODZNS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 60-88 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966)

(arguing that role of government has long been shared by federal, state and local authorities as
well as by public and private actors); see also id. at 60-153 (using metaphors like "marble cake"
to capture interdependent governance of federal, state, and local institutions); Mark Tushnet,
Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1623, 1639
(1994) (noting that many governmental functions are not themselves performed by governments,
but are contracted out to private entities); Resnik, supra note 403, at 491 n.132 ("[S]ome
segments of the population should be understood as living simultaneously in more than one
community."); id. at 475 n.58 ("'The Constitution did not purport to exhaust imagination and
resourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships."' (quoting New York v. O'Neill, 359
U.S. 1, 6 (1939))).
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array of different economic and political institutions-quasi governing
arrangements-by actors both within and out of government, in response to
both new and old problems. 498 Resnik celebrates these arrangements-calling
them collectively "inventive federalism "499-and sees in them proof of the
permeability of federalism's boundaries. 500 She finds in their emergence an
expansion of governing options beyond the bipolar choice of federal-state to
include an array of nondichotomous, noncentralized alternatives. 50 1 Resnik is
afraid, however, that the ongoing political dialogue between the state and
federal systems 5°2 is too narrowly conceived, and is missing many other
arrangements and alternative loci of government, like tribes.50 3
However, the problem is not lack of recognition of tribes as an alternative
locus of government in a federal system, as Resnik fears. Rather, it is that tribal
sovereignty is insufficiently privileged in the political dialogue with the federal
government and states. It is, in fact, a dialogue that is largely preemptive of
tribal sovereignty, and none of the examples of inventive federalism that
Resnik lists offers a sufficient shield by itself from a preemptive sovereign.

49

8Resnik, supra note 403, at 467, 473-74 (noting that "allocation of authority" between
federal government and states "is one [that is] constantly being reworked," and calling this
approach to federalism "noncategorical"); see also id. at 477-78 (listing as examples
"[inter]state compacts, ad hoc regulatory arrangements..., mechanisms to adopt uniform laws,
[and] the creation of new [multi-state] organizations to affect national political and legal life");
Andr6-Jean Amaud, Legal Pluralism and the Building of Europe, in LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY,
supra note 496, at 162-63 (suggesting devolving certain regulatory powers to local communities
as one way of preserving differences, and noting that local, state, regional, even international
decision makers, "will have to manage through complexity" and what he calls "necessary
recursivities from one level to another" (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 163-64
(suggesting ad hoc use of "legal transplants," in which one legal system borrows from another as
differences between systems).
way of49reconciling
9
Resnik, supra note 403, at 479.
50
° Resnik and Macklem see the boundaries between different levels of government and
cultures as porous, a web of interconnections and potential transformative moments. See
Macklem, supra note 6, at 1344 (commenting that cultural boundaries" are more porous than
cultural relativism presupposes"); Resnik, supra note 403, at 473 ("' State' and 'federal' interests
are not fixed sets, but are interactive and interdependent conceptions that vary over time."); see
also id. at 479, 492 (citing as example of "permeable boundaries of [federalism]" fact that
people "participat[e] as residents and citizens of different types in several states
[simultaneously,] and [need to] be accorded a range of legal statuses to reflect [various] degrees
of relatedness" to those states).
5 1
° Resnik, supra note 403, at 478.
502
1d. at 499-500 (citing Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1045-52, 1064-68 (1977), for
concept of dialogue between federal government and states).
°3d. at 478; see also Garnett, supra note 15, at 433-34 (noting that while "Constitution..
•presumes and protects splintered and diffused, yet balanced, sovereignty and power" as means
to secure civic liberties, tribes are "often ignored in discussions of constitutional federalism"
(citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (Blackmun J., dissenting)). But see
Monette, supra note 77, at 618) (noting "that tribes share the same sovereign plane" with states
in our republican democracy and federal system).
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An even greater problem with relying on a federalism solution to ethnic
(or racial) conflict is that it may be a surrogate for what Buchanan calls socioeconomic apartheid-internalsecession-a way of walling off the worst
problems 0 4 and abandoning a commitment to the redistributive state, leaving
the disenfranchised groups worse off than they were before. Therefore, there is
a danger that any solution that relies on decentralized governance institutions,
such as Resnik proposes, will not only tend to undermine a shared sense of
identity, but will also weaken a sense of obligation to aid the less fortunate
members of society. 5
It is difficult to see how reconceiving tribes as nondichotomous,
noncentralized loci of alternative governments in a federal structure will end
the preemptive dialogue between tribes and the federal government and avoid
Buchanan's internal secession. Therefore, it appears that a federalism solution
will not benefit tribes.
C. Substantive Equality and Heightened Scrutiny (NonstructuralSolutions)
Instead of insisting that tribes have "formal equality" with federal or state
governments, which effectively places them in the position they would have
been in before their sovereignty was forceably reduced, Macklein suggests that
they be accorded "substantive equality "-in other words, that the government
commit to eliminate the economic and social disadvantages under which tribes
have labored.50 6 Under a policy of substantive equality, tribes would qualify for
5
°4See Buchanan, supra note 483, at 61-62. Buchanan states that this process replaces
"commitment to the redistributive state ... [with a] tacit endorsement ... of the state as a mere
association among optimal trading partners," legitimizing "the next . . . step in a multidimensional process... that has already been at work for some time in many countries." Id. In
the United States, this is illustrated by the "migration of whites and prosperous businesses away
from impoverished inner cities, the worsening lack of access to higher education and health care
[for] the poor. . . , and the widening gap between those who possess the skills ... to thrive in a
global economy . . . and those who do not". Id. But see Thomas Christiano, Secession,
Democracy and DistributiveJustice, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 65 (1995) (taking issue with Buchanan's
use of discriminatory redistribution as criterion for invoking presumption against international
recognition of secession or federalist decentralization and instead favoring robust representative
democracy criterion because it is backed by broad international consensus, provides forum for
discussion of alternative conceptions of justice, is authoritative method of collective
decisionmaking,
and is relatively easy to ascertain).
50 5
Such a result would strike at the heart of republican principles, which support
"redistribution... of wealth and entitlements" and point powerfully toward "equalizing political
influence." Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1551; see also id. at 1552 (discussing "high premium"
that republican writers place on "political equality," "understood ... [to be] access [by all
individuals] to the political process" and who look with disfavor on "large disparities in political
influence"); Buchanan, supra note 483, at 62 (suggesting scrutinizing rules that govern both
representation and voting, "to see whether they afford opportunities for the better off to block
initatives for redistribution," or "whether the mechanisms of decentralization provide
unacceptable opportunities for the better off to thwart redistributive policies by impeding their
effective implementation at the local level").
50
6See Macklem, supra note 6, at 1360-64.
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special resources and assistance, and "improving [their] material
circumstances" would receive "preferential weight, . . . as [compared to]
measures which further empower advantaged groups. 5 °7
While improving the tribes' socio-economic conditions may enhance their
ability to resist cultural destruction, Macklem concedes the policy does nothing
to enhance the tribes' legal authority to resist this destruction, or to reverselet alone remedy the effects of-the denial of formal equality. 8 Substantive
equality does not require parity with non-Indians and is too dependent on the
largesse of federal and state governments to provide much solace for tribes. 50 9
Given both governments' history of indifference toward, and denial of, tribal
needs, and the inability of either government to resist the self-regarding
impulse to exercise authority over tribes in derogation of tribal interests, it is
difficult to see how the application of such a policy could help tribes.
Newton suggests that the solution lies in federal courts giving heightened
scrutiny to laws that are insensitive to the values of cultural diversity and
preexisting sovereignty. 1 0 She stitches together constitutional protections
under the Fifth Amendment's takings and due process clauses and the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause to provide
a basis for courts undertaking heightened review of suspect laws.5 1
Newton acknowledges, however, that "constructing a constitutional
framework that will protect tribal rights [faces] formidable barrier[s]. 512 She
identifies as one "barrier" the "legacy of the plenary power era," during which
the courts "justiflied] extraordinary federal power over ... tribal property and
sovereignty[,] and thus creat[ed] powerful precedents" that still impede

57

° 1d. at 1360-61. Although such a preference might be suspect in a non-Indian situation, it
is likely to survive constitutional challenge under the equal protection principles of the Fifth
Amendment when applied to Indians. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974)
(upholding Indian hiring preferences by Bureau of Indian Affairs, and noting that preference at
issue is political in nature, not racial).
50 Macklem, supra note 6, at 1363-64. Macklein goes on to note that "[u]nder principles
of [both] formal and substantive equality . . . , Indian nations have [a] clearer and more
immediate claim[] for a degree of sovereignty over their own affairs than do other racial and
cultural groups in North America." Id. at 1365.
59
5°1 Id. at 1360.
See Newton, supra note 9, at 198 (arguing for greater use of equal protection and due
to silence plenary power era); see also Manuel Del Valle, Puerto Rico Before
arguments
process
the United States Supreme Court, 19 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 13, 15 (1984) (praising United States
Supreme Court's "doctrine[] of judicial autonomy" implemented through rule of local deference,
under which tribunals reviewing decisions coming from Puerto Rico defer to interpretations of
insular courts on matters of "local law and practice"); Johnson, supra note 11, at 695 (suggesting
that United States courts could benefit from study of Canadian jurisprudence, which employs
careful scrutiny); Wells, supra note 11, at 1131-32 (arguing in favor of courts' use of strict
scrutiny
511when reviewing laws that infringe on core tribal rights).
Newton, supra note 9, at 243.
512
1d. at 240.
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"judicial scrutiny of federal actions affecting tribal claims." 51 3 Newton also
admits she is urging tribal advocates to advance arguments whose time "may
not yet be ripe" for acceptance, even though she remains optimistic that
"persistent efforts and arguments [may yet] convince the courts of the [need to
end] total deference to congressional power" over Indians. 1 4 Her optimism,
however, seems unwarranted given the Court's current resistance to a more
robust tribal sovereignty.
Therefore, placing the future of tribes in the hands of either the federal or
state governments or the courts, without more, seems decidedly unwise.
Secession, federalism, substantive equality, and heightened scrutiny all fall
short of protecting the space within which tribes can be different, and of
guaranteeing to them the right to Anaya's constitutive and ongoing selfdetermination. Either the the cost of achieving that goal is too high, as in
secession, or the result inadequate, problematic, or unlikely, as with the others.
D. Nullification
There may, however, be a solution that enables tribes to claim for
themselves a republican right to self-determination short of full nationhood.
That solution is to grant tribes a constrained power to nullify-to exempt
themselves from the application of-laws and policies that infringe on tribal
authority. Nullification would allow tribes to continue to share in some of the
benefits of their continuing association with both federal and state
governments. While stopping short of providing formal equality with states or
the federal government, nullification could offer more than substantive
equality or the benefits of heightened scrutiny.
This section proposes that tribes be authorized to nullify, or opt out of the
application of, federal and state laws and regulations that diminish tribal
sovereignty, specifically those laws or regulations that lessen a tribe's identity
as "Indian. 51 5 This authority could come as an affirmative, legislative grant of
513
d. at 240; see also Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555 ("As long as the special treatment can be
tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such
legislative
514 judgments will not be disturbed.").
Newton, supra note 9, at 288. Johnson recommends a frontal assault on the plenary
power doctrine. Johnson, supra note 11, at 714-15. He suggests that the Court should overturn
Lone Wolf and subject both federal and state legislation that adversely affects Indians to the
equivalent of "equal protection" strict scrutiny. Id. at 714. He looks with favor on the Supreme
Court of Canada's ruling in Sparrow v. The Queen, [1990] S.C.R. 1075, which interpreted a
1982 amendment to the Canadian Constitution codifying aboriginal rights of indigenous peoples.
Sparrow held that the Canadian federal government may not infringe aboriginal or treaty rights
without strong justification, and that "legislation adversely impacting Native Americans" must
be subjected to strict scrutiny to be sure it meets the Crown's duties towards its aboriginal
peoples. Johnson, supra note 11, at 714-15; see also Wells, supra note 11, at 1133 (using
Sparrow's
515 principles to guide his legislative proposal).
This proposal is not as far-fetched as it may seem in the twenty-first century. See, e.g.,
Tarlock, supra note 47, at 556-67 (discussing "toleration" as basis for allowing cultural
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a nullification power, a legislative acknowledgment "reinstating" a power that
tribes have always held, a law helping to guide legislative decisionmaking
affecting tribes, or a shift in the Court's Indian law jurisprudence that would
allow appropriate uses of this power. This proposal is conceptual only, and
leaves to others the hard work of developing its details. At least in theory,
nullification presents a promising way of enhancing tribal sovereignty without
fracturing the union or creating racial homelands.
Allowing tribes to invalidate or exempt themselves from the application
of offending laws would preserve for tribes the space that they need to
maintain a measured separatism within which they can continue to be vibrantly
different.5 16 However, this solution is not without problems. Although tribes
are unlikely to abuse the power, nullification has a dark history in this country
that must be addressed. 517 In addition, in order to implement a tribal
nullification power, Congress must be persuaded to give up some of its longstanding-albeit unfounded-preemptive authority over tribes, and/or the
Court must be convinced of the correctness of supporting some instances of
tribal resistance to assertions of federal and state jurisdiction over tribal
matters. Because nullification places the burden on tribes to exercise this
power, tribal inaction may validate otherwise suspect laws, and smaller tribes
may not have the resources to challenge every ill-conceived law or policy.
Other culturally and normatively distinct communities may seek similar
powers, and granting tribes this power may not only separate them too far from
the values of the communities that surround them, but could also inflict harms
on those communities.
Allowing tribes to fend off the application of offensive laws-like the
Dawes Act or the Major Crimes Act-by invalidating the laws' application to
minorities to either "exempt themselves from [uniform] laws

...

that threaten

. ..

[their] status

quo" or to isolate themselves from "dominant culture, and [exercise a] greater degree of selfwithin the existing political structures").
governance
5 16
See supra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
517
State nullification of unappealing laws is hardly a novel concept in this country. Its
abuse led to a civil war. States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries nullified a variety of
federal laws that they considered unconstitutional, or simply objectionable. See H. Newcomb
Morse, The Foundationsand Meaning of Secession, 15 STETSON L. REv. 419, 421-22, nn.9-10,
11, 14-17, 20-21, 23-24 (1986) (citing these federal laws). Senator John C. Calhoun equated
nullification with "declaring null an unconstitutional act of the General Government, as far as
the State is concerned." WENDELL HOLMES STEPHENSON, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE OLD SOUTH

167 (1959). Although tribes are not the equivalent of states in our federal structure, they
nonetheless share features with states of relevance to this discussion of nullification. For
example, tribes, like states, have the "inherent, autonomous ...

capacity .

.

. [to] enact [and

enforce] laws, regulate [activities on their lands], and raise and spend money without having to
secure authority from any other level of government." See Richard Briffault, "What About the
'Ism '?" Normative and Formal Concerns in ContemporaryFederalism,47 VAND. L. REv. 1303,
1304, 1306 (1994) (describing what he considers to be "essential [state] features"). Their
reservations give tribes "territorial integrity," like states, and tribes--even more than statesfunction as a critical component of their members' "political, economic, and cultural [identity]."
Id. at 1306.
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them because those laws invade rights preserved to Indians by their tribe's
sovereignty, is comparable to what some scholars believe the Ninth
Amendment preserves for individuals under the Constitution-unenumerated
fundamental liberty rights created or preserved in state constitutions. 518 Like
unenumerated fundamental individual rights preserved by the Ninth
Amendment through state constitutions, Indians have fundamental collective
rights that should be preserved to them by their tribe's sovereignty. These
include, for example, the right to engage in tribal ceremonies and customs,
practice a religion, speak a language, manage tribal natural resources, and be
subject to tribal laws. 5 9 Like "citizens in our federal system[, who are] free to
articulate, through their autonomous state governments, the values of human
liberty they particularly cherish" and to have those rights protected from an
invasive central government, 520 so Indians should have protected the rights
they particularly cherish.
However, tribal nullification is at odds with Congress' exercise of plenary
power over tribes. It will only emerge as a solution if Congress can either be
persuaded to partially rescind an authority it usurped centuries ago or
affirmativly authorize tribes to522use this power. 52' Republican thinking might
be helpful in reaching that end.
518

See Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications for
State ConstitutionalLaw, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1229, 1232 (arguing that Ninth Amendment gives
citizens "the power, through their state constitutions, to preserve areas of individual life from
invasion by the federal Congress in the exercise of its delegated powers"). Massey goes on to
argue that "[]ust as the fifth amendment prevents Congress from using its delegated powers" in
violation of some right enumerated in the Bill of Rights, "the ninth amendment prevents
Congress from" doing this in violation of some "unenumerated federal right contained within a
state constitution." Id. at 1232-33. Massey calls this "a form of reverse preemption." Id. at 1233.
519
Interestingly, the Ninth Amendment has been advanced by various members of the
Court as a possible textual home for the right to privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), and to uphold a right of press access to criminal
trials. 520
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 n. 15 (1980).
Massey, supra note 518, at 1265-66.
521Wells suggests Congress might pass a law that "recognizes and protects" core tribal
rights. Wells, supra note 11, at 1132. Such a law might include "internal procedural guidelines
for Congress to follow when considering future legislation that may infringe [those] core rights,"
such as special "rules governing floor consideration of legislation [affecting] core rights, [or]
mandatory committee reports considering the impact[s] of ... legislation" on core rights. Id. at
1133-35. Laws might also include "rules of construction for judicial interpretation of statutes"
that may conflict with core rights, which rules require such legislation to be construed narrowly;
a law waiving the United States' sovereign immunity from money damages; and allowing
compensation for infringement of certain core rights. Id. at 1132-35. But see id. at 1136-37
(admitting that legislative proposal provides limited protection for tribes because future
Congresses can repeal any portion of it at any time, and would be less than likely to identify
circumstances
in which its own breaches of trust might be remedied).
522
Some might argue that Congress should do this because it is the honorable thing for it to
do. See Newton, supra note 9, at 262-63 (discussing "'morality of promise-keeping' and
importance of keeping the nation's word in the international sphere (quoting HARRY H.
WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 189 (1968)); Wells, supra note 11, at 1132
("[T]he nation's honor is at stake when the government deals with Native Americans.").

562
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Michelman sees in "legislative politics[, as well as in] constitutional
adjudication[, a] form[] of self-revisionary normative dialogue through which
personal moral freedom is . . . achieved., 523 Ackerman calls this a
"'transformative' moment of civically aroused popular politics." 524 The aim of
republican deliberation "is not just to aggregate private preferences, or to
achieve an equilibrium among contending social forces," rather it is the
attainment of a normative public good. 5 According to Sunstein, the
"republican belief in deliberation counsels political actors to achieve a measure
of critical distance from prevailing desires and practices, subjecting [them] to
scrutiny and review., 526 "[B]ecause a true[, open-ended dialogue, in which
many points of view are considered,] presumes that arguments will be listened
to and answered, there is less likely to be a bias [in favor of] the status quo. 52 7
Republican dialogue, therefore, should "lead to, or be associated with, greater
equality, participation, innovation, and universality. 528 For these reasons,
republicans, as noted previously, are not hostile to the redistribution of wealth
and entitlements and are skeptical of classifications based on race, ethnicity,
gender or poverty because they are the product of social power. 29
If Congress' deliberations are viewed through a republican lens, then the
capacity exists for Congress to have a transformative moment on the topic of
tribal sovereignty. This would occur when it acts as an other-regarding-not
self-regarding-institution, and allows alternative perspectives to revise its
523

Michelman, supra note 339, at 1494.
d. at 1523 (referring to Bruce Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1164 (1988)). While Michelman goes on to call Ackerman's constitutional theory the
"most deeply popularist and genuinely republican," he criticizes it "as authoritarian
constitutional
jurisprudence." Id. at 1520.
52 5
Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1548.
526
d. at 1548-49; see also id. at 1549 ("Existing desires should be revisable in light of
collective discussion and debate, bringing to bear alternative perspectives and additional
information.").
527
Fitts, supra note 378, at 1655.
528
Id. "[R]epublicans [understand] that deliberative processes [can be] undermined by
intimidation, strategic and manipulative behavior, collective action problems, adaptive
preferences, . . . [and] disparities in political influence," but these are overcome by "the
republican beliefs in equality and universalism" as well as civic virtue-that "citizens and
representatives," in "their capacity as political actors, . . . [are to ask] what will best serve the
community in general." Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1550-51 (commenting that for "modem
republicans[,] ...civic virtue [is invoked] primarily in order to promote deliberation in the
service of social justice, not to elevate the character of the citizenry" as it is in traditional
republican
529 thought).
See Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1551, 1581 (citing "republican emphasis on the social
construction of property rights" as reason "republicans are hardly hostile to redistribution or to
collective efforts to reassess the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements."). While
"[r]epublican thought has traditionally been allied with exclusionary practices[,] ...the premises
of republican thought [the beliefs in political equality and deliberation-may actually] furnish an
aspiration that turns out to provide the basis for criticism of [exclusionary] republican
traditions". Id.
524
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prior policies. 530 Michelman calls this "jurisgenerative" politics-"the
mobilization, formation, and expression of a public-regarding, popular
determination to legislate a 'decisive break with the country's constitutional
past. 119531
Assuming Congress can be persuaded to have a jurisgenerative moment
and limit its plenary power over tribes, granting one government the power to
nullify laws enacted by another is potentially very destabilizing, and could
cause unwanted spillover effects, such as environmental harms, on innocent
parties living in adjacent states. Further, if such a power is improvidently
granted to tribes, then other culturally distinct groups, like the Amish,
Mormons, or Hasidic Jews, might seek comparable authority.532 Therefore, this
power should be narrowly drawn533to avoid these problems that undermine basic
aspects of our constitutionalism.
Rosen writes about the need to encourage "[g]eographic constitutional
nonuniformity ... to enable idiosyncratic but valuable discrete communities
[(including tribes)] to endure" and engage in the "norm-generation" essential
for their survival.534 He proposes relieving those communities of the effect of
otherwise applicable constitutional norms, and suggests the application of two
criteria for identifying these communities.53 5 First, the community in question
must be both "valuable" to the society as a whole and have "distinct[] needs
whose well-being [is] threatened [by the application of] ordinary constitutional
doctrines., 536 Second, there must be "relatively bright-line boundaries that
demarcate the operation of ordinary doctrines from the nonuniform," allowing
for easy application of the concept.5 37
Admittedly, Rosen's analysis is not completely apposite to the tribes'
situation, because tribes generally need protection from the Court's Indian law
jurisprudence and federal Indian policies, not from constitutional doctrine.
Nonetheless, Rosen's criteria are useful for distinguishing tribes from other
culturally distinct communities that might otherwise be entitled to nullify
530

See Fitts, supra note 378, at 1651 (describing modem civic republicans as articulating
"vision of public decisionmaking ...[,] in which decisions are made in the legislative process
through [neutral decisionmaking,] principled deliberation and reasoned dialogue"). But see
Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1579 (suggesting heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative
deliberations may be necessary to ensure that legislators do not reflexively follow their
constituents'
interests).
531
Michelman, supra note 339, at 1520 (quoting Ackerman, supra note 524, at 1172.)
532
See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 47, at 550-52 (finding legitimacy in cultural claims of
some at
risk Western communities).
533
Rosen, supra note 478, at 1192-93.
534
Rosen identifies tribes as qualifying idiosyncratic communities. Id. at 1193.
5 35

536See id. at 1169.

d. Rosen notes that the case law applying geographic constitutional nonconformity
typically suggests the presence of two preconditions: (1) "nonuniformity .. .to permit the
creation or preservation of the norms that constitute the particular community"; and (2) strong
societal
interest "in the particular community's existence." Id. at 1149.
537
d. at 1194.
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threatening laws. With regard to the first criterion, this Article has argued that
the ability of tribes to continue as a source of unique cultural norms is severely
threatened by the current Court, and that the survival of tribes as discrete,
healthy centers of norm generation and dispersion has value for society as a
whole. Although other culturally distinct groups might also qualify under this
first prong, only tribes with reservations can qualify under the second, because
they occupy land with distinct boundaries separating them from the general
society. Therefore, not only are reservation tribes arguably entitled to the relief
that Rosen suggests, but for the more limited purposes of this Article, his
second criterion substantially constrains the potential spillover effect538to nonIndian groups of granting tribes the power to nullify threatening laws.
Further limitation of this authority may also be necessary. Tribes should
not be able to invalidate any law they do not like, only those that threaten their
continued existence as discrete centers of norm development and dispersionRosen's first prong. Like Rosen found, there needs to be a way to distinguish,
in this case, not between potentially qualifying communities, but between
laws
5 39
that threaten the continued existence of tribes and those that do not.
The standard used in Montana v. United States540 to determine when it
should accede to an exercise of tribal sovereignty-a matter that would have a
direct, negative effect on a tribe's political integrity, economic security or its
health and welfare5 41-is too narrow for our purposes here because it may not
reach laws that interfere with tribal cultural life and identity. Canadian courts,
however, apply a broader standard when evaluating whether a federal or
provincial law runs afoul of constitutional protections for native peoples. They
ask whether the suspect law touches matters at the core of the individual or
collective identities of Aboriginal peoples as tribal Indians-"their
'Indianness"'54 --or "affect[s] the essential characteristics of a people as
Indian people,, 543 not just the political and economic survival of tribes. If the
538

See Gould, supra note 7, at 897 ("What distinguishes tribal Indians from other groups is
the claim of sovereignty-the right not simply to be self-governing, but to exercise dominion
over land."); McCoy, supra note 112, at 392 ("An important distinction between tribes and
,amorphous' groups is that tribes have historically been associated with designated land in the
form of
539reservations.").
Massey also writes about the need to "identify[] fundamental rights in a principled
fashion" and suggests that the way to go about doing this is to test the right against "history and
tradition." Massey, supra note 518, at 1258-59.
540450 U.S. 544 (1981).
541
1d. at 566.
542
johnson, supra note 11, at 699 (quoting Douglas Sanders, Hunting Rights-Provincial
Laws-Application
or Indian Reserves, 38 SASK. L. REv. 234, 242 (1974)).
543
Id. (quoting JACK WOODWARD, NATIVE LAW 121 (1989); see also Bruce Ryder, The
Demise and Rise of the ClassicalParadigm in CanadianFederalism: Promoting Autonomy for
the Provinces and First Nations, 36 McGILL L.J. 308, 368-69 (1991) (citing language from
Canadian Supreme Court decisions, which have held invalid otherwise valid provincial laws "if
their application would 'impair the status or capacity' of Indians, 'regulate Indians qua Indians,'
or touch on matters that are 'inherently Indian' or closely related to the 'Indian way of life'
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Wells, supra note 11, at 1134 n. 115 (drawing upon
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answer is "yes," then the law is invalidated. Because the Canadian standard
protects what it is to be Indian-what makes tribes "discrete" nomic
communities-it does a better job of protecting tribes from inroads into their
sovereignty than Montana does. 54
However, neither the Montana nor Canadian standard addresses the
situation in which an exercise of this power interferes with some other
enumerated fundamental liberty right or causes adverse unwanted effects on an
adjacent jurisdiction. Massey recognizes that granting individuals the right to
prevent the application of federal law to some practice protected by their state
constitutions because it is an unenumerated "liberty-bearing right[], 545 may be
at odds with enumerated federal constitutional rights or other federal
mandates.54 6 He concedes, in those situations, that the Constitution (or other
federal mandate) would preempt the unenumerated right, no matter how
fundamental; but, only after a searching review by a court to be sure that the
right is "implicit in ordered liberty" (in other words, one that is "essential to a
free people"), and that the practice is part of "the most specific tradition
available. 547
A similar test could be applied to any exercise by a tribe of the
nullification power: does it meet some version of a Montana-Sparrowstandard
set out above, and is it one founded on the tribe's traditional practices? Thus,
for example, in the case of a tribe's use of a halucigen like peyote as part of its
religious practices, a court might find that the practice is based both upon a
fundamental right-the right to practice one's religion-and one that has a
long tradition within the tribe.548
Nor would Massey allow the Ninth Amendment to be used to preserve
unenumerated rights, no matter how fundamental, if they diminish the
fundamental rights of others or allow a state to "game the system" by capturing
549
for its citizen certain benefits, the costs of which are paid by out-of-staters.
He would first ask if the right being infringed upon was fundamental, and if it
was, whether the infringement was substantial. 550 This test might also be useful
Sparrow v. The Queen, [1990] S.C.R. 1075, 1109-10, and suggesting that Congress not enact
laws that interfere with the core rights of Indians-those rights "essential to [a tribe's] long term
cultural and economic survival"--absent some compelling need).
544See Newton, supra note 9, at 286-87 (advocating educating Court about significance of
tribe and tribal membership to Indian's concept of dignity and personhood, and importance of
land and sovereignty to identity of Indians as people, to enable Court to do better job of
accommodating
tribal interests with those of larger political community).
545
Massey, supra note 518, at 1257 (internal quotation marks omitted).
546
54 7Id.at 1254-56.
1d. at 1259-60 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
54
8Application of Massey's test might have resulted in a different outcome in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
(sustaining Oregon's denial of unemployment compensation for two employees who were
dismissed
for ingesting peyote for ceremonial purposes).
549
See Massey, supra note 518, at 1257.
"O°d. at 1262-63.
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in situations arising on a reservation. For example, barring a county sheriff
from searching tribal governmental offices .in order to enforce possible acts of
welfare fraud against individual members, while infringing upon the county's
fundamental interest in preserving law and order, is not a substantial
infringement of that right when there are other ways of achieving that
objective, such as working cooperatively with the tribe to enforce against the
individuals. 5 '
There is also the potential problem of undesired spillover impacts on
adjacent communities when a tribe resists the application of an outside norm.
In some of these situations, for example restricting its use of peyote, the effects
would be limited to the reservation. But, in others, such as resisting the
application of stringent pollution controls to some tribal activity or allowing
certain activities-like clear-cutting reservation trees, diverting a river,
allowing the disposal of hazardous or radioactive wastes on the reservation, or
pumping an underground aquifer-the effect might not be contained. In those
situations, however, the answer is not to limit the tribe's power to exempt itself
from the application of a constraining federal or state law,552 but to expect that
the tribe will learn to adjust its activities so that they are not harmful to
residents of neighboring states,
just as the states learned that they engaged in
553
such activities at their peril.
551

See Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291 F.3d 549, 554 (9th. Cir. 2002) (holding
that exercise of search warrant against Tribe on tribal property interfered with right of
reservation Indians to make and be goverened by their own laws), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 712 (2003) (remanding on issue of
what federal common law prescription, if any, enables tribe to maintain action for declaratory
and injunctive
relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal process).
552
Massey would say that in such circumstances, the state-preserved individual right would
not rise
to the level of Ninth Amendment protection. See Massey, supra note 518, at 1256.
553
See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) ("When the states by
their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not
thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of
making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and
the alternative to force is a suit in this court."). More specifically, if the polluting tribe is
exercising delegated authority under one of the federal pollution control statutes, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, which retains oversight over the administration of those
programs, could be expected to intercede to correct any problems that might arise under its
delegated authority. Alternatively, the tribe could be sued in federal court under the citizen suit
provisions in those laws. See, e.g., Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094,
1100-01 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that Resource Conservation and Recovery Act abrogates tribal
sovereign immunity from liability for cleaning up dump sites located on reservation lands, and
that tribe, along with Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service, was responsible for
cleanup). Tribal sovereign immunity will shield the tribe from claims under laws without citizen
suit provisions or from common law nuisance claims. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978). That immunity extends to tribal agencies. See, e.g., Weeks Constr.,
Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that "tribal housing
authority possesses attributes of tribal sovereignty"). However, a tribe is not immune from suit
by the United States. United States v. Yakima Tribal Ct., 806 F.2d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 1986). Nor
does the tribe's immunity protect tribal officers. Santa ClaraPueblo, 436 U.S. at 59. Prospective
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Concededly, it will be difficult to persuade Congress to have a
jurisgenerative moment and relinquish the plenary power over tribes that it has
aggregated to itself for centuries. It could do this by affirmatively granting
legislative power to nullify certain types of laws, enacting a law that would
guide legislative decisionmaking affecting tribes (such as Wells suggests)

554

, or

legislatively acknowledging that Congress is "reinstating" a power tribes have
always had.
Alternatively, the Court could have its own jurisgenerative moment and
recognize the value of having discrete nomic communities-like Indian
tribes-in our pluralistic, heterogenous country. One way that the Court could
do this is to exercise restraint when it reviews tribal resistence to culturally
destructive laws or policies. This may not be as far-fetched as it sounds, as the
Court has exercised restraint in at least one similar situation, for reasons that
seem equally compelling for tribes. In Fornarisv. Ridge Tool Co.,555 the Court
explained why it exercises restraint when reviewing Puerto Rican laws:
The relations of the federal courts to Puerto Rico have often raised
delicate problems. It is a Spanish-speaking Commonwealth with a set
of laws still impregnated with the Spanish tradition. Federal courts,
reversing Puerto Rican courts, were inclined to construe Puerto Rican
laws in the Anglo-Saxon tradition which often left little room for the
overtones of Spanish culture. Out of that experience grew a
pronouncement by this Court that a Puerto Rican court should not be
overruled on its construction
of local law unless it could said to be
556
"inescapably wrong."
In Fornaristhe Court said that courts should not construe laws from a different
culture in a way that ignores the uniqueness of that culture; here, the Court is
being asked to allow a unique culture to ignore laws that leave little room for it
to survive. The basic principle remains the same-the Court needs to exercise
judicial restraint when faced with legal actions arising from cultural
differences.
The Court should also approach any law that a tribe nullifies with the
presumption that it is suspect and should not survive review absent a
compelling countervailing need-much like Randy Barnett suggests with

litigants who have been injured by some activity occurring on tribal lands can avail themselves
of the Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), exemption from state sovereign immunity.
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 924 F.2d 899,
901-02 (9th Cir. 1991), overruledon other grounds by Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams,
219 F.3d
554 944 (9th Cir. 2000).
Wells, supra note 11 at 1132-33.
15'400 U.S. 41 (1970).
5561d. at 42-43 (citing Bonet v. Texas Co., 308 U.S. 463, 471 (1940)).
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respect to protecting fundamental rights under the Ninth Amendment.5 57
Barnett argues that the Ninth Amendment creates a "general constitutional
presumption in favor of individual liberty" and would place the burden on the
government to justify the intrusion.5 58 Borrowing from Fornaris,the defender
of a suspect law might have to show that it would be inescapably wrong to
allow nullification because the national or state law advances an important
constitutional norm, which tribal nullification would threaten,5 59 or that the
tribe's actions would cause severe, unremediable effects on adjacent
jurisdictions 56°--the two situations that Massey identified as trumping 56
an1
unenumerated state constitutional right protected by the Ninth Amendment.
The proposal also borrows from Sparrow the idea that the federal government
assumes the burden of justifying any action that would negatively affect
aboriginal rights protected by section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution Act.562
557

See Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1

(1988).

558Barnett, supra note 557 at 35; see also Del Valle, supra note 510, at 48 (stating that

Court in Fornaris placed affirmative burden on party seeking to overturn Puerto Rican court
decision to show court's construction of local law was "inescapably wrong").
559Johnson proposes a slightly different standard when he suggests that state laws apply on
a reservation "[w]here an Indian and non-Indian are involved . . . even though Congress has
never so legislated," if the tribal interest is "modest" and the state interest "great." Johnson,
supra note 11, at 697. However, Briffault suggests that federal courts take a structural approach
to federalism questions, under which courts evaluate whether "national action" "threatens the
formal protections and powers of the states" or in some way diminishes their "capacity to be
independent lawmakers and alternative power centers within the federal framework, rather than"
an approach that calls for the courts to weigh implications of national actions for values said to
be advanced by that structure, because the latter "require[s courts to] assess[] ... empirical data"
and engage
in intensely political value judgments. Briffault, supra note 517, at 1322, 1350-53.
56
°See Sparrow v. The Queen, [1990] S.C.R. 1075, 1099, 1111 (holding that legislation
affecting exercise of aboriginal rights is valid only if court determines it meets test for
"justifying" interference with right "recognized and affirmed" under 1982 Constitution Act,
placing burden of justifying legislation that has any negative effect on any aboriginal right
protected under Act on law's proponent, and making any legislation that interferes with
aboriginal right prima facie infringement of Act). Under Sparrow, to find a prima facie case, a
court must determine whether (1) the "limitation is unreasonable," (2) the "regulation impose[s]
undue hardship," and (3) the "regulation denies holders [of the right] their preferred means of
exercising [it]." Johnson, supra note 11, at 691. If there is a valid legislative objective behind the
interference, such as conserving and managing a natural resource, the objective will probably be
considered valid. Id. If there is a valid legislative objective, the court then turns to an
examination of "whether 'the honour of the Crown' has been upheld" (in other words, whether
the Crown has upheld its trust duty toward aboriginal peoples). Id. A Canadian court must also
look at whether there has been the least infringement possible, whether fair compensation is
available if an expropriation is involved, and whether the aboriginal group has been consulted
with respect to the conservation measures. Id. at 691-92. Johnson goes on to note the similarities
between the so-called Sparrow rule and equal protection jurisprudence in this country, especially
strict scrutiny.
Id. at 693-95.
56 1
See supra notes 518-22 and accompanying text.
562
Constitutional Act of 1982, pt. II, § 35(1) ("The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of
the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."), quoted in Wells, supra
note 11. at 1128.
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[F]ederal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best
way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of
any government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal
rights. Such scrutiny is in keeping with.., the concept of holding the
Crown to a high standard of honourable dealing. 63
Rather than relying on Congress to take affirmative action to return to
tribes a portion of the authority usurped from them, the Court could take these
steps on its own by adopting a less deferential attitude toward congressional
power over tribes and a more protective attitude toward tribal sovereignty, as
Newton suggests. 564 Indeed, courts are uniquely suited to perform this function
because, according to Michelman, they have the particular capacity "to
conduct a sympathetic inquiry into how . . . the readings of history," upon
which the "voices from the margin" "base their complaint[s,] can count as
interpretation of that history-interpretations which, however re-collective or
even transformative, remain true to that history's informing commitment to the
pursuit of political freedom through j urisgenerative politics. 565
However, given the Court's steadfast reluctance to engage in
jurisgenerative politics on matters of tribal sovereignty, culture, or property,
and its unwillingness to preserve tribes as discrete centers of norm creation and
dispersion in this country, "Congress may now be the preferred forum," despite
the potential obstacles to a legislative approach.566 The growing political power
of tribes may make congressional action more likely today than it might have
been even a decade ago. However, there is risk that pursuing nullification (or
any other enhancement of tribal sovereignty) through self-interested political
action, in which "preferences are formed against the [shifting] backdrop of
disparities in power" which may (or may not) favor the tribes at any given
moment, would contradict the republican's search for the common good or
civic virtue.567 Tribal invocation of transcendent republican principles provides
a foundation for political (or judicial) action that avoids this risk and, thus,
better withstands the test of time.
VII. CONCLUSION
It may seem that reason and persuasion are too slow. Let us grant,
said Jefferson, that they require patience; but "the ground of liberty is
to be gained by inches ... we must be contented to secure what we
can get, from time to time, and eternally press forward for what is yet
563
Sparrow, [1990]
56

S.C.R. at 1109.

4See Newton, supra note 9, at 242-43 (discussing Newton's heightened scrutiny).
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Michelman, supra note 339, at 1537.
See Johnson, supra note 11, at 718.
567Sunstein, supra note 339, at 1544. See generally id. at 1542-47 (criticizing pluralism).
566
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to get. 56It8 takes time to persuade men to do even what is for their own
good.

It is ironic that Jefferson's observation of Indians "led [him] to [his]
theories of inherent rights in all men," when, two centuries later, Indians have
yet to share in that vision. 5 69 This Article has recounted how a nation built on
recognizing tribal dominion over land so that it could be transferred by treaty
or sale, first to the Crown and then to the federal government, has, over time,
conveniently put this construct aside to advance a different political and
economic agenda. Republican notions of self-determination and selfgovernment that animated the founding of this country were briefly applied to
tribes so long as they served the mercantile interests of colonizing Europeans.
Later, in the face of westward pushing settlers' insatiable appetite for land,
republican ideals gave way to broken promises and force. Unchecked, illconceived, and destructive federal policies tore at the fabric of Indian society.
At the same time, the Court dismantled notions of independent tribal
sovereignty. Yet, through it all, Indian tribes persevered. Today, tribes are fully
capable of functioning as centers of dispersed sovereign authority, provided a
coherent and persuasive theory to support that result can be developed, and an
institutional place found for tribes within our federal structure.
This Article finds that theory in republicanism. Republican principles
show why tribes are deserving of a more robust sovereignty than they have at
present. This Article shows how those principles might be applied to return
political and cultural autonomy to tribes. Alternatively, if this does not happen,
tribes may disappear as discrete centers of norm development and dispersion
because of the failure of traditional doctrines to protect them from incessant
assimilative pressure. Like Michelman and Sunstein, this Article has engaged
in a little "normative tinkering" 570 with republican principles to show that
while enhancing tribal sovereignty risks the perils of factionalism and selfinterested political decision making, it also makes tribes stronger participants
in the political and economic life of this country. Doing this, in turn,
strengthens the overall deliberative political process. Although resuscitating
tribal sovereignty invites conflict with federal and state interests and with some
568

ADRIENNE KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 187-88 (1957).
569
Falkowski, supra note 483, at 213 n.28 (citing ABRAHAM S. EISENSTADT, AMERICAN

17-19 (1969)).
Michelman uses the phrase "normative tinkering" to describe "the ongoing revision of
the normative histories that make political communities sources of contestable value[s] and selfdirection for their members," and the need to recognize and reconceive "those histories" so that
the political community can be extended to persons who do not have a stake "in 'our' past
because they had no access to it." Michelman, supra note 339, at 1495; see also Rodgers, supra
note 13, at 38 (attributing republicanism's "paradigmatic success," in light of its "ontological
fragility," to responsiveness of interpretative disciplines, such as history and law, "not to
evidence[,] ...but to their interpretative problematics," and saying that "gift of republicanism,
as an explanatory concept, lay in its ability to do so much disparate interpretative work").
HISTORY:
RECENT INTERPRETATIONS
570
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basic norms, like individual rights, modem republican thinking folds these
different perspectives into a deliberative process. It believes the resulting
conversation will not only transform the participants into other-regarding,
civically-engaged citizens, but will also result in a better regulative idea for us
all.
This Article has suggested a somewhat surprising institutional innovation
to help tribes move from the margins of that conversation closer to its center
and to give meaningful, yet manageable content to Wilkinson's measured
separatism. This solution calls for the Court to allow tribes to exercise a
limited authority to nullify laws and policies that would otherwise diminish
their sovereignty. However, this requires the invocation of republican
principles once again. Congress must be other-regarding in its willingness
either to concede tribes have had this power all along or to refrain from
exercising its plenary power to block its use, and the Court must be willing to
engage in Michelman's jurisgenerative thinking when asked to review the
power's use. We can help these two institutions reach that end, if we can be
other-regarding, civically engaged citizens for a long enough period of time to
recognize that our country's treatment of Indian tribes has been (and continues
to be) an anomaly in our republic. If we can do this, then the sorry state of
tribal sovereignty today should tell us that as a country, we are ready for a
"refounding"-what Michelman refers to as a "'decisive break with [our]
which, speaking as a "'mobilized
constitutional-legal past"' 5 7 1-in
"authorize
a sharp [legislative and] judicial
constitutional majority,"' we
departure from prior ... understanding[s]" about our history.572

In this way, the republican concept of dispersed sovereignty could provide
a theoretical solution for the problem of tribal sovereignty without
undermining our national identity or destabilizing our capacity to govern.
Similarly, nullification could provide the institutional means to enable tribes to
function as meaningful sovereigns within our federal system.

57 t
Michelman,
572

supra note 336, at 1520 (quoting Ackerman, supra note 524, at 1172).
d. (quoting Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013,1053, 1070-71 (1984)).

